adversaries. The objects of their hatred, torn from the bosom of their families, separated from their dearest friends, tried by partial judges and prejudiced individuals, debarred of the privilege of defending themselves, condemned to pay more than they possess, robbed of their goods, and reduced to misery, end their days in dungeons and in exile. To persecution, calumny has been added. The clergy, unable to refute the writings of filching" from philosophers, have taken the shorter method of " them their " good name." They are denounced as detestable apostates, as impious wretches, as profligate individuals; they are accused of having formed a conspiracy against the religion, Never were accusations more morality, and institutions of men. false and unfounded. In the first place, he who quits his religion for another, should not be held in detestation. Every man has a right to think for himself. If he finds that the dogmas imposed upon him by his parents are absurd, it is better for him to abandon openly his religion, than to feign hypocritically to profess it. St. Paul was an apostate; so was the Emperor Constantine; so was the Romans who forsook Jupiter for Jesus; so are the Heathens newly converted to Christianity. In the second place, it is ridiculous to charge them with impiety, because, like six hundred and forty-two millions of their fellow creatures, they do not follow the religion of Jesus Christ. Do they not entertain the most exalted notions of the supreme being? Do they not consider him as the moderator of the universe? To say that they are the enemies of virtue, to speak of their vicious lives, is both absurd and hypocritical. The greatest part of the modern philosophers were good and virtuous, and, treading in the footsteps of their great Chinese predecessor, Confucius, they taught "that all men should do as they would be done by." This is a truth which we find established in every biographical dictionary. If, however, what we are told of them by priests, was proved beyond doubt, it would be of no consequence. The professors of a bad religion are sometimes good; those of a good one, on the contrary, but too often bad. We should not commend Paganism, because Scipio, Cato, Titus, and Trajan were excellent men, nor condemn the Christian religion because James Clement, John Chatel, and Ravaillac were assassins. In a word, when we wish to judge of a sect, we should consider its tenets, not the lives of the men who pretend to follow them. As to the assertion that philosophers wish to overturn all political institutions, it is most unjust. They ask for reform, not for anarchy; they are the friends, not the enemies of legal power. Tyranny causes rebellion, and sits on the brink of an abyss. Prerogative, stripped of all its extravagant pretensions, reigns undisturbed and cannot be shaken. Such was the opinion of Theopompus, king of Lacedæmon. The Ephori were established under his reign to temper the government. One day, his queen upbraided him "that he would leave the royal

“ Nay,

authority to his children less than he had received it." but greater," replied the monarch, with laconic sense, "because more lasting." It may even be said, that, in seeking the modification of absolute government, philosophers endeavour to destroy every kind of disorder; for is not the sway of a tyrant, that is, of a man who knows no law, a continual state of anarchy ?

A. GUILBARt.

SUBSTANCE OF A SPEECH,

Delivered Monday evening January 22, 1827, at the Forum of the Society of "Free Discussion and Mutual Improvement," 47, Brick Lane, Spitalfields, on the following question :—

"Are there any rational grounds to believe man has an immortal soul?"

BY T. R. BAYLEY POTTS.

MR. CHAIRMAN.-Your question asks "Are there any rational grounds to believe man has an immortal soul?" If I were asked to answer the question by a monosyllable, I should immediately say No!-but this you will say is only my judgment in the case from sensational impressions, you will immediately demand my reasons for answering in the negative. This I will endeavour to do in the course of the remarks I am about to make. But, sir, seeing that none of the Soulites, who have spoken on the question, have defined what they mean by the term Soul! but have assumed its existence, and argued from such premises: nay, they appear to indicate, that their opponents with themselves all recognize it. This being the case, before entering into the subject, I shall take the liberty to define what I understand by the terms used in your question. And first, the term "Rational," which I define to be that which shall accord with our reason, after cogitating on preconceived ideas derived from sensational impressions alone. But, as it regards the term "Soul," I am in a very awkward dilemma, for never having received any sensational impression relative to the existence of such a thing, it can hardly be expected that I can define it. Here then I must refer to the Vocabulary of the Soulite, and take his definition from his imagination alone. He tells me it is something, or some part of us, that will live after the body is dead, and which they term immortal; but as the inventors of this scheme, previous to the inculcation of their doctrine, had evidence and experience, that the material man was mortal, and subject to decay and death, they had recourse to something which they call immortal, immaterial, incorporeal, or spirit, and which they affirm the soul to be. Having thus stated what I am given to understand by the term "Soul," I will also state what I understand of its use; but here again Mr. Chairman, I am in the same dilemma, for having never received any impressions relative to it myself, I must again ha've recourse to the vocabulary of the Soulite. They tell me that it is designed to carry an account of our actions (or sins) committed while here, up to another tribunal; or, in other words, to account for our actions to a deity, who, they tell us, has revealed to man a state of future rewards and punishments, which

