intelligent, voluntary, and accountable creatures encircled by temptations; that this law extends to every act of the mind; that obedience to it is enforced by an appeal to the strongest instincts of our nature, our sense of misery, and our desire of happiness; and, that its authority is coeval with our existence, incapable of being either lessened or evaded.

Conformity to this law is morality; the spirit of obedience to its requirements is virtue.

The fundamental requirement of the law of God is the exercise of right dispositions towards himself. All our duties arise from the relations we sustain: our relation to God is the earliest, the closest, the most durable, the most essential; regard to him, therefore, as our God, is our first and highest duty.

If it were possible to fulfil every other claim, to discharge the duties of every other relation, and yet the claims of God were not fulfilled, the duties arising from our relation to him not discharged,— what would be the description of our virtue? It would be, at best, imperfect; and the failure would exist in that particular class of obligations, which is of all others the most obvious, sacred, and endearing.

There are systems of morality in which the high claims of God upon our hearts, if not omitted, are but slightly and formally noticed; while domestic ties, and social engagements, and the benevolence of philanthropy, and the fidelity of friendship, and the order of political subordination, are sustained by all the power of argument, adorned with every charm of eloquence.

These systems are the productions of men, alive to the apparent interests of humanity, but "alienated from God through the blindness that is in them." In the enactments of God himself, who knows his own claims upon his creatures, and who "will not give his glory to another," the first commandment

is, "Thou shalt have no other gods but ME." But, obedience to this commandment is not merely an integral part of true morality: it is essential to all the rest. A due regard to God is the principle which gives vitality to the moral character,-to what an apostle has called emphatically "the spirit of the mind."

If there be any virtue, it must be uniform, and therefore regulated by some standard; it must be capable of being brought to some test; it must be influenced by some grand and simple motive. The standard of virtue must be the character of the best Being in the universe; the test by which our pretensions to virtue are to be tried, the known will of this Being; the motive which impels us, a love of his character, producing regard to his commands. It is not enough, then, to say, that where God is not cordially and practically acknowledged, our virtue is deficient: the plain truth is, in that case we have no virtue.

It may be objected, and it is desirable, on every account, to allude, in this place, to the opinion,-that there is a considerable portion of morality, there are pleasing instances of virtue in society, where there is no avowed, nor, in some cases, any intended regard to God.

It must, in candour, be conceded, that very injudicious assertions have been hazarded on this subject. The badness of human nature has been declaimed against in terms so indiscriminate, and in a spirit so censorious, as to resemble the phantoms of misanthropy, or the coarse caricatures of invective, rather than the sober delineations of truth. It cannot for a moment be doubted, that, in external actions, there is an almost immeasurable difference between one class of men and another. From this we ought, in justice, to infer a corresponding difference in the internal and governing disposition. Let it be remembered, notwithstanding, that all these differences may exist, for shades of difference analagous to them do

confessedly exist,-where there is not a particle of virtue. There are current in society very superficial and fluctuating ideas of the nature and the tests of virtue. In general, men form a very partial estimate, both of single actions, and of prevailing character. In most cases, little attention is paid to the force of opinion and the operation of circumstances; and, in all cases, the views which we are apt to form on these subjects, are influenced by pride,—a feeling which prompts us to share in the general stock of virtue attributed to the species.

In the contrast of one man with another, we have admitted, there may be much comparative virtue; as in a hospital, where all are known to be diseased, some, contrasted with others, may be said to be in comparative health. Let us try to analyze the best extreme in the contrast,-the character which passes currently for virtuous.

The conduct of men is usually affected more by habit, than by any other cause; and such is the power of this principle, that actions, to which we were impelled by some assignable reason, are continued, after the reason has ceased to operate, or even when opposite reasons are struggling for the ascendency, merely, because we are accustomed to the performance. Habits are generated by education. Education, in its best state, is conducted by persons who are sensible that, for various reasons, it is of importance that the external actions should be virtuous. The general advantageousness of this is early impressed upon the mind; the actions, which are regarded as virtuous, are studiously exemplified; and inducements, level to the capacity, and suited to the taste of the learner, are held forth, to allure his imitation of the models set before him. As virtue promotes the happiness of those around us, and all around us desire an increase of happiness, those actions which are thought to have this tendency are admired, and the motives are, of course, applauded. If the admiration and applause of others are secured,

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advantages of a more solid, if not more gratifying description, are associated with the cultivation of these habits,—the superior enjoyment, safety, influence, and worldly distinction, of well-ordered minds, and well-regulated characters. Where there is nothing impetuous in the constitution; where opposite counsels, examples, and temptations are not allowed to interfere; where the outward condition of the individual is favourable to the growth of habits, thus induced and guarded; happily for him, and for society, his character is well proportioned and beautifully finished; free from the stains of vice, it is rich in the most winning attractions: he is not only blameless, but honoured and beloved. It will be confessed, that this is a flattering picture of the most virtuous man on earth. Still you observe, there is in all this, no reference to the soul,-no calculation of eternity. There is the most vigilant circumspection, but no seeret communing with the heart; there is much politeness; but no humility; much benevolent regard to the health, the sensibilities, the mental improvement, the worldly reputation, the external decency, the perishing substance of our fellowcreatures, but no concern for their purity and happiness in a future state, compared with which the interests of the present are momentary as the flash of lightning. And the reason is obvious: there is no reference to Him who is omniscient, righteous, and eternal. It is not true, then, in any sense that can at all interfere with the principles of this lecture, that there is any genuine morality, any true virtue, separate from a supreme regard to the character, the will, and the glory of God.

Since a practical regard to God, as our Supreme Governor, is the essential principle of virtue, this simple truth enables us to account for the want of moral goodness, and for the existence and prevalence, in its stead, of moral evil in all its stages and features. The same truth illustrates the position of this commandment, in the beginning of the moral

law, frowning on the first and fruitful suggestions of our evil nature,-demanding, at once, that homage and subjection which will lead the way to every moral attainment.

In attempting to illustrate this command, let us advert to the revealed character and claims of God, by whom it is uttered; to the tendency in our nature, which it opposes; to the duties it requires; and to some of the practical questions it suggests.

I. The revealed character and claims of God are referred to as understood: "I am the Lord thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt." Here, the Hebrews are reminded of those manifestations of his attributes and relations, which God had previously and repeatedly given; given, because the knowledge of them is of infinite consequence; repeated, because the tendency in human nature to forget or slight them is so deep and dangerous; referred to in the introduction to the dispensation of the law, as the basis of those obligations which the law enforces; and connected with that particular event by which the Hebrews were separated from the nations, for the purpose of reminding them, and the world by them, that the character of God is displayed in the agency of his providence, and, that in proportion to our means of acquaintance with that character, are our obligations and inducements to obey his will.

Before the image of God on the human soul was defaced by sin, the knowledge of God possessed by man was immediate, sublime, and influential. Since the apostacy, God has revealed himself to us through the medium of words, emblems, and events. These modes of revelation are harmonious; each illustrates the rest; they have been progressive. By means of them, the knowledge of the divine character and demands has been preserved amidst the dark and corrupt tendencies of his fallen creatures, and is still referred to as the ground of obligation, and the incentive to obedience. In the Scriptures, especially,