content, and the repugnance which they have to bear arms against their brothers the French-Well! we will fly to their succour !--we will make a descent on the island-we will lodge there fifty thousand caps of liberty-we will plant there the sacred tree, and we will stretch out our arms to our republican brethren-the tyranny of their government will soon be destroyed.' He called the attention of the house to this declaration, which distinguished the English people from the king and the parliament, and to the nature of that present which was meant to be made them. While such declarations were made, what could be thought of any explanations which were pretended to be given, or what credit was due to the assertions, that they entertained no intentions hostile to the government of this country? From all these circumstances he concluded, that the conduct and pretensions of the French were such as were neither consistent with the existence or safety of this country, such as that house could not, and he was confident, never would, acquiesce in. Their explanations had only been renewed insults, and instead of reverting to those assurances with which they had originally set out, they now showed themselves determined to maintain the ground, such as it was, upon which they stood with respect to this country. In the last paper which had been delivered, they had given in an ultimatum, stating that, unless you accept such satisfaction as they have thought proper to give, they will prepare for war. unless you then recede from your principles, or they withdraw it, a war must be the consequenceas to the time, the precise moment, he should not pretend to fix it-it would be left open to the last for any satisfactory explanation, but he should deceive them if he should say, that he thought any such explanation would be given, or that it was probable that a war could be avoided: rather than recede from our principles, war was preferable to a peace, which could neither be consistent with the internal tranquillity nor external safety of this country." He then moved an address of thanks to his majesty. OPPOSED BY LORD WYCOMB, WHITBREAD AND FOX. EARL WYCOMB said, "that he conceived it to be his most indispensable duty to use every argument in his power to avert from his country so grievous a calamity as that of entering into a war; a calamity of such a nature, as to leave only a doubt as to the extent of ills which might probably result from it; and he conjured the house not to agree to the proposed address, till they had well considered the consequence. This country, his lordship said, was in no danger whatever, being equally secured by its insular situation, its internal resources, and the strong attachment of the people to the constitution: he conceived, therefore, that we had no ground for alarm on the first point mentioned in the message from his majesty. As to the second point, the security of our allies, his lordship said it was impossible we could be told that Prussia had been attacked by France, and of course this part of the message must relate to Holland. If the navigation of the Scheld was the subject of dispute, it appeared to be a matter of indifference to this country; except that in one view it would be of great advantage to our commerce and manufactures by opening a new channel in the best and most convenient situation for sending our manufactures into all the continent of Europe. From several circumstances, it would be idle and impolitic in the Dutch themselves to meditate war, and they seem by no means disposed to do so: shall we then urge them to resistance, and menace France with war? With regard to the new point in his majesty's message, the propagation of French principles, he thought it by no means safe to go to war against principles. If the principles alluded to were levelling principles, they should be met with contempt; but he by no means reprobated all the French principles. Great stress had been laid on the cruelties perpetrated in France; but he could not think they were a proper cause of war: in his opinion these cruelties had all originated in the famous expedition of the duke of Brunswick, which might be called a fraternity of kings for the purpose of imposing despotism on all Europe. Another ground taken by ministers, he said, was the necessity of preserving the balance of power in Europe-or, the system of Europe: but he could not see why this country should be ready, upon all occasions, to go to war for the benefit of other nations. This system he looked upon to be no more than a political fiction, a cover for any interference that caprice might dictate. The next thing to which he wished to call the attention of the house was the means of carrying on the war. When the present supposed accumulation, of which ministers boasted, was exhausted, they must have recourse to new taxes; and if there was no absolute necessity for war, why burden the people to maintain a war, of the issue of which no judgment could be formed? and the relative situation of France to this country was such, that the connection of this country with her should not, he thought, be put to unnecessary hazard. The war might be carried on for some time without any additional duties; but when our resources were exhausted, taxes must follow, accompanied by the murmurs, if not execrations, of the people; and he hoped we would not fall into an error with respect to the finances