followed in this part of the discourse, until it gradually conducts to the most complete demonstration. Doubts must be dispelled, and the proofs, when strong, clear, and animated, fix irresolution and carry conviction to the mind. 278. In stating the proofs the best order to be observed is that which nature dictates; viz., to begin by those which are weaker and go on increasing to the end:—or when the whole issue of the cause depends upon one strong argument, it may be stated first, and then the subsidiary arguments may be brought in, as it were, incidentally, to give the greater effect. 279. The former method, that is to say, when the issue of the cause depends upon the combined effect of different arguments, stated separately, has been called by Quintilian the Homeric arrangement of the proofs, in allusion to the manner in which Nestor drew up his troops in the order of battle. « Ίππηας μεν πρωτα συν ιπποισιν και όχεσφι 280. The finding of proofs belongs properly to the science of dialectics; their qualities are principally those which follow. 1. They ought to be suitable to the subject.-As the same mode of reasoning is not suitable to all subjects, so each particular subject has its peculiar kind of argumentation; and a mode of reasoning which would be considered conclusive in some cases would not be equally so in others of a different nature and character. Hence deep reflection, guided by good sense, must direct the speaker in the choice of his proofs. If an argument does not clearly make for his cause it will assuredly injure it. 2. They should not only be suitable to the subject, but to the disposition and character of the audience addressed. It is one of the plainest dictates of common sense that our discourses should be made level to the capacities of those to whom we speak. Young and inexperienced speakers are apt to fall into the opposite error from the vain desire of displaying their talents or erudition, and hence it is that we frequently hear discourses, addressed to a mixed concourse of people, which would seem to have been intended rather for a philosophical or theological chair than a popular audience. It may reasonably be asked, what use is it to address people in a style and language which they do not comprehend? 281. These considerations become more important when we reflect that it is not always those proofs which are in themselves the strongest that carry the greatest weight:-their influence depends upon the dispositions, the habits, the manners of those to whom we speak. Ex. Thus Cato, in his speech against Catiline in the Roman Senate, addressed to the people those arguments which he was sure would make an impression upon them. He appeals to their pride, their ostentation, their luxurious habits, all of which were threatened with danger if Catiline triumphed. “Sed, per Deos immortales, vos ego appello, qui semper domos, villas, signa, tabulas vestras pluris quam Rempublicam fecistis: si ista cujuscumque modi sint, quæ amplexamini, retinere, si voluptatibus vestris otium præbere vultis; expergiscimini aliquando et capessite Rempublicam. Non nunc agitur de vectigalibus, non de sociorum injuriis: libertas et anima nostra in dubio est."-Sallust. So, too, in Demosthenes, we find nothing that is not to the point. In all his orations there is a close chain of reasoning; no meretricious display of ornament; no idle discussion foreign to his subject. His discourses gradually increase in force and vehemence as he proceeds, and he illustrates his positions by bold figures and lively images. We are at once impressed that he has nothing but the good of the republic at heart, and we feel that nature herself speaks in all his transports. “Όρατε γας, ώ Ανδρες Αθηναίοι, το πρᾶγμα, δι προεληλυθεν ασελγείας ανθρωπος, ος ουδ' αιρεσιν υμῖν διδωσι του πράττειν, η αγειν ησυχίαν, αλλ' απειλει και λογους ὑπερηφανους, ως φασι, λεγει και ουκ διος τι εστιν εχων ά κατεστραπται, μενειν επι τούτων. Αλλ' αει τι προσπεριβάλλεται, και κυκλῳ πανταχη μελλοντας ὑμᾶς και καθημένους περιστοιχιζεται. Ποτ' ουν, Ανδρες Αθηναίοι, ποτε ἁ χρη πραξετε; επειδανθιγενηται; επειδαν, νη Δια, αναγκη τις ἡ; νῦν δε τι χρη τα γινόμενα ἡγεισθαι; εγω μεν γαρ διμαι τοῖς ελευθεροις μεγίστην αναγκην την ὑπερ τῶν πραγμάτων αισχυνην ειναι η βουλεσθε, είπε μοι, περηοντες αυτών πυνθάνεσθαι κατα την αγοραν, λεγεται τι καινον ; γενοιτο γαρ αν τι καινότερον η Μακεδων ανηρ Αθηναίους καταπολε μῶν και τα των Ελληνων διοιχῶν; Τεθνηκε Φιλιππος, ου μα Δι', αλλ' ασθενει. Τι δ' ὑμῖν διαφέρει; και γαρ αν όντος τι παθη, ταχεως ὑμεῖς ἑτερον Φιλιππον ποιήσετε, αν περ όντω προσεχητε τοῖς πραγμασι τον νοῦν. Ουδε γαρ ουτος παρα την αυτοῦ βωμην τοσουτον επηύξηται, ςσον παρα την ὑμετέραν αμετ λεlav."-Demosthenes. The Latin historians abound in specimens of genuine eloquence which in force and appropriateness have never been surpassed. As an example, in illustration of what has been said above, take the following from Livy, in which the young Perolla is dissuaded by his father Pacuvius from the assassination of Hannibal, on the occasion of a banquet given by the Carthagenian general after the surrender of Capua. "Per ego te, fili, quæcunque jura liberos jungunt parentibus, precor quæsoque, ne ante oculos patris facere et pati omnia infanda velis.-Paucæ horæ sunt, intra quas jurantes quidquid deorum est, dextra dextras jungentes, fidem obstrinximus, ut sacratas fide manus, digressi ab colloquio, extemplo in eum armaremus? Surgis ab hospitali mensâ, ad quam tertius Campanorum adhibitus ab Annibale es, ut eam ipsam mensam cruentares hospitis sanguine? Annibalem, pater filio meo potui placare: filium Annibali non possum ! "Sed sit nihil sancti, non fides, non religio, non pietas; audeantur infanda, si non perniciem nobis cum scelere afferunt. Unus agressurus es Annibalem? Quid illa turba tot liberorum servorumque? quid in unum intenti omnium oculi? quid tot dextræ? Torpescentne in amentiâ illâ? Vultum ipsius Annibalis quem armati exercitus sustinere nequeunt, quem horret Populus Romanus, tu sustinebis!— Et alia auxilia desint, me ipsum ferire, corpus meum opponentem pro corpore Annibalis, sustinebis? Atqui per meum pectus petendus ille tibi transfigendusque est.-Deterreri hic sine te potius quam illic vinci. Valeant preces apud te meæ, sicut pro te hodie valuerunt."*-Lib. xxiii. 8, 9. V. OF THE REFUTATION. 282. The refutation is a species of indirect confirmation, and consists in destroying the proofs and arguments which have been adduced by an adversary; or which are opposed to the view we take of our subject. 283. To execute this part of the discourse pro * It may amuse the classical reader to see how this admirable speech is unintentionally travestied by Silius Italicus. "Per si quid superest vitæ, per jura parentis, Non jam tibi pectora pubis Sidoniæ fodienda manu tutantia regem. Hoc jugulo dextram explora; namque hæc tibi ferrum, |