Mr Whitbread wished to know if this were really intended. No answer was made to this. The House became impatient for the question; having been kept up till five o'clock in the morning; and Earl Temple's motion was negatived, by 230 votes to 111. May 12. Three days afterwards, Mr Whitbread moved for a return of the names of all the officers attached to the foreign corps raised under Colonel Charmilly, the various sums advan ced to them in the way of allowance or otherwise, and their present state in his Majesty's service. "The whole of those officers were known to be Roman Catholics, and he believed there were many of them who were not men of the most unexceptionable character. It was, however, pretty extraordinary, that, in the year 1794, a positive refusal was given by the go. vernment to the late duke of Bedford's request for a commission for the command of his own armed tenantry, in the defence of his own country; because it was thought too dangerous a confidence to repose in a nobleman who differed from them in politics. Lord Petre also was refused a commission for the command of 400 of his own infantry, arned and clothed at his own expence, for the like purpose, upon no other pretence than that of his being a Roman Catholic: yet at that very time the then ministry felt no hesitation in granting to M. Charmilly, a Frenchman, an utter stranger, and a Roman Catholic, letters of service to recruit French soldiers at the door of a military prison, and at a bounty of sixteen guineas per man; and afterwards, when they deemed it expedient to disband this regiment, they turned them loose upon the public." Certainly this was a heavy charge against the ministry of 1794 for their intolerance, and the wasteful prodigality with which the war department was then administered; but to the present motion a sufficient objection was stated by Lord Castlereagh,-that the names of the officers, and their present situations in the service, could not be communicated, without exposing them to great hazard and injury at some future time. Mr Whitbread persisted in pressing the motion, and it was negatived, by 54 against 29. Whatever may have been the pri vate character of M. Venault de Charmilly, he was most unjustly and cruelly treated in the course of these debates. On his return to England he published a narrative* of his trans * Colonel de Charmilly pubished also some pamphlets respecting the attacks made upon his private character. As it has been necessary to repeat these attacks in detailing the proceedings in Parliament, it becomes an act of justice to notice in this place, as succinctly as possble, his defence. The story of the gambling debt to Mr Devereux is curiously expained. Charmilly became intimate with this gentleman, and with a Mr F., till, perceiving that he constantly lost at play at Mr F's house, he thought it advisable o drop his acquaintance. Of Mr Devereux, who, it seems, is an Irish Roman Cathols delegate, he entertained no suspicion; and, meeting him one day, he accepted an initation to dinner-upon an occasion sufficiently characteristic of the morals of all prties. Mr D. said, "that he had at length completed a great adventure, which had nuch engaged his attention and his heart for the last three months; that he had atlast succeeded, and brought his Dulcinea to his own house,-a real Dulcinea; for he was a true country lass, which was the only sort of woman he liked. He wouldnot suffer her to be acquainted with too many of his actions in Spain with Mr Frere and General Moore. By this statement it appeared, that, on his way to Ma drid, he had dined at Sir John Moore's table; a circumstance which would certainly have exculpated Mr Frere friends, some of whom were great rakes, who would corrupt her principles, and perhaps carry her away into the bargain; but as he placed great confidence in Charmilly, from what he had seen of his general conduct, he hoped he would come and take la fortune du pot." Charmilly accordingly went. He found a magnificent dinner, which his friend said was le repas des noces; and F. was the only person to meet him. The wines were choice and numerous; the glass was briskly circulated. Soon after ten o'clock, Charmilly lost all recollection of what passed: about five in the morning, however, he found himself at his own door, very ill, and sick. The persons who conveyed him there gave a violent double rap, and left him. He was put to bed, and when he rose next day, a good many guineas were on the table, which the servant who undressed him found in his pocket. Now he had gone out with only a few shillings in his purse, and recollecting a remarkable trick which had been played not long before, he immediately suspected some foul play of the same kind. He therefore communicated the circumstance to the Marquis de la Jaille, who laughed at his uneasiness, but advised him to write, and ask how the money found in his pocket had come there. Mr Devereux's answer was written in rather a threatening style, begging him to fix the time when it would be convenient to pay him sixteen hundred guineas, which he had lost to him; adding, as a proof of it, that M. Charmilly had lost at the same time above four hundred guineas to Mr F. The demand was resisted; and the dispute which arose in consequence was referred by Messieurs Devereux and F. to General Tarleton, by the other party to the Count de Vaudreuil. The count stated, that he had known M. de Charmilly well a long time, and knew that he was not in the habit of gambling; that it was not at all probable he should have lost so large a sum as the one claimed; if he had done so, he must have been made completely drunk for the purpose; but to the count's recollection he had never been drunk before in his life; that M. de Charmilly positively declared he had no knowledge whatever of having played, and therefore was determined not to pay any part of the 2000 guineas. In fact, it was astonishing that Mr Devereux should pretend that he had, in his own house, won 1600 guineas from Charmilly, without any other witness than F., who claimed 400 himself; and that F. should claim these 400 with no other witness than Devereux, the one standing witness to the other. Upon this General Tarleton said, that if they had played at a club, drunk or sober, be money said to have been lost must have been paid; but as the transaction had taken place in a private house, that circumstance made a material difference. In conformity, therefore, to his professed" detestation of private play," he awarded that Devereux should take back the guineas found in Charmilly's pocket, and give up his claim.