of France, for it had undoubtedly resources which would be sufficient at least for some time. The death of the king of France had been pathetically lamented by ministers; but they never attempted to interfere, and while they professed peace, used every haughty irritating provocation to war. Upon the whole, he could view the war in no other light than as a revival of the system of extirpation that was the basis of the late American war. He should therefore give his negative to the motion for the address." Whitbread, junr. said, "The house was then to consider whether war was justifiable upon any grounds stated in the papers upon the table, and whether ministers had done their utmost to avert that calamity. To both these he gave a decided negative; and before he adverted to the grounds stated in the papers, he should say something as to the real cause of the war, as he conceived it would at length appear to be, if war were undertaken. This was no less than the total overthrow of the new system of government existing in France: for no other reason could ministers have refused to acknowledge the republic. They had admitted of non-official communications: this was an acknowledgment of the power residing in those persons with whom they thus communicated; but they refused to acknowledge the right of those persons to the exercise of the power with which they were invested. This was securing the possibility of joining with the combined powers, whenever a convenient opportunity might offer, for the overthrow of the new system. He deprecated such an attempt as contrary to the rights of nations. No country had a right to interfere with the internal arrangements adopted by another. The national will was supreme in every country; and that alone could constitute, alter, or modify forms of government. Could any man doubt that the nation willed a republic in France? If we attempted to interfere with the disposition of the national will, let us recollect upon what grounds the title of the king of England stood,-upon the will of the nation; and one of the most despotic sovereigns in Europe, the empress of Russia, owed her elevation to the supposed expression of the national will, at the revolution in 1762. She possessed the throne upon no other footing: and what form of government soever any nation willed for itself, such it had the right to adopt. He now came to the first stated ground of complaint of this country against France, the decree of November the nineteenth; which decree he did not in itself defend; but he contended that the explanation which the French had been disposed to give of that decree, was such as to take away all well grounded apprehensions of any injury designed to this country, and certainly would not justify us in going to war. The next object stated was the aggrandizement of France, which was likely to endanger the balance of Europe. Upon the subject of the balance of Europe, which now appeared to be a matter of such signal importance, be begged to call the attention of the house, and to the general conduct of his majesty's ministers in their endea. vours to maintain that balance. At the time the despotic powers had formed a combination against France, which it was not conceivable that she could resist--when it appeared that the country was to be overrun, and to become an easy prey to the duke of Brunswick, no apprehensions were enter tained on account of the balance of power: the нь same supineness had been visible when the empress of Russia in the course of the last summer, had taken possession of Poland: but now that the French were victorious, and had defeated their enemies, combined to crush them, the balance of power was in danger! But the aggrandizement of France was dangerous as connected with the principles she propagated: he begged to know whether this apprehension was not equally well found ed, when applied to the case of Russia? he conceived the principles of despotism propagated by the sword of the one, as dangerous to the general security of Europe, as the licentiousness propagated by the sword of the other. With regard to the request urged by the British government, that the French should withdraw their troops within their own territory, in order to pave the way to any negotiation with us, he thought such a demand the height of insolence. France had been attacked; she had successfully repelled that attack, and gained possession of the territory of her adversary, and had a right to maintain that possession, at least till the conclusion of the war, to enable her to make advantageous terms for herself. We had forced her to an anticipation of her designs on the subject of Brabant. She had de clared her intentions not to add the low countries to her own territories; but to suffer the Belgians to erect themselves into an independent sovereignty. A hard necessity, indeed, he should conceive it for Great Britain, to be forced to go to war, to maintain to the Dutch the exclusive navigation of the Scheld; but he had never said that he was against supporting the faith of treaties, where the casus fæderis was clearly defined. But was it, in this instance, a new and unexercised right of nature for which it was contended? certainly not. Autwerp was a monument of the exercise of that right by her inhabitants; and he was free to say, that it would give him joy to see the commerce of that once flourishing city restored; for the exclusive navigation