it has the greatest tendency to the true improvement and cultivating of it. It makes men truly wise, and gives them a right judgment in things of the greatest importance. Inordinate affections are the greatest enemies to reason, if rightly understood. They bribe it into their corrupt interests, and bias it against evidence. A main thing therefore in true freedom of thinking and reasoning, is freedom from that bias of wrong affections. If this cannot be had without the prevalence of the contrary good affections, the source of true freedom of thought is divine love. It is a general property of the strong affections, that they have a natural influence on the memory, on fixing the thoughts, and on rendering men's invention more fruitful. But different affections make men's inventions fruitful in a very different manner, according to the good or bad nature and tendency of these affections themselves. The mind is naturally fruitful in those thoughts which are most suitable and most favourable to those affections which are most predominant. These things show that the love of God, and that love of truth which is implied in it, have a manifold advantageous influence on men's reasoning faculties. Divine love restrains those perverse affections which are the causes of wrong judgment and of delusion every day: it gives the mind a freedom from the most hurtful biasses; it fixes the attention; it puts the mind in the best situation for the most useful inquiries; it makes the mind fruitful in the thoughts that are most subservient to them; it reconciles it to what labour and application may attend them.

It is proper to observe, that there are two sorts

of reasoning on things that relate to practice, between which there is a considerable difference. The one is, that reasoning which is designed for finding out the truth, in cases where men as yet want evidence and must suspend their judgment: the other is, that reasoning which is designed to strengthen good affections and purposes, by reflection on proper motives of the truth, of which the mind has already a well-founded persuasion. As to the first sort of reasoning, even where divine love takes place, and is founded on a just assent to the most essential truths, men may have occasion for such inquiries, and find them attended with difficulty. The fre quent diversity of sentiments among the best men, in a special manner about the application of uncontested general rules to particular cases, puts this out of question. In such cases it is necessary to avoid a blind affection to one side of a question, before a man's judgment is sufficiently informed and determined on good grounds. This is that cool and judicious consideration which is so requisite in impartial inquiry. It must exclude the influence of corrupt affections, because they tend to bias the mind against evidence; but, for the same reason, it must not exclude the influence of the love of God, than which, nothing is more truly subservient to the search of truth.

But, notwithstanding the usefulness of such inquiries, it would be manifestly unreasonable to place the whole of religion in them. It would be absurd to pretend, that all devout exercises should be performed with such a suspense of judgment as these inquiries suppose. This would infer that there can

be no exercise of divine love, founded on the just and firm belief of divine truths; and that a state of sincere holiness must be a state of perpetual scepti cism. It is evident that this would cast a very injurious reflection on the means God has given us of knowing his will. It would infer that they are so obscure and defective, that men's belief can never be fully determined on good grounds; and that the right use of reason in religion, is to be "ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth."

From what is said, it is evident that the lively exercise of divine love and joy, has the greatest connection with the most desirable sedateness and composure of mind. When men oppose sedateness of mind and lively affections to one another, they do not consider duly the great disparity between those irregular affections, which should never be introduced into devotion; and those affections which belong to divine love, which are essential to the right performance of devotion. What has been said above, concerning the opposite tendency of these two sorts of affections, shows that the one is as useful in order to due composure and serenity of mind, as the other is hurtful to it. Irregular affections tend to darken the mind, hinder due attention, and distract the thoughts. The very reverse of this is the natural result of divine love, and of all those concomitants of it which the apostle calls the fruits of the Spirit, -joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness. Whoever believes the scripture account of future blessedness, must own, that it is a state of the most vigorous and most perfect love and joy in the most

perfect serenity and tranquillity. To have the love of God shed abroad in our hearts, and to be filled with joy and peace in believing, is the nearest resemblance of that blessedness. That faith which works by love, is a faith by which the soul and conscience enter into rest, Heb. iv. While that faith and love are wanting, and while men's chief affections are such as cannot be satisfied, and must be controlled, there can be no durable and solid rest or composure of mind.

SECTION VI.

Of various general Properties common to the best Devout Affections with the other Affections of Human Nature.

AFTER considering the distinguishing excellencies of the affections included in divine love, it is useful to consider some properties which are common to them with other devout affections, or all the other affections of human nature in general. A right view of this matter, is of use both for vindicating the importance of these holy affections, and for further illustration of their peculiar excellencies. Some general resemblances between them and other affections of a very different kind, are sometimes made use of as arguments against two very important points. These things are improved partly against the usefulness of all devout affections considered in themselves in general, partly against ascribing any of them to

divine grace. Whatever may be said of such objections otherwise, their success, on the minds of many, makes them considerable. If there are people who are strongly prejudiced against devout affections, it is not to be wondered at that this should bias their minds in favour of any appearance of arguments against them.

The general resemblances between the affections included in divine love and other devout affections, are either such as relate to the means of exciting them, or the effects which proceed from them. As

to the first, it is sometimes objected, that the same natural causes, which are means of exciting human affections in general, have a natural influence in exciting devout affections, and that both in good and bad men, as well as any other affections whatever. As to these natural causes or means of exciting the affections, some view was taken of them above. The primary means are the knowledge and due consideration of proper motives. This alone seems essential and necessary for exciting the affections in a reasonable manner. But there are other secondary means, which, though not so absolutely necessary as attention to motives, are natural helps subservient to it. Such as the advantageous proposal of them, pathetic discourse, the force of example, and the like.

Some people seem to imagine, that because devout affections are excited, both in good and bad men, by such natural causes; therefore none of them ought to be ascribed to divine supernatural operation. And again, because there is so great a resemblance between all devout affections, as to the manner of exciting them, they imagine there can