verified by a number of examples; that whatsoever is gained by an abusive treaty, ought to be restored "in integrum:" as we see the daily experience of this in civil pleas; for the images of great things are best seen contracted into small glasses: we see, I say, that all pretorian courts, if any of the parties be entertained or laid asleep, under pretence of arbitrement or accord, and that the other party, during that time, doth cautelously get the start and advantage at common law, though it be to judgment and execution; yet the pretorian court will set back all things "in statu quo prius," no respect had to such eviction or dispossession. Lastly, let there be no mistaking; as if when I speak of a war for the recovery of the Palatinate, I meant, that it must be "in linea recta," upon that place for look into "jus faciale," and all examples, and it will be found to be without scruple, that after a legation" ad res repetendas," and a refusal, and a denunciation or indiction of a war, the war is no more confined to the place of the quarrel, but is left at large and to choice, as to the particular conducing designs, as opportunities and advantages shall invite.

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men of Venice, unused to the wars, out of the love of their country, became brave and martial the first day, and so likewise the re-adeption of Trevigi, and the rest of their dominions, was matter of scruple, whether just or no, because it had source from a quarrel ill begun? The war of the Duke of Urbin, nephew to Pope Julius the Second, when he made himself head of the Spanish mutineers, was as unjust as unjust might be; a support of desperate rebels; an invasion of St. Peter's patrimony, and what you will. The race of this war fell upon the loss of Urbin itself, which was the duke's undoubted right; yet, in this case, no penitentiary, though he had enjoined him never so strait penance to expiate his first offence, would have counselled him to have given over the pursuit of his right for Urbin; which, after, he prosperously re-obtained, and hath transmitted to his family yet until this day. Nothing more unjust than the invasion of the Spanish Armada in 88 upon our seas: for our land was holy land to them, they might not touch it; shall I say, therefore, that the defence of Lisbon, or Cales, afterwards, was unjust? There be thousands of examples; "utor in re non dubia exemplis non necessariis:" the reason is plain; wars are "vindictæ," revenges, reparations. But revenges are not infinite, but according to the measure of the first wrong or damage. And, therefore, when a voluntary offensive war, by the design or fortune of the war, is turned to a necessary defensive war, the scene of the tragedy is changed, and it is a new act to begin. For the particular actions of war, though they are complicate in fact, yet they are separate and distinct in right: like to cross suits in civil pleas, which are sometimes both just. But this is so clear, as needeth no farther to be insisted upon. And yet if in things so clear, it were fit to speak of more or less clear in our present cause, it is the more clear on our part, because the possession of Bohemia is settled with the emperor. For though it be true, that "non datur compensatio injuriarum ;" yet were there somewhat more colour to detain the Palati- Concerning the former proposition, it is good nate, as in the nature of a recovery, in value or to hear what time saith. Thucydides, in his compensation, if Bohemia had been lost, or were inducement to his story of the great war of still the stage of war. Of this, therefore, I speak Peloponnesus, sets down in plain terms, that the no more. As for the title of proscription or for- true cause of that war was the overgrowing greatfeiture, wherein the emperor, upon the matter, ness of the Athenians, and the fear that the hath been judge and party, and hath justiced | Lacedæmonians stood in thereby; and doth not himself, God forbid but that it should well endure doubt to call it, a necessity imposed upon the an appeal to a war. For certainly the court of Lacedæmonians of a war; which are the words heaven is as well a chancery to save and debar forfeitures, as a court of common law to decide rights; and there would be work enough in Germany, Italy, and other parts, if imperial forfeitures should go for good titles.

