said of hearing: and our feeling distant solid matter by means of somewhat in our hand, seems an instance of the like kind, as to the subject we are considering. All these are instances of foreign matter, or such as is no part of our body, being instrumental in preparing objects for, and conveying them to the perceiving power, in a manner similar, or like to the manner in which our organs of sense prepare and convey them. Both are, in a like way, instruments of our receiving such ideas from external objects, as the Author of nature appointed those external objects to be the occa-sions of exciting in us. However, glasses are evidently instances of this; namely, of matter, which is no part of our body, preparing objects for, and con-veying them towards the perceiving power, in like manner as our bodily organs do. And if we see with: our eyes only in the same manner as we do with glasses, the like may justly be concluded, from analogy, of all our other senses. It is not intended, by any thing. here said, to affirm, that the whole apparatus of vi sion, or of perception by any other of our senses, can be traced, through all its steps, quite up to the living power of seeing, or perceiving; but that, so far as it can be traced by experimental observations, so far it. appears, that our organs of sense prepare and convey on objects, in order to their being perceived, in like manner as foreign matter does, without affording any shadow of appearance, that they themselves perceive.. And that we have no reason to think our organs of sense percipients, is confirmed by instances of persons. losing some of them, the living beings themselves, their former occupiers, remaining unimpaired. It is. confirmed also by the experience of dreams; by which we find we are at present possessed of a latent, and. what would otherwise be an unimagined unknownpower of perceiving sensible objects, in as strong and lively a manner without our external organs of sense,

as with them.

So also with regard to our power of moving, or directing motion by will and choice; upon the de

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struction of a limb, this active power remains, as it evidently seems, unlessened; so as that the living being, who has suffered this loss, would be capable of moving as before, if it had another limb to move with. It can walk by the help of an artificial leg, just as it can make use of a pole or a lever, to reach towards itself, and to move things beyond the length and the power of its natural arm: and this last it does in the same manner as it reaches and moves, with its natural arm, things nearer and of less weight. Nor is there so much as any appearance of our limbs being endued with a power of moving or directing themselves; though they are adapted, like the several parts of a machine, to be the instruments of motion to each other; and some parts of the same limb, to be instruments of motion to other parts of it.

Thus, a man determines that he will look at such an object through a microscope; or, being lame suppose, that he will walk to such a place with a staff, a week hence. His eyes and his feet no more determine in these cases, than the microscope and the staff. Nor is there any ground to think they any more put the determination in practice, or that his eyes are the seers or his feet the movers, in any other sense than as the microscope and the staff are. Upon the whole, then, our organs of sense and our limbs are certainly instruments, which the living persons, ourselves, make use of to perceive and move with: There is not any probability, that they are any more; nor, consequently, that we have any other kind of relation to them, than what we may have to any other foreign matter formed into instruments of perception and motion, suppose into a microscope or a staff (I say, any other kind of relation, for I am not speaking of the degree of it); nor, consequently, is there any probability, that the alienation or dissolution of these instruments is the destruction of the perceiving and moving a gent.

And thus, our finding, that the dissolution of matter in which living beings were most nearly interest

w and that the destruction struments of percepging to them is not their destratively, that there is no dissolution of any other matother organs and instruments, or destruction of living agents, relation. And we have no reaany other kind of relation to nd dissolved by death.

se observations are equally applidit is thought an insuperable diffishould be immortal, and by conseof everlasting happiness. Now, this sion is both invidious and weak: but ded by it, is really no difficulty at all, way of natural or moral consideration. Suppose the invidious thing, designed in wer of expression, were really implied, as it

least, in the natural immortality of brutes; that they must arrive at great attainments, come rational and moral agents; even this

difficulty, since we know not what latent can be and capacities they may be endued with. There appeare, prior to experience, as great presumption on obst human creatures, as there is against the brute mannares, arriving at that degree of understanding shad we have in mature age; for we can trace up And own existence to the same original with theirs. send we find it to be a general law of nature, that los eatures endued with capacities of virtue and religion, thhould be placed in a condition of being, in which they care altogether without the use of them for a considerble length of their duration, as in infancy and childhood. And great part of the human species go out of the present world, before they come to the exercise of these capacities in any degree at all. But then,

2dly, The natural immortality of brutes does not in the least imply, that they are endued with any latent capacities of a rational or moral nature. And

the economy of the universe might require, that there should be living creatures without any capacities of this kind. "And all difficulties, as to the manner how they are to be disposed of, are so apparently and wholly founded on our ignorance, that it is wonderful they should be insisted upon by any, but such as are weak enough to think they are acquainted with the whole system of things. There is then, absolutely, nothing at all in this objection, which is so rhetorically urged against the greatest part of the natural proofs or presumptions of the immortality of human minds: I say, the greatest part; for it is less applicable to the following observation, which is more peculiar to mankind :

III. That as it is evident our present powers and capacities of reason, memory, and affection, do not depend upon our gross body, in the manner in which perception by our organs of sense docs; so they do not appear to depend upon it at all in any such manner, as to give ground to think, that the dissolution of this body will be the destruction of these our present powers of reflection, as it will of our powers of censation; or to give ground to conclude, even that it will be so much as a suspension of the former.

Human creatures exist at present in two states of life and perception, greatly different from each other; each of which has its own peculiar laws, and its own peculiar enjoyments and sufferings. When any of our senses are affected, or appetites gratified with the objects of them, we may be said to exist, or live, in a state of sensation. When none of our senses are affected, or appetites gratified, and yet we perceive, and reason, and act, we may be said to exist, or live, in a state of reflection. Now, it is by no means certain, that any thing which is dissolved by death is any way necessary to the living being, in this its state of reflection, after ideas are gained. For though, from our present constitution and condition of being, our external organs of sense are necessary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers, as carriages, and

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ed, is not their dissolution; and that the destruction of several of the organs and instruments of perception and of motion belonging to them is not their destruction; shows, demonstratively, that there is no ground to think, that the dissolution of any other matter, or destruction of any other organs and instruments, will be the dissolution or destruction of living agents, from the like kind of relation. And we have no reason to think we stand in any other kind of relation to any thing which we find dissolved by death.

But it is said, these observations are equally applicable to brutes; and it is thought an insuperable difficulty, that they should be immortal, and by consequence, capable of everlasting happiness. Now, this manner of expression is both invidious and weak: but the thing intended by it, is really no difficulty at all, either in the way of natural or moral consideration. For, Ist, Suppose the invidious thing, designed in such a manner of expression, were really implied, as it is not in the least, in the natural immortality of brutes; namely, that they must arrive at great attainments, and become rational and moral agents; even this would be no difficulty, since we know not what latent powers and capacities they may be endued with. There was once, prior to experience, as great presumption against human creatures, as there is against the brute creatures, arriving at that degree of understanding which we have in mature age; for we can trace up our own existence to the same original with theirs. And we find it to be a general law of nature, that creatures endued with capacities of virtue and religion, should be placed in a condition of being, in which they are altogether without the use of them for a considerable length of their duration, as in infancy and childhood. And great part of the human species go out of the present world, before they come to the exercise of these capacities in any degree at all. But then, 2dly, The natural immortality of brutes does not in the least imply, that they are endued with any latent capacities of a rational or moral nature. And