(on this hypothesis) without this soul, would be altogether useless. If I were asked,-Do you believe the material animal man has, superadded to his natural organization, an immaterial something, indescribable, yet possessing within itself a conscious identity, which will continue to exist, and possess the same conscious identity, when the animal frame, to which it is now attached, shall become disorganized and decomposed ?-I should immediately answer No!-for this reason Sir; because I know nothing relative to immateriality, or spirit; consequently, I shall in the course of my remarks endeavour to show that the animal man, like all other animals, is altogether material. Indeed Sir, all the aguments of the Soulist, I have been in the habit of hearing for the last twenty years, never proved any thing more than that the soul they contended for is material. It is true, they continually talk about spirit; ut as they cannot define what it is, they are necessitated to stop at the point Material. The very idea of asking the question implies a doubt, for il were cognizable to our senses, we should all believe it! and I have no hesitation in saying, that if they could define it, I could; but there is this difference only, the cogitative faculty, or thinking principle which I call mind, they term soul. Now the author of that noble work, entitled Mirabaud's "System of Nature," invariably uses the term "Soul" for mind, and the celebrated (walking) Stewart, calls the mind the sixth sense. Now I have no objection to these as synonimous terms, though I am quite satisfied with the term "mind;" but in spite of their inability to define this soul, beyond materiality, yet they strongly affirm it to be independent of matters They will not allow that matter can think, this alone is the attribute of the soul. I will here state a case to prove my assertion.—Some time ago, I attended a chapel in Moorfields, to hear the Rev. Mr. Morrison deliver a lecture on the Nature and Worth of the Human Soul." This lecture was addressed to mechanics, who were particularly requested to attend, in order to do away the sceptical notions which have got abroad among that class of people, relative to the existence of the soul. Mr. Morrison commenced by informing us that “thinking is not a property of matter;" but he with very great gravity assured us, that this soul, this thinking principle is an "immaterial compounded substance." But what is more strange and wonderful than all this, he immediately after told us that "the soul was as distinct from the body, as the piece of mechanism made by our hands."

Now, how this soul, which is "immaterial" can be a substance, and yet distinct, and separate from the body, I am wholly at a loss to conjecture. How can that which is separate and distinct from the body, take cognizance of actions done in or by the body, in order to carry them up to another tribunal? Or how can incorporiety take cognizance of actions done by corporeal body? Besides, I have no idea of substance but matter, materiality. I have no idea of the word " compounded," but as it relates to matter. To me it is evident, that (on the hypothesis of the Soulite himself) the idea of an immaterial soul, separate and distinct from the body, can be of no use, for if we come to define this soul or spirit, which the Soulite affirms it to be, it will be found to be something which our senses cannot take cognizance of, it is only on the score of its being amalgamated with the body, that it can take cognizance of actions done in or by the body, in order (as the Soulite thinks) to carry them up to this tribunal, which they so much anticipate. Then, said the Soulite, if

it were amalgamated with the body, it would not be spirit. Granted; so that the Soulite is placed on one or the other of the horns of this dilemma. Either to allow that the soul is spirit, which when they have defined is a non-entity, or if amalgamated with the body, it would be material or matter, of course our senses could take cognizance of it, consequently it could not be spirit.