Thus much for the first ground of war with Spain, being in the nature of a plaint for the recovery of the Palatinate: omitting here that which might be the seed of a larger discourse, and is

To proceed therefore to the second ground of a war with Spain, we have set it down to be, a just fear of the subversion of our civil estate. So, then, the war is not for the Palatinate only, but for England, Scotland, Ireland, our king, our prince, our nation, all that we have. Wherein two things are to be proved: The one, that a just fear, without an actual invasion or offence, is a sufficient ground of a war, and in the nature of a true defensive: the other, that we have towards Spain cause of just fear; I say, just fear: for as the civilians do well define, that the legal fear is "justus metus qui cadit in constantem virum" in private causes so there is "justus metus qui cadit in constantem senatum, in causa publica;" not out of umbrages, light jealousies, apprehensions afar off, but out of clear foresight of imminent danger.

of a mere defensive: adding that the other causes were but specious and popular. "Verissimam quidem, sed minime sermone celebratam, arbitror extitisse belli causam, Athenienses, magnos effectos et Lacedæmoniis formidolosos, necessitatem illis imposuisse bellandi: quæ autem propalam ferebantur utrinque cause, istæ fuerant, &c." "The truest cause of this war, though least voiced, I conceive to have been this; that the Athenians,

Clinias the Candian, in Plato, speaks desperately and wildly, as if there were no such thing as peace between nations; but that every nation expects but his advantage to war upon another. But yet in that excess of speech there is thus much that may have a civil construction; namely, that every state ought to stand upon its guard, and rather prevent than be prevented. His words are, “Quam rem fere vocant pacem, nudum et inane nomen est; revera autem omnibus, adversus omnes civitates, bellum sempiternum perdurat." "That which men for the most part call peace, is but a naked and empty name; but the truth is, that there is ever between all estates a secret war." I know well this speech is the objection and not the decision, and that it is after refuted; but yet, as I said before, it bears thus much of truth, that if that general malignity, and predisposition to war, which he untruly figureth to be in all nations, be produced and extended to a just fear of being oppressed, then it is no more a true peace, but a name of a peace.

being grown great, to the terror of the Lacedæ-fencing-school, that never ward till the blow be monians, did impose upon them a necessity of a past: "Ut barbari pugiles dimicare solent, ita vos war: but the causes that went abroad in speech bellum geritis cum Philippo: ex his enim is, qui were these, &c." Sulpitius Galba, consul, when ictus est, ictui semper inhæret; quod si eum alibi he persuaded the Romans to a preventive war, verberes, illo manus transfert; ictum autem dewith the later Philip, King of Macedon, in regard pellere, aut prospicere, neque scit neque vult." of the great preparations which Philip had then "As country fellows use to do when they play at on foot, and his designs to ruin some of the wasters, such a kind of war do you, Athenians, confederates of the Romans, confidently saith, make with Philip; for with them he that gets a that they who took that for an offensive war, un-blow straight falleth to ward, when the blow is derstood not the state of the question. "Ignorare passed; and if you strike him in another place, videmini mihi, Quirites, non, utrum bellum an thither goes his hand likewise: but to put by, or pacem habeatis, vos consuli, neque enim liberum foresee a blow, they neither have the skill, nor the id vobis permittet Philippus, qui terra marique | will." ingens bellum molitur, sed utrum in Macedoniam legiones transportetis, an hostem in Italiam recipiatis." "Ye seem to me, ye Romans, not to understand, that the consultation before you is not, whether you shall have war or peace, for Philip will take order you shall be no choosers, who prepareth a mighty war both by land and sea, but whether you shall transport the war into Macedon, or receive it into Italy." Antiochus, when he incited Prusias, King of Bithynia, at that time in league with the Romans, to join with him in war against them, setteth before him a just fear of the overspreading greatness of the Romans comparing it to a fire that continually took, and spread from kingdom to kingdom: "Venire Romanos ad omnia regna tollenda, ut nullum usquam orbis terrarum nisi Romanum imperium esset; Philippum et Nabin expugnatos, se tertium peti; ut quisque proximus ab oppresso sit, per omnes velut continens incendium pervasurum:" "That the Romans came to pull down all kingdoms, and to make the state of Rome a universal monarchy; that Philip and Nabis were already ruinated, and As for the opinion of Iphicrates the Athenian, now was his turn to be assailed; so that, as every it demands not so much towards a war as a just state lay next to the other that was oppressed, so fear, but rather cometh near the opinion of the fire perpetually grazed." Wherein it is well Clinias; as if there were ever amongst nations a to be noted, that towards ambitious states, which brooding of a war, and that there is no sure league are noted to aspire to great monarchies, and to seek but impuissance to do hurt. For he, in the treaty upon all occasions to enlarge their dominions, of peace with the Lacedæmonians, speaketh plain "crescunt argumenta justi metus ;" all particular language; telling them, there could be no true fears do grow and multiply out of the contempla-and secure peace, except the Lacedæmonians tion of the general courses and practice of such yielded to those things, which being granted, it states. Therefore, in deliberations of war against would be no longer in their power to hurt the the Turk, it hath been often, with great judgment, Athenians, though they would: and to say truth, maintained, that Christian princes and states have if one mark it well, this was in all memory the always a sufficient ground of invasive war against main piece of wisdom, in strong and prudent the enemy; not for cause of religion, but upon a counsels, to be in perpetual watch, that the states just fear; forasmuch as it is a fundamental law about them should neither by approach, nor by in the Turkish empire, that they may, without any increase of dominion, nor by ruining confederates, other provocation, make war upon Christendom nor by blocking of trade, nor by any the like for the propagation of their law; so that there means, have it in their power to hurt or annoy the lieth upon the Christians a perpetual fear of a states they serve; and whensoever any such cause war, hanging over their heads, from them; and did but appear, straightways to buy it out with a therefore they may at all times, as they think good, war, and never take up peace at credit and upon be upon the prevention. Demosthenes exposeth to interest. It is so memorable, as it is yet as fresh scorn wars which are not preventive, comparing as if it were done yesterday, how that triumvirate those that make them to country fellows in a of kings, Henry the Eighth of England, Francis