-General Tarleton published a reply to this statement, in which he confirms all the circumstances of the dispute, and the decision; but persists in believing the statement of the Catholic delegate, in preference to that of the emigrant. I affirms also, that he had given Charmilly an opportunity of challenging him; and this assertion has produced another letter from Charmilly, to which he has affixed as a motto, On ne peut faire boire an ane qui n'a pas soif. Colonel de Charmilly called also upo. Earl Greyand Mr Whitbread to acknowledge that they had wronged him in their speeches. The former, in reply, acknowledged that he now saw no reason for imputing any reacherous design to him, and that the unfavourable impressions which he had receed, with respect to the bankruptcy, had been considerably diminished by Colone.de Charmilly's explanations. The correspondence with Mr Whitbread has not beenpublished. in making choice of him as a messenger to that general, if any choice had been exercised on the occasion. But Charmilly was already charged with intelligence to Sir John from the Duke del Infantado; he fell in accidentally with the English minister on his way, and, in consequence, that opportunity was taken of sending dispatches by him. This statement also explained why Mr Frere required that Charmilly should be examined before a council of war. Though he had no hesitation to take upon himself any responsibility for the advice which he gave, he feared that General Moore, having begun the retreat, might think his responsibility was engaged also, and that that feeling might have some influence upon his resolution. The decision of a council of war would, he thought, take this responsibility from the commander. It appeared, therefore, that this measure, against which such an outcry was raised, that the ministry did not think proper to defend it, originated in delicacy towards Sir John Moore. Mr Frere was also violently condemned for the language which he had used toward the general, respecting his intended retreat from Salamanca ;-" a measure," he said, "which must be followed by the im mediate, if not the final ruin of our ally, and by indelible disgrace to the country with whose resources you are intrusted. I am unwilling to enlarge upon a subject in which my feelings must either be stifled, or ex pressed at the risk of offence, which, with such an interest at stake, I should feel unwilling to excite; but thus much I must say, that if the British army had been sent abroad for the express object of doing the utmost possible mischief to the cause of Spain, (with the single exception of not firing a shot against the Spanish troops,) they would, according to the measures now announced as about to be taken, have most completely fulfilled their purpose. That the defence of Gallicia should be abandoned, must appear incredible." And in the same letter he warned him of "the immense responsibility which he took upon himself by-such a measure."-Mr Frere would not have been attacked with so much acrimony, if he had not been the ticular friend of Mr Canning; and perhaps that very circumstance prevented the latter from defending him as warmly and as boldly as his own unbiassed judgement would have prompted. par In the debate upon Earl Temple's motion, Lord Henry Petty quoted an observation of Cardinal de Retz, who says, "that men may be placed in situations, wherein, turn how they would, they must commit a fault; but that Fortune never placed them in such situations, which were only the effects of their own errors." In such a situation, he affirmed, Sir John Moore had been placed by the ministers. Lord Bacon's apophthegm, that "wise men make more opportunities than they find," is more pertinent to the case. Had General Moore returned to England, an inquiry into his conduct must have taken place: the circumstance of his death, and the political convenience of both parties, prevented this; but they did not prevent impartial observers from forming their own judgement upon his campaign, and they must not prevent the historian from faithfully discharging his office.There are three points to be considered. Ought Sir John Moore to have remained so long inactive? Ought he to have advanced when he did? Ought he to have retreated as he did? On each of these points we happen to possess the opinion of the enemy. "So splendid an armament,' says the bulletin," so strange an inactivity for the last six weeks, appears most unaccountable. During the months of November and December, the English beheld the destruction of the army of Gallicia at Espinosa; of the army of Estremadura at Burgos; of that of Aragon and Valencia at Tudela; of the army of reserve at Somosierra. In fine, they beheld the fall of Madrid, without making a single movement, and without any attempt to succour the Spanish armies; to whom, however, a division of English troops would have proved of considerable assistance."" If General Moore had marched upon Somosierra or Guadarrama, he would have covered Madrid, and given time to organize the defence of that capital; he would have rallied the wreck of the Spanish army; and, whether he succeeded or not, he would have tried his fortune with honour."