I will here take the liberty to read a string of questions I lately put to a gentleman, who is a Soulite, together with his answers; but I wish to state, that the gentleman with whom I had the following dialogue is not a Christian, that is, he rejects all revelation. He calls himself a Deist, viz. he professes to believe in a God, and in a soul, and a future state of rewards and punishments, which is to take place through the medium of his soul, carrying an acccount of his actions done here, up to the tribunal of this deity. I mention this particularly, in order to do away with the impressions generally entertained, that none but Christians believe in a soul, and a future state.

Questions to a Soulite, with his Answers:

Q. What do you mean by the term "Soul ?"—A. Thinks it is that part of us, that will live after the body is dead, to account to a deity, for the actions done by the body, while here.

Is the soul separate and distinct from the body ?-Does not know.

Is the sentient principle the soul?—No.

Is the cogitative faculty, or thinking principle, a property of matter ?— No.

Is the judgment subservient or superior to the senses? - Superior, of

course.

If the soul is separate and distinct from the body, how can it take cognizance of actions, done in or by the body ?-Does not pretend to know any thing about that.

If the body loses one of its senses (for instance the sight) is not the judgment weakened thereby ?-No.

Is the memory a distinct faculty from the judgment ?-Don't know.

Can we receive any ideas, but by impressions made through the medium of the senses?-Don't think we can.

Can the cogitative faculty, act, only but upon preconceived ideas?-Thinks it can.

Can we have any real ideas, of any thing, but what the senses can take cognizance of?—No, not real ideas.

If the sentient principle is the soul, and that is dependent on Matter! (i. e. the brain) does it not die with the rest of the body?—I have already, said that the sentient principle is not the soul, the soul appears to me, to be something independent of the functions of the brain, or of the matter which composes it.

Can mind exist without a living animal body?-Don't know.

If you mean to substantiate a soul, are you not bound to define something

7

more than what we call mind?-There is certainly something more than mind.

But you admit you cannot define it ?—No, I cannot define it, but it appears to me to be an inward monitor, and probably may depend upon such fine particles of matter, that our senses cannot take cognizance of it.

But you must admit, that if it depends upon ever such fine particles of matter, still it is matter! and that is all the Materialist contends for ?-But that matter may go off into spirit at death.

Can you define what you mean by the term "spirit?"-No.

If we cannot define what is called "spirit," is it not a non-entity?—No. But you have admitted that the senses cannot take cognizance of it, consequently how do you know it exists?-There certainly is something which I cannot account for.

If the soul consists of fine particles of matter, and is amalgamated with the body, is it not one sure proof that it dies with the rest of the body ?—No, it may be motion, as you cannot define what motion is.

Do you believe that motion is the soul?—It may be, for what I know.

Admitting motion to be the soul, how is it possible it can retain our conscious identity, in order to carry an account of our actions up to another tribunal ?-Don't know.

Here then, the Soulist acknowledges, or rather maintains, the existence of the soul, though he admits he cannot define what it is! But what more wonderful is, how he should know it exists, when he allows he can take cognizance of nothing but matter.

It is generally allowed by Soulites, that our senses are entirely dependant on matter. I will here take the sense of sight; the eye, (for instance) is matter; the optic nerve is matter; the nerves of the brain are matter. Now, for all impressions received by the eye, the effect instantaneously follows the cause. Perception and idea originates, and the whole is dependant on matter without we are to suppose, that when the impressions arrives in the brain, that it does not receive them, but consigns them over to this "immaterial substance;" if this were the case, and this "immaterial substance" should happen to be capricious, we might have to wait perhaps for some time, before we should be furnished with an idea; this we know by experience is never the case.

Now, if the humours of the eye are defective or diseased, though the optic nerve remain sound, the sight is lost !—if the whole of the parts of the eye are sound, and the optic nerve is defective, the sight is lost!—and if the eye and the optic nerve should both be in a sound state, and the brain should be disordered, or should an accident happen to it, such as a concussion, (for instance) the sight is destroyed likewise!

The same may be adduced in reference to all the other senses !

In this case we cannot possibly deny that the matter which composes the nerve, conveys the impressions, though we can have no more real ideas how the matter which composes the nerves, conveys the impressions, than we can