of the Scheld had been established by force, and consented to by weakness.' But a necessary preliminary to these investigations, would have been some precise requisition of the Dutch for the stipulated assistance of her ally. The chancellor of the exchequer had avowed that no such demand had been made; and if the house were to judge of the dispositions of the States-general by their own declarations, he believed it would be found that they did not think it worth their while to go to war for the maintenance of this right. He alluded to the proclamation for a general fast put forth by the States. general on January the tenth, in which they declare that they are then at peace, and that the strict neutrality they observed had hitherto protected them from aggression. A manifest token that they did not consider the free navigation of the Scheld, as asserted by the French, a reason for going to war. If then we did go to war on that ground, we should force our allies into it, and not ourselves be involved in it by the terms of our alliance." Whitbread said, "that having gone through the matter contained in the papers, as far as they related to the probability of war, he could find no justification of the conduct of administration. He thought the maintenance of peace, consistently with the dignity, honour, and interests of this country, was perfectly in the power of ministers; but their conduct and words denoted war." in another nation, which had no direct reference to us. The general maxim of policy always was, that the crimes perpetrated in one independent state were not cognizable by another. Need he remind the house of our former conduct in this respect! Had we not treated, had we not formed alliances with Portugal and with Spain, at the very time when these kingdoms were disgraced and polluted by the most shocking and barbarous acts of superstition and cruelty, of racks, torture, and burning, under the abominable tyranny of the inquisition? Did we ever make these outrages against reason and humanity a pretext for war? Did we ever inquire how the princes with whom we had relative interests either obtained or exercised their power? Why then were the enormities of the French in their own country held up as a cause of war? Much of these enormities had been attributed to the attack of the combined powers; but this he neither considered as an excuse, nor would argue as a pal. liation. If they had dreaded, or had felt an attack, to retaliate on their fellow-citizens, however much suspected, was a proceeding which justice disclaimed; and he had flattered himself, that when men were disclaiming old, and professing to adopt new principles, those of persecution and revenge would be the first that they would discard. He should now show, that all the topics to which Pitt had adverted, were introduced into the debate to blind the judgment, by rousing the passions, and were none of them the just grounds of war. These grounds were three: the danger of Holland; the decree of the French convention of November the nineteenth, and the general danger to Europe, from the progress of the French arms. With respect to Hol land, the conduct of ministers afforded a fresh proof of their disingenuousness. They could not state, that the Dutch had called upc us to fulfil the terms of our alliance. They were obliged to confess, that no such requisition had been made; but added, that they knew the Dutch were very much disposed to make it. Whatever might be the words of the treaty, we were bound in honour, by virtue of that treaty, to protect the Dutch, if they called upon us to do so, but neither by honour nor the treaty till then. The conduct of the Dutch was very unfortunate upon this occasion. In the order for a general fast by the states, it was expressly said, That their neutrality seemed to put them into security amidst surrounding armies, and hitherto effectually protected them from molestation.' This he by no means construed into giving up the opening of the Scheld on their part; but it pretty clearly showed, that they were not disposed to make it the cause of a war, unless forced to do so by us. France had broke faith with the Dutch; was this a cause for us to go to war? How long was it since we considered a circumstance tending to diminish the good understanding between France and Holland, as a misfortune to this country? The plain state of the matter was, that we were bound to save Holland from war, or by war if called upon; and that to force the Dutch into a war at so much peril to them, which they saw and dreaded, was not to fulfil, but to abuse the treaty. Hence he complained of the disingenuous conduct of ministers, in imputing that to the Dutch, which the Dutch wished to avoid. The decree of the nineteenth of November, he considered as an insult; and the explanation of the executive council as no adequate Fox said, "that although some words had fallen satisfaction; but the explanation showed that the from the right honourable gentleman (Pitt), which French were not disposed to insist upon that demight lead him to think, that war was not absolute- crec, and that they were inclined to peace, and then ly determined upon, yet the general tenor and im- our ministers, with haughtiness unexampled, told pression of his speech was such as to induce him them they had insulted us, but refused to tell them to enter somewhat at large into the subject. The the nature of the