the First of France, and Charles the Fifth, emperor | landi, libido dominandi, et si quæ sunt similia, and King of Spain, were in their times so provi- hæc sunt quæ in bellis jure culpantur." And the dent, as scarce a palm of ground could be gotten same St. Thomas in his own text, defining of the by either of the three, but that the other two just causes of a war, doth leave it upon very would be sure to do their best, to set the balance general terms: "Requiritur ad bellum causa justa, of Europe upright again. And the like diligence ut scilicet illi, qui impugnantur, propter aliquam was used in the age before by that league, where- culpam impugnationem mereanter:" for "impugwith Guicciardine beginneth his story, and maketh natio culpa" is a far more general word than "ultio it, as it were, the calendar of the good days of injuriæ." And thus much for the first proposition, Italy, which was contracted between Ferdinando, of the second ground of a war with Spain: namely, King of Naples, Lorenzo of Medici, Potentate of that a just fear is a just cause of a war; and that Florence, and Lodovico Sforza, Duke of Milan, a preventive war is a true defensive. designed chiefly against the growing power of the Venetians; but yet so, as the confederates had a perpetual eye one upon another, that none of them should overtop. To conclude, therefore; howsoever some schoolmen, otherwise reverend men, yet fitter to guide penknives than swords, seem precisely to stand upon it, that every offensive war must be "ultio," a revenge, that presupposeth a precedent assault or injury; yet neither do they descend to this point, which we now handle, of a just fear; neither are they of authority to judge this question against all the precedents of time. For, certainly, as long as men are men, the sons, as the poets allude, of Prometheus, and not of Epimetheus, and as long as reason is reason, a just fear will be a just cause of a preventive war; but especially if it be part of the case, that there be a nation that is manifestly detected to aspire to monarchy and new acquest; then other states, assuredly, cannot be justly accused for not staying for the first blow; or for not accepting Polyphemus's courtesy, to be the last that shall be

eaten up.