-This was the movement which he ought to have made immediately after Blake's defeat. When General Hope was at Guadarrama, the rest of the army should have been at Somosierra and at Madrid. At Somosierra, the advantage of the pass would have compensated for their inferiority of numbers. There the battle should have been fought, not at Coruna; there, on advanced ground, and in the face of Buonaparte,-not upon the last neck of land in the peninsula. Morla could not have betrayed the British army: he could not have betrayed Madrid, had there been a British * 20th Bulletin. + 21st Bulletin. force upon the spot, who would have directed the enthusiasm of the people, and deserved their confidence. Madrid was not more defenceless than Zaragoza, not more defenceless than Acre. Had there been a man like Scanderbeg at the head of the British army, the fortune of Buonaparte might have been for ever terminated before that city. Every trial which has been made between the two nations, from a skirmish of picquets to the battles of Vimiera and Talavera, warrants this presumption. The British soldiers are at this day as much superior to the French as they were in the days of the Plantagenets. O for a spirit like that of the Plantagenets to lead them on! Sir John Moore remained inactive till all the Spanish armies were dispersed, and the capital had been betrayed. "Then," says the bulletin, "he moved forward. Intoxicated with the silly hope of deceiving the French general, the English fell into the snare which the French general had laid for drawing them into the open country." This assertion the enemy have uniformly made. Buonaparte, we well know, scruples at no falsehood, when it will serve his purpose; but in this he has no purpose to serve. The plan of Marshal Soult, he tells us, was to decoy Sir John Moore into the open country. He must know the truth; and, upon this occasion, there is no reason why he should not declare it. What, on the other hand, were the English general's motives for advancing, and falling into the snare? Not Mr Frere's exhortations. He tells Mr Frere explicitly, that, upon a question merely military, he thought himself the best Moniteur, Sept. 14, 1810. $22d Bulletin. judge, and should never think of asking his advice or opinion. That minister proceeded upon the belief that Madrid held out against the enemy; Sir John knew that it had capitulated, and acted upon the contents of an intercepted letter, with which Mr Frere was unacquaii ted. But he acted against his own judgement; aware of the danger to which he exposed himself, and despairing of any good that could possibly result from the risk. "The movement I am making," he says, "is of the most dangerous kind. I not only risk to be surrounded every moment by superior forces, but to have my communication intercepted with Gallicia. I wish it to be apparent to the whole world, as it is to every individual of the army, that we have done every thing in our power in support of the Spanish cause, and that we do not abandon it, until long after the Spaniards had abandoned us. It was necessary to risk this army, to convince the people of England, as well as the rest of Europe, that the Spaniards had neither the power nor the inclination to make any efforts for themselves. With respect to the cause, it will probably have no effect. Even if I beat Marshal Soult, it will be attended with no other advantage than the character it will attach to the British arms." For advancing, therefore, when he did, Sir John Moore stands condemned, not only by the enemy, but by himself. The skill of a general is never so completely manifested as in the management of a retreating army: greater military talents were displayed by Moreau in his retreat, than by Buonaparte in all his victories. It is needless to say how Sir John Moore conducted himself on a like occasion, We need only refer to the history of his army, from the time when they turned their backs to the enemy at Sahagun, till the battle of Coruna. The country through which he retreated is one of the strongest and most defensible in Europe; and the excuse which has been set up for the precipitation of his flight, that the French might have overtaken him by lateral roads, is false in fact. One road, and only one, crosses the Bierzo; that road is excellent. Yet even there he left behind him all his stores. his military chest, and not less than a fourth part of his army. To suppose, then, that he could be overtaken by mule-paths and sheep-tracks, over such mountains as those between Astorga and Lugo, is palpably absurd. Yet this retreat has been the subject of panegyric! Lord Castlereagh affirmed, that Jan. 24. never was there, in the military history of any country, a more complete diversion; "it had completely succeeded in drawing the French forces from the pursuit of the Spanish armies, to the northern extremities of the peninsula;"—that is, it drew them to Coruna and Ferrol, and enabled the traitors there to de liver up those important places, and the Ferrol fleet, into their hands!It has been said also, that Sir John, when he advanced against Soult, "saw clearly the whole plan which had been laid against him, prepared for the danger, calculated the time, and acquired the glory of being the first general who has frustrated Buonaparte !"-that is, the glory of frustrating him by having run faster than he could follow. Had there been no English army * Mr James Moore's Narrative, p. 168. |