Fourthly, That it consisteth in this point, that
every common subject by the poll be fit to
make a soldier, and not only certain condi-
tions or degrees of men.
Fifthly, That it consisteth in the temper of the
government fit to keep the subjects in good
heart and courage, and not to keep them in
the condition of servile vassals.

ways trouble a sound resolution. And those that are conversant attentively in the histories of those times, shall find that this purchase which Alexander made and compassed, was offered by fortune twice before to others, though by accident they went not through with it; namely, to Agesi. laus, and Jason of Thessaly: for Agesilaus, after he had made himself master of most of the low

And, sixthly, That it consisteth in the com- provinces of Asia, and had both design and commandment of the sea.

mission to invade the higher countries, was diverted and called home upon a war excited against his country by the states of Athens and Thebes, being incensed by their orators and counsellors, which were bribed and corrupted from Persia, as Agesilaus himself avouched pleasantly, when he said, That a hundred thousand archers of the King of Persia had driven him home: understanding it, because an archer was the stamp upon the Persian coin of gold. And Jason of Thessaly, being a man born to no greatness, but one that made a fortune of himself, and had obtained by his own vivacity of spirit, joined with the opportunities of time, a great army, compounded of voluntaries and adventurers, to the terror of all Græcia, that continually expected where that

And let no man so much forget the subject propounded, as to find strange, that here is no mention of religion, laws, or policy. For we speak of that which is proper to the amplitude and growth of states, and not of that which is common to their preservation, happiness, and all other points of well-being. First, therefore, touching largeness of territories, the true greatness of kingdoms upon earth is not without some analogy with the kingdom of heaven, as our Saviour describes it; which he doth resemble, not to any great kernel or nut, but to one of the least grains; but yet such a one, as hath a property to grow and spread. For as for large countries and multitude of provinces, they are many times rather matters of burden than of strength, as may manifestly appear both by reason and exam-cloud would fall; disclosed himself in the end, ple. By reason thus. There be two manners of securing of large territories, the one by the natural arms of every province, and the other by the protecting arms of the principal estate, in which case commonly the provincials are held disarmed. So are there two dangers incident unto every estate, foreign invasion, and inward rebellion. Now, such is the nature of things, that these two remedies of estate do fall respectively into these two dangers, in case of remote provinces. For if such an estate rest upon the natural arms of the provinces, it is sure to be subject to rebellion or revolt; if upon protecting arms, it is sure to be weak against invasion: neither can this be avoided.

Now, for examples, proving the weakness of states possessed of large territories, I will use only two, eminent and selected. The first shall be of the kingdom of Persia, which extended from Egypt, inclusive, unto Bactria, and the borders of the East India; and yet, nevertheless, was overrun and conquered, in the space of seven years, by a nation not much bigger than this isle of Britain, and newly grown into name, having been utterly obscure till the time of Philip, the son of Amyntas. Neither was this effected by any rare or heroical prowess in the conqueror, as is vulgarly conceived, for that Alexander the Great goeth now for one of the wonders of the world; for those that have made a judgment grounded upon reason of estate, do find that conceit to be merely popular; for so Livy pronounceth of him, ~ Nihil aliud quam bene ausus vana contemnere." Wherein he judgeth of vastness of territory as a vanity that may astonish a weak mind, but no

that his design was for an expedition into Persia, the same which Alexander, not many years after achieved, wherein he was interrupted by a private conspiracy against his life, which took effect. So that it appeareth, as was said, that it was not any miracle of accident that raised the Macedonian monarchy, but only the weak composition of that vast state of Persia, which was prepared for a prey to the first resolute invader.

The second example that I will produce, is of the Roman empire, which had received no diminution in territory, though great in virtue and forces, till the time of Jovianus. For so it was alleged by such as opposed themselves to the rendering Nisibis upon the dishonourable retreat of the Roman army out of Persia. At which time it was avouched, that the Romans, by the space of eight hundred years, had never, before that day, made any cession or renunciation to any part of their territory, whereof they had once had a constant and quiet possession. And yet, nevertheless, immediately after the short reign of Jovianus, and towards the end of the joint reign of Valentinianus and Valens, which were his immediate successors, and much more in the times succeeding, the Roman empire, notwithstanding the magnitude thereof, became no better than a carcase, whereupon all the vultures and birds of prey of the world did seize and ravine for many ages, for a perpetual monument of the essential difference between the scale of miles, and the scale of forces. And, therefore, upon these reasons and examples, we may safely conclude, that largeness of territory is so far from being a thing inseparable from greatness of power, as it is

many times contrariant and incompatible with the
same. But to make a reduction of that error to a
truth, it will stand thus, that then greatness of
territory addeth strength, when it hath these four
conditions:

First, That the territories be compacted, and
not dispersed.
Secondly, That the region which is the heart
and seat of the state, be sufficient to support
those parts, which are but provinces and
additions.

