PROP are, are plainly divine powers; nor can the wit of IV. man ever invent any way by which these faculties could possibly come to be in men, but by immediate communication from God: Again; though we see not, saith he,* the soul of man, as indeed neither are we able to see God; yet, as from the works of God we are certain of his being, so, from the faculties of the soul, its memory, its invention, its swiftness of thought, its noble exercise of all virtue, we cannot but be convinced of its divine original and nature: And, speaking of the strength and beauty of that argument, which, from the wonderful faculties and capacities of the soul, concludes it to be of an immaterial and immortal nature; though all the vulgar and little philosophers in the world, saith he,† (for so I cannot but call all such as dissent from Plato and Socrates, and those superior geniuses,) should put their heads together; they will not only never, while they live, be able to explain any thing so neatly and elegantly; but even this argument itself they will never have understanding enough fully to perceive and comprehend how neat, and beautiful, and strong it is. The chief prejudice against the belief of the soul's existing thus, and living after the death of the body, and the sum of all the objections brought against this doctrine by the Epicurean philosophers of old, who denied the immortality of the soul, and by certain atheistical persons of late, who differ very little from them in their manner of reasoning, is this: That they cannot apprehend how the soul can have any sense of perception, without the body wherein evidently are * Mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut Deum non vides, tamen, ut Deum agnoscis ex operibus ejus, sic ex memoria rerum, et inventione, et celeritate motus, omnique pulchritudine virtutis, vim divinam mentis agnoscito.-Id. ibid. + Licet concurrant plebeii omnes philosophi, (sic enim ii qui à Platone et Socrate et ab illa familia dissident, appellandi videntur ;) non modo nihil unquam tam eleganter explicabunt, sed ne hoc quidem ipsum quam subtiliter conclusum sit intelligent-Id. Ibid. +- -Si immortalis natura animi est, Et sentire potest secreta a corpore nostro; all the organs of sense; But neither can they any bet- PROP. ter apprehend or explain how the soul in the body,* IV. (that is, the body itself, according to their opinion,) is capable of sense or perception, by means of the organs of sense: And besides, this argument, that the soul can have no perception, when all the ways of perception that we have at present ideas of, are`removed, is exactly the very same argument, and no other, than what a man born blind might make use of, with the very same force, to prove that none of us can possibly have in our present bodies any perception of light or colours, as I have explained more particularly in the former discourse.† ral credi This consideration, of the soul's appearing in all The natu. reason to be naturally immortal, afforded great plea- bility of sure and satisfaction to the wisest and soberest men the soul's mortal of wiser in the heathen world; was a great support under ca- being imlamities and sufferings, especially under such as men great use brought upon themselves by being virtuous; filled to the them with great hopes and comfortable expectations heathens. of what was to come hereafter, and was a mighty encouragement to the practice of all moral virtue, and particularly to take pains in subduing the body and keeping it in subjection to the reason of the mind. First, it afforded great pleasure and satisfaction to the wisest and soberest men in the heathen world, from the bare contemplation of the thing itself. No -At neque seorsum oculi, &c. Quinque (ut opinor) eam faciundum est sensibus auctam: Lucret. lib. 3. Quod autem corpus animæ per se? quæ materia? ubi cogitatio illi? quomodo visus? auditus? aut qui tangit ? qui usus ejus? aut quod sine his bonum?-Plin. lib. 7. Neque aliud est quidquam cur incredibilis his animorum videatur æternitas, nisi quod nequeunt qualis sit animus vacans corpore intelligere, et cogitatione comprehendere.-Cie. Tusc. Quæst. lib. 1. * Quasi vero intelligant qualis sit in ipso corpore.Mihi quidem naturam animi intuenti, multo difficilior occurrit cogitatio, multoque obscurior, qualis animus in corpore sit, quam qualis cum exierit. Id. Ibid. + Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, page 71. PROP. body, saith Cicero,* shall ever drive me from the hope IV. of immortality; and, if this my opinion concerning the immortality of the soul should at last prove an error, yet it is a very delightful error, and I will never suffer myself to be undeceived in so pleasing an opinion as long as I live. Secondly, it was a great support to them under calamities and sufferings, especially under such as men brought upon themselves by being virtuous: These and the like contemplations, saith Cicero, had such an effect upon Socrates, that when he was tried for his life, he neither desired any advocate to plead his cause, nor made any supplication to his judges for mercy; and on the very last day of his life made many excellent discourses upon this subject, and a few days before, when he had an opportunity offered him to have escaped out of prison, he would not lay hold of it: For thus he believed, and thus he taught; that when the souls of men depart out of their bodies, they go two different ways; the virtuous to a place of happiness, the wicked and the sensual to misery. Thirdly, it filled them with great hopes and comfortable expectations of what was to come hereafter: O happy day, saith the good old man in Cicero, when I shall go to that blessed assembly of spirits, and depart out of this wicked and miserably confused world! Lastly, it was a mighty encouragement to the practice of all moral virtue, and parti *Sed me nemo de immortalitate depellet.