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Nay, I observe farther, that in that passage of Plato which I cited before, and even in the tenet of that person that beareth the resolving part, and not the objecting part, a just fear is justified for a cause of an invasive war, though the same fear proceed not from the fault of the foreign state to be assailed for it is there insinuated, that if a state, out of the distemper of their own body, do fear sedition and intestine troubles to break out amongst themselves, they may discharge their own ill humours upon a foreign war for a cure. And this kind of cure was tendered by Jasper Coligni, Admiral of France, to Charles the Ninth, the French king, when by a vive and forcible persuasion he moved him to a war upon Flanders, for the better extinguishment of the civil wars of France; but neither was that counsel prosperous; neither will I maintain that position: for I will never set politics against ethics; especially for that true ethics are but as a handmaid to divinity and religion. Surely St. Thomas, who had the largest heart of the school divines, bendeth chiefly his style against the depraved passions which reign in making wars, speaking out of St. Augustine: "Nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, implacatus et implacabilis animus, feritas rebel

The second or minor proposition was this; that this kingdom hath cause of just fear of overthrow from Spain. Wherein it is true, that fears are ever seen in dimmer lights than facts. And, on the other side, fears use, many times, to be represented in such an imaginary fashion, as they rather dazzle men's eyes than open them: and therefore I will speak in that manner which the subject requires; that is, probably, and moderately, and briefly. Neither will I deduce these fears to present occurrences; but point only at general grounds, leaving the rest to more secret counsels.

Is it nothing, that the crown of Spain hath enlarged the bounds thereof within this last sixscore years, much more than the Ottoman's? I speak not of matches or unions, but of arms, occupations, invasions. Granada, Naples, Milan, Portugal, the East and West Indies; all these are actual additions to that crown. They had a mind to French Britain, the lower part of Picardy, and Piedmont; but they have let fall their bit. They have, to this day, such a hovering possession of the Valtoline, as a hobby hath over a lark: and the Palatinate is in their talons: so that nothing is more manifest, than that this nation of Spain runs a race still of empire, when all other states of Christendom stand in effect at a stay. Look then a little farther into the titles whereby they have acquired, and do now hold these new portions of their crown; and you will find them of so many varieties, and such natures, to speak with due respect, as may appear to be easily minted, and such as can hardly at any time be wanting. And, therefore, so many new conquests and purchases, so many strokes of the alarm bell of fear and awaking to other nations; and the facility of the titles, which hand-over-head have served their turn, doth ring the peal so much the sharper and louder.

Shall we descend from their general disposition to enlarge their dominions, to their particular disposition and eye of appetite which they have had towards us: they have now twice sought to impatronize themselves of this kingdom of England; once by marriage with Queen Mary; and the second time by conquest in 88, when their forces by sea and land were not inferior to those they have now. And at that time in 88, the counsel S