Thirdly, That the arms or martial virtue of the
state be in some degree answerable to the
greatness of dominion.

the boughs and branches. For if the top be over great, and the stalk too slender, there can be no strength. Now, the body is to be accounted so much of an estate, as is not separated or dis-tinguished with any mark of foreigners, but is united specially with the bond of naturalization; and therefore we see that when the state of Rome grew great, they were enforced to naturalize the Latins or Italians, because the Roman stem could not bear the provinces and Italy both as branches : and the like they were contented after to do to most of the Gauls. So, on the contrary part, we see in the state of Lacedæmon, which was nice in that point, and would not admit their confederates to be incorporate with them, but rested upon the natural-born subjects of Sparta, how that a small time after they had embraced a larger empire, they were presently surcharged, in respect to the slenderness of the stem. For so in the defection of the Thebans and the rest against them, one of the principal revolters spake most aptly, and with great efficacy in the assembly of the associates, telling them, That the state of Sparta was like a river, which, after that it had run a great way, and taken other rivers and streams into it, ran strong and mighty, but about the head and fountain of it was shallow and weak; and therefore advised them to assail and invade the main of Sparta, knowing they should there find weak resistance either of towns or in the field: of towns, because upon confidence of their greatness they fortified not upon the main; in the field, because their people was exhaust by garrisons and services far off. Which counsel proved sound, to the astonishment of all Græcia at that time.

And, lastly, That no part or province of the state be utterly unprofitable, but do confer some use or service to the state. The first of these is manifestly true, and scarcely needeth any explication. For if there be a state that consisteth of scattered points instead of lines, and slender lines instead of latitudes, it can never be solid, and in the solid figure is strength. But what speak we of mathematical principles? The reason of state is evident, that if the parts of an estate be disjoined and remote, and so be interrupted with the provinces of another sovereignty; they cannot possibly have ready succours in case of invasion, nor ready suppression in case of rebellion, nor ready recovery, in case of loss or alienation by either of both means. And, therefore, we see what an endless work the King of Spain hath had to recover the Low Countries, although it were to him patrimony and not purchase; and that chiefly in regard of the great distance. So we see that our nation kept Calais a hundred years space after it lost the rest of France, in regard of the near situation; and yet in the end they that were nearer carried it by surprise, and overran succour. Therefore Titus Quintius made a good comparison of the state of the Achaians to a tortoise, which is safe when it is retired within the shell, but if any part be put forth, then the part exposed endangereth all the rest. For so it is with states that have provinces dispersed, the defence whereof doth commonly consume and decay, and sometimes ruin the rest of the estate. And so, and added forces, added treasures, added reputalikewise, we may observe, that all the great monarchies, the Persians, the Romans, and the like of the Turks, they had not any provinces to the which they needed to demand access through the country of another: neither had they any long races or narrow angles of territory, which were environed or clasped in with foreign states; but their dominions were continued and entire, and had thickness and squareness in their orb or contents. But these things are without contradiction. For the second, concerning the proportion between the principal region, and those which are but secondary, there must evermore distinction be made between the body or stem of the tree, and

For the third, concerning the proportion of the military forces of a state to the amplitude of empire, it cannot be better demonstrated than by the two first examples which we produced of the weakness of large territory, if they be compared within themselves according to difference of time. For Persia at a time was strengthened with large territory, and at another time weakened; and so was Rome. For while they flourished in arms, the largeness of territory was a strength to them,

tion: but when they decayed in arms, then greatness became a burden. For their protecting forces did corrupt, supplant, and enervate the natural and proper forces of all their provinces, which relied and depended upon the succours and directions of the state above. And when that waxed impotent and slothful, then the whole state laboured with her own magnitude, and in the end fell with her own weight. And that, no question, was the reason of the strange inundations of people which both from the east and north-west overwhelmed the Roman empire in one age of the world, which a man upon the sudden would attribute to some constellation or fatal revolution