satisfaction that we required. It crimes, the murders, and the massacres, that had was said, we must have security; and he was ready been committed in France, he did not view with to admit that neither a disavowal by the executive less horror, he did not consider as less atrocious council of France, nor a tacit repeal by the conventhan those who made them the perpetual theme of tion, on the intimation of an unacknowledged agent, their declamation, although he put them entirely of a decree, which they might renew the day after out of the question in the present debate. The they repealed it, would be a sufficient security. condemnation and execution of the king, he pro- But at least we ought to tell them what we meant nounced an act as disgraceful as any that history by security, for it was the extreme of arrogance to recorded; and whatever opinion he might at any complain of insult without deigning to explain what time have expressed in private conversation, he reparation we required: and he feared an indefinite had expressed none certainly in that house, on the term was here employed, not for the purpose of objustice of bringing kings to trial, revenge being un. taining, but of precluding satisfaction. Next it was justifiable, and punishment useless, where it could said, they must withdraw their troops from the not operate cither by way of prevention or ex- Austrian Netherlands, before we could be satisfied. ample. He saw neither propriety nor wisdom in Were we then come to that pitch of insolence, as that house, passing judgment on any act committed to say to France, You have conquered part of an But ed. 235 nemy's territory, who made war upon you, we of administration had brought the government and will not interfere to make peace, but we require the legislature into contempt in the eyes of the you to abandon the advantages you have gained, people. If there were any danger from French while he is preparing to attack you anew.' Was principles, to go to war without necessity was to this the neutrality we meant to hold out to France? fight for their propagation. On these principles, as If you are invaded and beaten, we will be quiet reprobated in the proposed address, he would freespectators; but if you hurt your enemy, if you en- ly give his opinion. It was not the principles that ter his territory, we declare war against you.' If were bad and to be reprobated, but the abuse of the invasion of the Netherlands was what now them. From the abuse, not the principles, had alarmed us, and that it ought to alarm us if the reflowed all the evils that afflicted France. The use sult was to make the country an appendage to of the word equality by the French was deemed France, there could be no doubt we ought to have highly objectionable. When taken as they meant interposed to prevent it in the very first instance; it nothing was more innocent; for what did they for it was the natural consequence which every man say, all men are equal in respect of their rights.' foresaw of a war between France and Austria. The To this he assented; all men had equal rights; equal French now said, they would evacuate the country rights to unequal things; one man to a shilling, at the conlusion of the war, and when its liberties another to a thousand pounds; one man to a cotwere established. Was this sufficient? By no tage another to a palace; but the right in both was means but we ought to tell what we would deem the same; an equal right of enjoying, au equal sufficient, instead of saying to them, as we were now right of inheriting or acquiring; and of possessing saying, this is an aggravation, this is nothing, and inheritance or acquisition.-The effect of the prothis is insufficient.' That war was unjust which posed address was to condemu, not the abuse of told not an enemy the ground of provocation, those principles, (and the French had much abused and the measure of atonement; it was as impoli them,) but the principles themselves. To this he tic as unjust; for without the object of contest, clear- could not assent, for they were the principles on ly and definitely stated, what opening could there which all just and equitable government was foundbe for treating of peace! Before going to war with He had already differed sufficiently with a France, surely the people, who must pay and suf right honourable gentleman (Burke) on this subfer, ought to be informed on what object they were ject, not to wish to provoke any fresh difference; to fix their hopes for its honourable termination. but even against so great an authority he must say, After five or six years' war, the French might agree that the people are the sovereigns in every state; to evacuate the Netherlands as the price of peace; that they have a right to change the form of their was it clear that they would not do so now, if we government, and a right to cashier their governors would condescend to propose it in intelligible for misconduct, as the people of this country caterms? Surely in such an alternative, the experi-shiered James II. not by parliament, or any regular ment was worth trying: but then we had no securi- form known to the constitution, but by a convention ty against the French principles.