and design of Spain was by many advertisements | And they bragged, that they doubted not to abuse revealed and laid open to be, that they found the and lay asleep the queen and council of England, war upon the Low Countries so churlish and as to have any fear of the party of Papists here; longsome, as they grew then to a resolution, that for that they knew, they said, the state would but as long as England stood in a state to succour cast the eye and look about to see whether there those countries, they should but consume them- were any eminent head of that party, under whom selves in an endless war: and therefore there was it might unite itself; and finding none worth the no other way but to assail and depress England, thinking on, the state would rest secure and take which was as a back of steel to the Flemings. no apprehension: whereas they meant, they said, And who can warrant, I pray, that the same to take a course to deal with the people, and parcounsel and design will not return again? So as ticulars by reconcilements, and confessions, and we are in a strange dilemma of danger: for if we secret promises, and cared not for any head of suffer the Flemings to be ruined, they are our out-party. And this was the true reason why, after work, and we shall remain naked and dismantled: that the seminaries began to blossom, and to make if we succour them strongly, as is fit, and set missions into England, which was about the threethem upon their feet, and do not withal weaken and-twentieth year of Queen Elizabeth, at what Spain, we hazard to change the scene of the war, time also was the first suspicion of the Spanish and turn it upon Ireland or England: like unto invasion, then, and not before, grew the sharp and Theums and defluxions, which, if you apply a severe laws to be made against the Papists. And strong repurcussive to the place affected, and do therefore the Papists may do well to change their not take away the cause of the disease, will shift thanks; and whereas they thank Spain for their and fall straightways to another joint or place. favours, to thank them for their perils and miseries, They have also twice invaded Ireland; once under if they should fall upon them: for that nothing the pope's banner, when they were defeated by ever made their case so ill as the doubt of the the Lord Gray and after in their own name, greatness of Spain, which adding reason of state when they were defeated by the Lord Mountjoy. to matter of conscience and religion, did whet the So as let this suffice for a taste of their disposition laws against them. And this case also seemeth, towards us. But it will be said, this is an alına- in some sort, to return again at this time; except nack for the old year; since 88 all hath been the clemency of his majesty, and the state, do well; Spain hath not assailed this kingdom, how-superabound; as, for my part, I do wish it should; soever by two several invasions from us mightily provoked. It is true: but then consider, that immediately after 88, they were embroiled for a great time in the protection of the league of France, whereby they had their hands full; after being brought extreme low by their vast and continual embracements, they were enforced to be quiet that they might take breath, and do reparations upon their former wastes. But now of late, things seem to come apace to their former estate; nay, with far greater disadvantage to us; for now that they have almost continued, and, as it were, arched their dominions from Milan, by the Valtoline, and Palatinate, to the Low Countries, we see how they thirst and pant after the utter ruin of those states; having in contempt almost the German nation, and doubting little opposition, except it come from England: whereby either we must suffer the Dutch to be ruined, to our own manifest prejudice; or put it upon the hazard I spake of before, that Spain will cast at the fairest. Neither is the point of internal danger, which groweth upon us, to be forgotten; this, that the party of the Papists in England are become more knotted, both in dependence towards Spain and amongst themselves, than they have been. Wherein again comes to be remembered the case of 88: for then also it appeared by divers secret letters, that the design of Spain was, for some years, before the invasion attempted, to prepare a party in this kingdom to adhere to the foreigner at his coming.

and that the proceedings towards them may rather tend to security, and providence, and point of state, than to persecution for religion. But to conclude; these things briefly touched, may serve as in a subject conjectural and future, for to represent how just cause of fear this kingdom may have towards Spain: omitting, as I said before, all present and more secret occurrences.

And

The third ground of a war with Spain, I have set down to be, a just fear of the subversion of our church and religion: which needeth little speech. For if this war be a defensive, as I have proved it to be, no man will doubt, that a defensive war against a foreigner for religion is lawful. Of an offensive war there is more dispute. yet in that instance of the war for the Holy Land and sepulchre, I do wonder sometimes, that the schoolmen want words to defend that which St. Bernard wanted words to commend. But I, that in this little extract of a treatise do omit things necessary, am not to handle things unnecessary. No man, I say, will doubt, but if the pope, or King of Spain, would demand of us to forsake our religion upon pain of a war, it were as unjust a demand, as the Persians made to the Grecians of land and water; or the Ammonites to the Israelites of their right eyes. And we see all the heathen did style their defensive wars, "pro aris et focis;" placing their altars before their hearths. So that it is in vain of this to speak farther. Only this is true; that the fear of the subversion of our

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religion from Spain is the more just, for that all other Catholic princes and states content and contain themselves to maintain their religion within their own dominions, and meddle not with the subjects of other states; whereas the practice of Spain hath been, both in Charles the Fifth's time, and in the time of the league in France, by war; and now with us, by conditions of treaty, to intermeddle with foreign states, and to declare themselves protectors-general of the party of Catholics, through the world. As if the crown of Spain had a little of this, that they would plant the pope's laws by arms, as the Ottomans do the law of Mahomet. Thus much concerning the first main point of justifying the quarrel, if the king shall enter into a war; for this that I have said, and all that followeth to be said, is but to show what he may do.