decided not by the sharpest sword, but by the | estate, doth generate faster than it can sustain.
greatest purse. And that very text or saying of In which people it well appeared what an author-
Mutianus which was the original of this opinion, ity iron hath over gold at the battle of Granson,
is misvouched, for his speech was, "Pecuniæ at what time one of the principal jewels of
sunt nervi belli civilis," which is true, for that Burgundy was sold for twelve pence, by a poor
civil wars cannot be between people of differing Swiss, that knew no more a precious stone than
valour; and, again, because in them men are as did Esop's cock. And although this people
oft bought as vanquished. But in case of foreign have made no plantations with their arms, yet we
wars, you shall scarcely find any of the great see the reputation of them such, as not only their
monarchies of the world, but have had their foun- forces have been employed and waged, but their
dations in poverty and contemptible beginnings, alliance sought and purchased, by the greatest
being in that point also conform to the heavenly kings and states of Europe. So as though for-
kingdom, of which it is pronounced, "Regnum tune, as it fares sometimes with princes to their
Dei non venit cum observatione." Persia, a servants, hath denied them a grant of lands, yet
mountainous country, and a poor people in com- she hath granted them liberal pensions, which are
parison of the Medes and other provinces which made memorable and renowned to all posterity,
they subdued. The state of Sparta, a state by the event which ensued to Louis the Twelfth;
wherein poverty was enacted by law and ordi- who, being pressed uncivilly by message from
nance; all use of gold and silver and rich furni- them for the enhancing their pensions, entered
ture being interdicted. The state of Macedonia, into choler, and broke out in these words,
a state mercenary and ignoble until the time of "What! will these villains of the mountains put
Philip. The state of Rome, a state that had poor a tax upon me?" which words cost him his
and pastoral beginnings. The state of the Turks, Duchy of Milan, and utterly ruined his affairs in
which hath been since the terror of the world, Italy. Neither were it indeed possible at this
founded upon a transmigration of some bands of day, that that nation should subsist without
Sarmatian Scythes, that descended in a vagabond descents and impressions upon their neighbours,
manner upon the province that is now termed were it not for the great utterance of people which
Turcomania; out of the remnants whereof, after they make into the services of foreign princes and
great variety of fortune, sprang the Ottoman estates, thereby discharging not only number, but
family. But never was any position of estate so in that number such spirits as are most stirring
visibly and substantially confirmed as this, touch- and turbulent.
ing the pre-eminence, yea, and predominancy of
valour above treasure, as by the two descents and
inundations of necessitous and indigent people,
the one from the east, and the other from the west,
that of the Arabians or Saracens, and that of the
Goths, Vandals, and the rest: who, as if they had
been the true inheritors of the Roman empire,
then dying, or at least grown impotent and aged,
entered upon Egypt, Asia, Græcia, Afric, Spain,
France, coming to these nations, not as to a prey,
but as to a patrimony; not returning with spoil,
but seating and planting themselves in a number
of provinces, which continue their progeny, and
bear their names till this day. And all these men
had no other wealth but their adventures, nor no
other title but their swords, nor no other press but
their poverty. For it was not with most of these
people as it is in countries reduced to a regular
civility, that no man almost marrieth except he
see he have means to live; but population went
on, howsoever sustentation followed, and taught
by necessity, as some writers report, when they
found themselves surcharged with people, they For the first of these, it is a thing that cannot
divided their inhabitants into three parts, and one be denied, that in equality of valour the better
third, as the lot fell, was sent abroad and left to purse is an advantage. For like, as in wrestling
their adventures. Neither is the reason much between man and man, if there be a great over-
unlike, though the effect hath not followed in match in strength, it is to little purpose though
regard of a special diversion, in the nation of the one have the better breath; but, if the strength be
Swisses, inhabiting a country, which in regard near equal, then he that is shorter winded will,
of the mountainous situation, and the popular if the wager consist of many falls, in the end have

And, therefore, we may conclude, that as largeness of territory, severed from military virtue, is but a burden; so, that treasure and riches severed from the same, is but a prey. It resteth therefore to make reduction of this error also unto a truth by distinction and limitation, which will be in this manner:

Treasure and moneys do then add true greatness and strength to a state, when they are accompanied with these three conditions:

First, The same condition which hath been

annexed to largeness of territory, that is, that they be joined with martial powers and valour.

Secondly, That treasure doth then advance greatness, when it is rather in mediocrity than in great abundance. And again better, when some part of the state is poor, than when all parts of it are rich.

And, lastly, That treasure in a state is more or less serviceable, as the hands are in which the wealth chiefly resteth.