--What security speaking the sense of the people; that convention would they be able to give us, after a war which produced a parliament and a king. They elected they could not give now? With respect to the gen- William to a vacant throne, not only setting aside eral danger of Europe, the same arguments applied, James, whom they had justly cashiered for misconand to the same extent. To the general situation duct, but his innocent son. Again they elected the and security of Europe, we had been so scandal- house of Brunswick, not individually, but by dyously inattentive; we had seen the entire conquest nasty; and that dynasty to continue while the terms of Polaud, and the invasion of France, with such and conditions on which it was elected are fulfilled, marked indifference, that it would be difficult now and no longer. He could not admit the right of doto take it up with the grace of sincerity; but even ing all this but by acknowledging the sovereignty this would be better provided for, by proposing of the people as paramount to all other laws. But terms before going to war. He had thus shown it was said, that although we had once exercised that none of the professed causes were grounds for this power, we had in the very act of exercising it, going to war. What then remained but the inter- renounced it for ever.-We had neither renounced nal government of France, always disavowed, but it, nor, if we had been so disposed, was such a reever kept in mind, and constantly mentioned? The nunciation in our power. We elected first an indidestruction of that government was the avowed ob- vidual, then a dynasty, and lastly, passed an act of ject of the combined powers whom it was hoped we parliament in the reign of queen Anne, declaring it were to join; and we could not join them heartily to be the right of the people of this realm to do so if our object were one thing while theirs was ano- again without even assigning a reason. If there ther; for in that case the party whose object was were any persons among us who doubted the supe first obtained might naturally be expected to make rior wisdom of our monarchical form of governseparate terms, and there could be no cordiality nor ment, their error was owing to those who changed confidence. To this then we came at last, that we its strong and irrefragible foundation in the right were ashamed to own engaging to aid the restora and choice of the people, to a more flimsy ground tion of despotism, and collusively sought pretexts of title. Those who proposed repelling opinions by in the Scheld and the Netherlands. Such would force, the example of the French in the Netherbe the real cause of the war, if war we were to lands might teach the impotence of power to repel have a war, which he trusted he should soon see or introduce. But how was a war to operate in as generally execrated as it was now thought to be keeping opinions supposed dangerous out of this popular. In all decisions on peace or war, it was country? It was not surely meant to beat the important to consider what we might lose, and French out of their own opinions; and opinions what we could gain. On the one hand, extension were not like commodities, the importation of of territory was neither expected nor eligible. On which from France war would prevent.-War, it the other, although he feared not the threat of the was to be lamented, was a passion inherent in the French marine minister, would any man say that nature of man; and it was curious to observe what our ally might not suffer; that the events of war at various periods had been the various pretexts. might not produce a change in the internal state In ancient times wars were made for conquest. of Holland, and in the situation of the stadtholder, To these succeeded wars for religion; and the opintoo afflicting for him to anticipate. In weighing ions of Luther and Calvin were attacked with ail the probable danger, every consideration ought to the fury of superstition and of power. The next be put into the scale. Was the state of Ireland pretext was commerce; and it would probably be such as to make war desirable? That was a sub- allowed that no nation that made war for commerce ject which had been said by some honourable gen- ever found the object accomplished, on concluding tleman to be too delicate to be touched upon; but peace. Now we were to make war about opinions; he approved not of that delicacy which taught men what was this but recurring again to an exploded to shut their eyes to danger. The state of Ireland cause; for a war about principles in religion was he was not afraid to mention. He thought it both as much a war about opinions, as a war about prinpromising and alarming; promising, because the ciples in politics. The justifiable grounds of war government of this country had forced the govern- were insult, injury, or danger. For the first, satisment of that to an acknowledgment of the undoubt faction; for the second, reparation; for the third, ed rights of a great majority of the people of Ire- security was the object. Each of these, too, was land, after having, in a former session, treated their the proper object of negotiation, which ought ever humble petition with contempt, and in the summer to precede war, except in case of an attack actually endeavoured to stir up the protestants against the commenced. How had we negotiated? Not in catholics; alarming, because the gross misconduct any public or sufficient form, a mode which he sus pected, and lamented, by his proposing it had been prevented. When the triple league was formed to check the ambition of Louis the fourteenth, the contracting parties did not