The second main part of that I have propounded to speak of, is the balance of forces between Spain and us. And this also tendeth to no more, but what the king may do. For what he may do is of two kinds: what he may do as just; and what he may do as possible. Of the one I have already spoken; of the other I am now to speak. I said, Spain was no such giant; and yet, if he were a giant, it will be but as it was between David and Goliath, for "God is on our side." But to leave all arguments that are supernatural, and to speak in a human and politic sense, I am led to think that Spain is no overmatch for England, by that which leadeth all men; that is, experience and reason. And with experience I will begin, for there all reason beginneth.

Is it fortune, shall we think, that, in all actions of war or arms, great and small, which have happened these many years, ever since Spain and England have had any thing to debate one with the other, the English upon all encounters have perpetually come off with honour, and the better? It is not fortune, sure; she is not so constant. There is somewhat in the nation and natural courage of the people, or some such thing. I will make a brief list of the particulars themselves in an historical truth, no ways strouted, nor made greater by language. This were a fit speech, you will say, for a general, in the head of an army, when they were going to battle: yes; and it is no less fit speech to be spoken in the head of a council, upon a deliberation of entrance into a war. Neither speak I this to disparage the Spanish nation, whom I take to be of the best soldiers in Europe; but that sorteth to our honour, if we still have had the better hand.

bravely and furiously at the first; but after a fight maintained by the space of a whole day, was repulsed, and forced to a retreat, with great slaughter of his men; and the course of his farther. enterprises was wholly arrested; and this chiefly by the prowess and virtue of the English and Scottish troops, under the conduct of Sir John Norris and Sir Robert Stuart, colonels: which troops came to the army but the day before, harassed with a long and wearisome march; and, as it is left for a memorable circumstance in all stories, the soldiers being more sensible of a little heat of the sun, than of any cold fear of death, cast away their armour and garments from them, and fought in their shirts: and, as it was generally conceived, had it not been that the Count of Bossu was slack in charging the Spaniards upon their retreat, this fight had sorted to an absolute defeat. But it was enough to chastise Don John for his insidious treaty of peace, wherewith he had abused the States at his first coming. And the fortune of the day, besides the testimony of all stories, may be the better ascribed to the service of the English and Scottish, by comparison of this charge near Rimenant, where the English and Scottish in great numbers came in action, with the like charge given by Don John half a year before at Glemblours, where the success was contrary: there being at that time in the army but a handful of English and Scottish, and they put in disarray by the horsemen of their own fellows.

The first dart of war which was thrown from Spain or Rome upon the realm of Ireland, was in the year 1580; for the design of Stukely blew over into Afric; and the attempt of Saunders and Fitz-Maurice had a spice of madness. In that year Ireland was invaded by Spanish and Italian forces, under the pope's banner, and the conduct of San Josepho, to the number of seven hundred or better, which landed at Smerwick in Kerry. A poor number it was to conquer Ireland to the pope's use; for their design was no less; but withal they brought arms for five thousand men above their own company, intending to arm so many of the rebels of Ireland. And their purpose was, to fortify in some strong place of the wild and desolate country, and there to nestle till greater succours came; they being hastened unto this enterprise upon a special reason of state, not proper to the enterprise itself; which was by the invasion of Ireland, and the noise thereof, to trouble the council of England, and to make a division of certain aids, that then were preparing from hence for the Low Countries. In the year 1578, was that famous Lammas day, a place where they erected a fort, which they which buried the reputation of Don John of Aus- called the Fort del Or: and from thence they tria, himself not surviving long after. Don John bolted like beasts of the forest, sometimes into being superior in forces, assisted by the Prince of the woods and fastnesses, and sometimes back Parma, Mondragon, Mansell, and other, the best again to their den. Soon after siege was laid commanders of Spain, confident of victory, to the fort by the Lord Gray, then deputy, with a charged the army of the States near Rimenant, smaller number than those were within the fort;

They chose