ledge, his discernment, his sincerity, and his impartiality are well known and acknowledged, would not one naturally desire to know his decision? Moreover, the majority of readers are incapable of judging in these matters for themselves, and thence cannot derive the moral instruction which certain facts are fitted to impart. Should he then leave them continually in doubt and in ignorance by depriving them of the advantage of his reflections? For a man is not "plus savant quand il doute, qu'il n'est riche quand il cherche."

204. But such reflections should be short, and not too frequent; they should naturally spring from the subject and be intimately connected with it. They produce much greater effect when they are expressed indirectly, or are incorporated in the body of the work, than if they are presented under the form of a direct and detached sentence. Thus Tacitus, speaking of the manner in which Agricola was treated by Domitian, adds, "proprium humani ingenii est odisse quem læseris." This reflection is just and well placed, but its form is too philosophical. The same historian says elsewhere, when speaking of Germanicus, "Anxius occultis in se patrui aviæque odiis, quorum causæ acriores quia iniquæ." This thought is of the same nature as the preceding; it produces the greater effect because it is connected with the narration, and seems to be given simply as the reason for the disquiet that preyed upon the mind of Germanicus, on account of the jealousy and enmity with which Livia and Tiberius regarded him.

SECT. 4. OF INTEREST.

205. The second duty of the historian is to please and interest the reader. He will succeed in this if he omits unimportant facts,-those which lead to no result of consequence, and those which do not conduce to instruction. But he ought not to pass over in silence any of those circumstances or details. which tend to fix important facts in the memory: he should paint his scenes so vividly as to render them present to the imagination; and he must faithfully depict the genius, the character, and the manners of the people whose history he writes, as well as those of the great men, and in general of all the most distinguished personages who figure in his story.

SECT. 5. OF UNITY.

206. It is not sufficient to instruct and interest the mind, we must go farther than merely give an exposition of the succession of events; we must probe into their causes and effects; we must demonstrate how some prepared the way for others, and show how they are all bound and connected together in one continuous chain. It is this mutual dependence of the facts upon each other that constitutes the unity of history, and renders it truly instructive and interesting.

207. For, however varied the events that constitute a history may be, they have always some relation or dependence upon each other. If they have

not this, it is a proof that they lead to no important result, and that consequently they ought to be rejected as useless.

208. To effect this unity in his work the historian ought to be master of the whole succession of events which he means to relate, the system or plan which binds them together, the end to which they tend, and the principle or source from which they flow. A man never acts but with some intention in view, and in the whole series of his actions there is always some object which he proposes to himself, and some motive by which he is influenced and determined. Now this motive always springs from preceding events, from his interests, from his genius, from his peculiar character, and from that of those with whom he associates. It is the business of the historian to discover this object, and to unravel this motive. It may infallibly be ascertained from the actions which result from it.

209. But in the progress and direction of human affairs there is another force which has a still more powerful influence; and this is that of Providence, which it is very easy to distinguish and ascertain, because it is constant in its operation, and its tendency is always distinctly known. God, indeed, cannot act but for his own glory, which is the only end worthy of him, and his glory consists in being known and served by men. To this end he directs, with wonderful sweetness and irresistible force, all human events, and all the designs of man, however adverse they may seem to this end, still conduce to

nothing else. The historian, then, would be blind indeed if he did not recognise the divine agency in the great examples of virtue which God has given at all times to men to lead them to happiness; in the scandals which he permits to try the virtue of his elect; in the growth and prosperity of those states that encourage and protect religion; and in the downfall and calamities he inflicts upon people and kings, in order to punish them for their crimes, and to make them know and feel the nothingness of sublunary felicity.

To this great principle of unity all the revolutions that have taken place in the world must finally be referred. Here will be found the sole bond which links together all the facts of the universal history of mankind.

CHAPTER III.

Of the manner of writing History.

ART. I. OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

210. Hence there are two methods of writing history. In the one, all particular detail of facts which are supposed to be generally known to the reader are suppressed, and the causes of events collected into one view, and the results or consequences that follow them are alone dwelt upon. Το this species of historical composition the name of the philosophy of history has been given. Bossuet in

his "Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle," and Montesquieu in his " Considerations sur le grandeur et la décadence des Romains," who have followed this method, are the best models in this kind. o historical composition.

211. The fault to be avoided in these kinds of histories, a fault common to historical authors of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries-is not to reason upon the facts, but to anticipate them; to conclude from certain principles previously entertained that the facts are of this or that nature, and must have passed in the manner preconceived; and hence that their causes and consequences must necessarily be in conformity with such notions. Hence, the philosophical historian, prepossessed with his peculiar ideas, takes for granted the certainty of what he pretends to prove, without having collected a sufficient number of facts to support his views; or, perhaps, what is still more rash and unjust, he warps the facts to his theories, often suppresses those which contradict his position, or, at least, alters their circumstances, and consequently falsifies the truth which is the sole foundation of history, and, hence, he can no longer have that impartiality which can alone assure to him credibility.

ART. II. OF HISTORY PROPERLY SO CALLED.

212. The other mode of writing history consists in presenting the facts in all their details. This is the method adopted by Herodotus, Livy, Rollin, Robertson, etc. In this the writer supposes the