First, that there be quantity sufficient of treasure, as well in the treasury of the crown or state, as in the purse of the private subject.

Secondly, that the wealth of the subjects be rather in many hands than in few.

And, thirdly, that it be in those hands, where there is likest to be the greatest sparing, and

useth to be greatest expense and consumption.

the worst; so it is in the wars, if it be a match between a valiant people and a cowardly, the advantage of treasure will not serve; but if they be near in valour, then the better moneyed state will be the better able to continue the war, and so in the end to prevail. But if any man think that money can make those provisions at the first encounters, that no difference of valour can counter-increase, and not in those hands, wherein there vail, let him look back but into those examples which have been brought, and he must confess, that all those furnitures whatsoever are but shows and mummeries, and cannot shroud fear against resolution. For there shall he find companies armed with armour of proof, taken out of the stately armories of kings who spared no cost, overthrown by men armed by private bargain and chance as they could get it: there shall he find armies appointed with horses bred of purpose, and in choice races, chariots of war, elephants, and the like terrors, mastered by armies meanly appointed. So of towns strongly fortified, basely yielded, and the like; all being but sheep in a lion's skin, where valour faileth.

For the second point, that competency of treasure is better than surfeit, is a matter of common place or ordinary discourse; in regard that excess of riches, neither in public nor private, ever hath any good effects, but maketh men either slothful and effeminate, and so no enterprisers; or insolent and arrogant, and so overgreat embracers; but most generally cowardly and fearful to lose, according to the adage, "Timidus Plutus;" so as this needeth no further speech. But a part of that assertion requireth a more deep consideration, being a matter not so familiar, but yet most assuredly true. For it is necessary in a state that shall grow and enlarge, that there be that composition which the poet speaks of, "Multis utile bellum ;" an ill condition of a state, no question, if it be meant of a civil war, as it was spoken; but a condition proper to a state that shall increase, if it be taken of a foreign war. For except there be a spur in the state, that shall excite and prick them on to the wars, they will but keep their own, and seek no further. And in all experience, and stories, you shall find but three things that prepare and dispose an estate to war; the ambition of governors, a state of soldiers professed, and the hard means to live of many subjects. Whereof the last is the most forcible and the most constant. And this is the true reason of that event which we observed and rehearsed before, that most of the great kingdoms of the world have sprung out of hardness and scarceness of means, as the strongest herbs out of the barrenest soils.

For the third point, concerning the placing and distributing of treasure in a state, the position is simple; that, then treasure is greatest strength to a state, when it is so disposed, as it is readiest and easiest to come by for public service and use; which one position doth infer three conclusions

For it is not the abundance of treasure in the subjects' hands that can make sudden supply of the want of a state; because, reason tells us, and experience both, that private persons have least will to contribute when they have most cause; for when there is noise or expectation of wars, then is always the deadest times for moneys, in regard every man restraineth and holdeth fast his means for his own comfort and succour, according as Solomon saith, The riches of a man are as a stronghold in his own imagination: and, therefore, we see by infinite examples, and none more memorable than that of Constantinus the last Emperor of the Greeks, and the citizens of Constantinople, that subjects do often choose rather to be frugal dispensers for their enemies, than liberal lenders to their prince. Again, wheresoever the wealth of the subject is engrossed into few hands, it is not possible it should be so respondent and yielding to payments and contributions for the public, both because the true estimation or assessment of great wealth is more obscure and uncertain; and, because the burden seemeth lighter when the charge lieth upon many hands; and, further, because the same greatness of wealth is for the most part not collected and obtained without sucking it from many, according to the received similitude of the spleen, which never swelleth but when the rest of the body pineth and abateth. And, lastly, it cannot be that any wealth should leave a second overplus for the public that doth not first leave an overplus to the private stock of him that gathers it; and, therefore, nothing is more certain, than that those states are least able to aid and defray great charge for wars, or other public disbursements, whose wealth resteth chiefly in the hands of the nobility and gentlemen. For what by reason of their magnificence and waste in expense, and what by reason of their desire to advance and make great their own families, and again upon the coincidence of the former reason, because they are always the fewest; small is the help, as to payments or charge, that can be levied or expected from them towards the occasions of a state. Contrary it is of such states whose wealth resteth in the hands of merchants, burghers, tradesmen, freeholders, farmers in the country, and the like, whereof we have a most evident and present example before our eyes, in our neighbours of the Low Countries, who could never have endured and continued so inestimable and insupportable charge, either by their natural frugality, or by