-Cic. Tusc. Quæst. lib. 1. + Quod si in hoc error, quod animos hominum immortales esse credam, libenter erro; nec mihi hunc errorem, quo delector, dum vivo, extorqueri volo.-Idem de Senectute. His et talibus adductus Socrates, nec patronum quæsivit ad judicium capitis, nec judicibus supplex fuit, et supremo vitæ die, de hoc ipso multa disseruit; et paucis ante diebus, cum facile posset educi e custodia, noluit.. -Ita enim censebat, itaque disseruit, duas esse vias, duplicesque cursus animorum, e corpore excedentium, &c.—Id. Tusc. Quæst. lib. 1. See also the passage of Sophocles, cited above. O præclarum diem, quum in illud animorum concilium cætumque proficiscar, et quum ex hac turba et colluvione discedam!Idem de Senect. IV. cularly to take pains in subduing the body and keeping PROP. it in subjection to the reason of the mind: We ought to spare no pains, saith Plato,* to obtain the habit of virtue and wisdom in this life; for the prize is noble, and the hope is very great. Again; having reckoned up the temporal advantages of virtue in the present world, he adds :† But we have not yet mentioned the greatest and chiefest rewards which are proposed to virtue; for what can be truly great in so small a portion of time ?-The whole age of the longest liver in this our present world, being inconsiderable, and nothing in comparison of eternity. And again ; these things, saith he, are nothing, either in number or greatness, in comparison with those rewards of virtue, and punishments of vice, which attend men after death. And to mention no more places, they, saith he,|| who in the games hope to obtain a victory in such poor matters as wrestling, running, and the like, think not much to prepare themselves for the contest by great temperance and abstinence; and shall our scholars, in the study of virtue, not have courage and resolution enough to persevere, with patience, for a far nobler prize? Words very like those of St. Paul, 1 Cor. ix. 24. Know ye not that they which run in a race, run all; and every man that striveth for the mastery, is temperate in all things? Now they do it to obtain a corruptible crown, but we an incorruptible. ment for a 2. Another argument which may be used in proof The arguof a future state, so far as to amount to a very great future probability, is, that necessary desire of immortality, state # Χρὴ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον, καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη.—Plato in Phædone. † Καὶ μεν τά γε μέγιστα ἐπίχειρα ἀρετῆς καὶ προκειμενα ἆθλα ἐ διεληλύθαμεν.—Τί δ' ἂν ἔν γε ὀλίγῳ χρόνω μέγα γένοιτο ; πᾶς γὰρ ἔτός γε ὁ εν παιδος μέχρι πρεσβύτε χρόνος πρὸς πάντα ὀλίγος πέ τις ἂν εἴη. Plato de Republ. lib. 10. † Ταῦτα τοίνυν ἐδέν ἐστι πλήθει ἐδὲ μεγέθει πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἅ τελευτήσαντα ἑκάτερον περιμένει.—Idem, ibid. || Οἱ μὲν ἄρα νίκης ἕνεκα πάλης καὶ δρόμων καὶ τῶν τοιέτων, ἐτόλμησαν ἀπέχεσθαι. Οἱ δὲ ἡμέτεροι παιδες ἀδυνατήσεσι καρτερεῖν, πολὺ καλλιόνος veza viens.-Plato de Legib. lib. 8. IV. drawn PROP. which seems to be naturally implanted in all men, with an unavoidable concern for what is to come hereafter. If there be no existence after this life, it from men's will seem that the irrational creatures who always sire of im. enjoy the present good, without any care or solicimortality. tude for what may happen afterwards, are better pro natural de Another from men's ment of actions. Rom. ii. 14, 15. vided for by nature than man, whose reason and foresight, and all other those very faculties, by which they are made more excellent than beasts, serve them, upon this supposition, scarcely for any other purpose, than to render them uneasy and uncertain, and fearful and solicitous about things which are not. And it is not at all probable that God should have given men appetites which were never to be satisfied; desires which had no objects to answer them; and unavoidable apprehensions of what was never really to come to pass. 3. Another argument, which may be brought to drawn prove a future state, is that conscience which all men conscience have of their own actions, or that inward judgment or judg which they necessarily pass upon them in their own their own minds; whereby they that have not any law, are a law unto themselves, their conscience bearing witness, and their thoughts accusing or else excusing one another. There is no man, who at any time does good, and brave, and generous things, but the reason of his own mind applauds him for so doing; and no man at any time does things base and vile, dishonourable and wicked, but at the same time he condemns himself in what he does. The one is necessarily accompanied with good hope, and expectation of reward; the other with continual torment and fear of punishment. And hence, as before, it is not probable that God should have so framed and constituted the mind of man as necessarily to pass upon itself a judgment which shall never be verified, and stand perpetually and unavoidably convicted by a sentence which shall never be confirmed. Another 4. Lastly, another argument, which may be drawn drawn from right reason, in proof of a future state, is this; from man's |