deal so rigorously by him, as we were now told it was essential to the peace of Europe that we should deal by the French. They never told Louis that he must renounce all his conquests, in order to obtain peace. But then it was said to be our duty to hate the French for the part they took in the American war. He had heard of a duty to love, but a duty to hate was new to him. That duty, however, ought to direct our hatred to the old government of France, not to the new, which had no hand in the provocation. Unfortunately the new French government was admitted to be the successor of the old in nothing but its faults and its offences. It was a successor to be hated and to war against; but it was not a successor to be negotiated with. He feared, however, that war would be the result, and from war apprehending greater evils than he durst name, he should have shrunk from his duty if he had not endeavoured to obtain an exposition of the distinct causes of all wars he dreaded that the most which had no definite object, because of such a war it was impossible to see the end. Our war with America had a definite object, an unjust one indeed, but still definite; and after wading through years on years of expense and blood, after exhausting invectives and terms of contempt on the vagrant congress, one Adams, one Washington, &c. &c. we were compelled at last to treat with this very congress, and those very men. The Americans, to the honour of their character, committed no such horrid acts as had disgraced the French; but we were as liberal of our obloquy to the former then, as to the latter now. If we did but know for what we were to fight, we might look forward with confidence, and exert ourselves with unanimity; but while kept thus in the dark, how many might there be who would be lieve that we were fighting the battles of despotism. To undeceive those who might fall into this unhappy delusion, it would be no derogation from the dignity of office to grant an explanation. If the right honourable gentleman (Pitt) would but yet consider -if he would but save the country from a warabove all, a war of opinion, however inconsistent with his former declarations his measures might be, he would gladly consent to give him a general indemnity for the whole, and even a vote of thanks. Let not the fatal opinion go abroad that kings had an interest different from that of their subjects; that between those who had property and those who had none there was not a common cause and common feeling." The question being put on the motion, the address was carried without a division. THE FRENCH DECLARE WAR AGAINST BRITAIN AND HOLLAND. THESE debates are perhaps sufficient to convince the most incredulous that the British ministry were determined on war-that they were more solicitous to colour the pretext for hostilities against France, than to obtain satisfaction for the acts of aggression complained of, as appears from the tenor of their proceedings. If in support of these charges any additional proof is wanting, we shall find it amply supplied by a letter from lord Auckland, the English ambassador at the Hague, dated January the twenty-fifth, 1793, and presented to the states-general immediately on the departure of Chauvelin. In this letter, his lordship affirms to their high mightinesses, in language which sets all ideas of decency and decorum at defiance, that "not four years ago some wretches, assuming the title of philosophers, had the presumption to think themselves capable of establishing a new system of civil society. In order to realize that dream of their vanity, they found it necessary to overthrow and destroy all received notions of subordination, manners, and religion, which have hitherto formed all the security, happiness, and consolation of the human race. Their destructive projects have but too well succeeded. But the effects of the new system which they endeavoured to introduce served only to show the imbecility and villany of its authors. The events which so rapidly followed each other since that epoch, surpass in atrocity all which had ever polluted the pages of history. Property, liberty, security, even life itself, have been deemed playthings in the hands of infamous men, who are the slaves of the most licentious passions of rapine, enmity and ambition." From the conduct of the English government at home, and the very high language and sentiments conveyed through their diplomatic organs abroad, the French now saw that every hope of peace was vanished. The convention therefore came to a resolution of anticipating She designs of the English and the Dutch, and, by a decree unanimously passed on the first of February, 1793, declared the republic of France at war with the king of Great Britain, and the stadtholder of Holland. CHAPTER XXV. Motion to ascertain the precise grounds of War-Motion for Peace-Barracks-Motion for an Inquiry respecting Sedition-Message on German Auxiliaries-Ways and Means-Traitorous Correspondence Bill The French propose to treat for Peace, but receive no Reply-Subsidy to Sardinia-Numerous Bankruptcies, and Aid given for relief of Commerce-Motions of Censure on Lord Auckland-Proceedings of British Parliament-Hastings's Trial-Parliament Prorogued-Proceedings of Irish Parliament Military Transactions on the Continent-Capture of Pondicherry and Tobago-Insurrection of the Royalists in Britany and Poitou-The French Convention declares War against Spain -Proceedings of the two leading Parties in France-Death of Marat. FOX'S MOTION TO ASCERTAIN THE PRECISE GROUNDS OF WAR-MOTION FOR PEACE BARRACKS, &c. 'A S the prevailing opinion of the British public appeared to be for war, but chiefly because the friends of peace feared to be deemed abettors of revolutionary principles, Fox, on the eighteenth of February, moved a series of resolutions, stating that war with France, on the grounds alleged, was neither for the honour or the interest of this country; that ministers, in their late negotiations with the French government, had not taken the proper means for procuring an amicable redress of the grievances complained of; and that it was their duty to advise his majesty against entering into engagements which might prevent a separate peace. He alleged that his object in making these motions was to procure a doclaration of the precise grounds of the war, he being persuaded, that the real objects of our ministers in going to war were those which they disclaimed; and that those which they avowed were only pretexts. But the resolutions so proposed, and a motion by Grey for an address to his majesty, expressing the opinion that the differences between this country and France might have been adjusted by negotiation, and requesting his majesty to embrace the first opportu nity of restoring peace;-and also a motion by Taylor, in the same month, "that it is the opinion of this house that the uniform and persovering opposition of our ancestors, from time to time, to the erecting barracks in this country, was founded upon a just sense of the true principles of our most excellent constitution: and that the soldiers should live intermixed with the people, in order that they might be connected with them; and that no sepa rate camp, no barracks, no inland fortresses, should be allowed"-with a motion by Sheridan, on the fourth of March, that the house should resolve itself into a committee, to consider of the seditious practices referred to in his majesty's speech, were successively rejected or negatived: so decided a preponderance had the advocates for a war, the course and issue of which it was in vain to conjecture. GERMAN AUXILIARIES-WAYS AND MEANS -TRAITOROUS CORRESPONDENCE BILL. A MESSAGE from the king was presented to parliament, on the sixth of March, stating that he had engaged a body of his electoral troops in the ser vice of Great Britain, for the purpose of assisting his allies, the States-general, and that he had directed an estimate of the charge to be laid before the house. In a committee of supply, on the eleventh, Pitt brought forward his budget for the current year, estimating the total of the expenses at eleven million one hundred and eighty-two thou sand two hundred and thirteen pounds, and of the ways and means at eight million two hundred and ninety-nine thousand six hundred and ninety-six pounds. The deficiency he proposed to raise by loan, and to defray the interest by making permanent the temporary taxes imposed upon occasion of the Spanish armament. He made some remarks which show how little he then contemplated the excessive increase of the national debt, and of the taxation consequent thereon, which has since taken place. "I do not think it useless," said he, "to suggest some observations with respect to this war in which we are engaged." He said, that the excess of the permanent revenue was then nine hundred thousand pounds above the peace establishment; which, even if destroyed by war, would leave the country in possession of all its ordinary revenue. This nine hundred thousand pounds he contingencies to which war is liable. The sum was desirous to leave as a security against those borrowed was four million five hundred thousand pounds; and the terms were, that for every seventy-two pounds advanced to the public, the lender should be entitled to one hundred pounds stock, bearing three per cent. He said, that he expected to have made better terms for the loan, but he had not received two offers on the occasion. Among other resources, the sum of six hundred and seventy-five thousand pounds was agreed to be raised by lottery, but several regulations were laid down to diminish the practice of insurance-a species of gambling upon chances which had been very inju. rious to the lower classes. On the fifteenth of March, the attorney-general, Sir John Scott, introduced a bill denominated the "Traitorous Correspondence Bill," by which it was declared to be high treason to supply the existing government of France with military stores, to purchase lands of inheritance in France, to invest money in any of the French funds, to underwrite insurances upon ships and goods bound from France to any part of the world, or to go from this country to France, without a licence under the privy seal. It likewise prohibited the return of such British subjects as were already there, unless on giving security to the government. This bill met with much opposition, and several of its more obnoxious clauses were modified in the course of its progress. In the lords it received several modifications, which were agreed to by the commons, and the bill passed into a law. FRENCH PROPOSE TO TREAT FOR PEACESUBSIDY TO SARDINIA-BANKRUPTCIES -AID TO COMMERCE-CENSURE ON LORD AUCKLAND. EARLY in April, le Brun, minister of foreign affairs in France, addressed a letter to lord Grenville, stating that the French republic was desirous to |