REVIEW, &c.-PRESCIENCE OF GOD. [Concluded from our last.] Now, he who knows what is in the power of men, and what is not; who knows the make of their bodies, and all the mechanism and propension of them; who knows the nature and extent of their understandings, and what will determine them this way or that; who knows all the process of natural causes, and consequently how these may work upon them;-he, I say, who HAVING extended this critique much beyond our original intention, we should have terminated our remarks in the preceding number, but for a wish, which we were unwilling to suppress, to lay before our readers the reasonings of an acute writer, on this momentous subject. Should any apo-knows all this, may know what men logy be necessary for the length of our observations, we hope it will be found in the occasion of this discussion, that has placed before us an object, which, though abstruse in its investigation, is of serious importance in its nature, and deeply interesting to mankind. The writer proceeds as follows: It seems to me not impossible, that God should know what is to come: on the contrary, it is highly reasonable to think, that he does and must know things future. Whatever happens in the world, which does not come immediately from him, must either be the effect of mechanical causes, or of the motions of living beings and free agents. Now, as to the former, it cannot be impossible for him, upon whom the being and nature of every thing depend, and who, therefore, must intimately know all their powers, and what effects they will have; to see through the whole train of causes and effects, and whatever will come to pass in that way; nay, it is impossible that he should not do it. We ourselves, if we are satisfied of the goodness of the materials of which a machine is made, and understand the force and determination of those powers by which it is moved, can tell what it will do, or what will be the effect of it. And as to those things which depend upon the voluntary motions of free agents, it is well known, that men can only be free with respect to such things as are within their sphere, and this we are assured is not very extensive and their freedom with respect to these, can only consist in a liberty either to act without any incumbent necessity, as their own reason and judgment shall determine them; or to neglect their rational faculties, and not to use them at all; but suffer themselves to be carried away by the tendencies and inclinations of the body, which, left thus to itself, acts in a manner mechanically. will do, if he can but know this one thing more, viz. whether they will use their rational faculties, or not. And since even we ourselves, mean and defective as we are, can, in some measure, conceive how so much as this may be done, and seem to want but one step more to finish the account, can we, with any shew of reason, deny to a Perfect Being this one article more, or think that he cannot do that too; especially if we call to mind, that this very power of using our faculties is held of him? Observe, what a sagacity there is in some men, not only in respect of physical causes and effects, but also of the future actings of mankind; and how very easy it is, many times, if the persons concerned, and their characters and circumstances, are given, to foresee what they will do; as also to foretel many general events, though the intermediate transactions, upon which they depend, are not known. Consider how much more remarkable this penetration is in some men than in others: consider further, that if there be any minds more perfect than the human, (and who can be so conceited of himself as to question this?) they must have it in a still more eminent degree, proportionable to the excellence of their natures. If, therefore, even on this ground of analogy, we only allow this power of discerning in God, to be proportionable to his nature, as in lower beings it is proportionable to theirs, it then becomes infinite; and then again the future actions of free agents are at once all unlocked, and exposed to his view. For that knowledge is not infinite, which is limited to things past, or present, or which come to pass necessarily. But after all that has been said, and all that can be advanced, on this mysterious, but interesting subject, our best attempts to shew how far we can go, towards an adequate conception of the manner in which future things may ceiving these. As they want a fifth sense to perceive sounds and colours, of which they have no notion; so we, perhaps, want a sixth sense, or some be known, can only be considered as feeble, mean, and grovelling. Of an infinite and all-perfect Being, we can | have no adequate conception; and therefore we cannot justly reason from faculty, of which future events may ourselves to him. His powers, and among them his power of knowing, | must infinitely surpass our understanding. It must be something different from, and infinitely transcending, all the modes of apprehending | ing. things, of which we have any knowledge. be the proper objects. Nor have we any more reason to deny that there is such a sense or faculty, than the deaf or blind have to deny, that there is such a sense as that of hearing or see We can never conclude, that it is impossible for an infinitely-perfect Being to know what a free agent will choose to do, until we can comprehend all the powers of such a Being; and that is, till we ourselves are infinite and perfect. So far are we from being able to pronounce, with any shew of reason, that it is impossible there should be such knowledge in God. In the last place, this knowledge is not only not impossible, but that which has been already proved concerning the Deity and his perfection, doth necessarily infer, that nothing can be hidden from him. For, if ignorance be an imperfection, the ignorance of future acts and events must be so; and then, if all imperfections are to be denied of him, this must. We know matter of fact, by the help of our senses, the strength of memory, impressions upon the fancy, or the report of others; and all these mediums or ways suppose the things known either to be present, or once to have been so. But is it therefore impossible, that there should be any other ways of knowing? This is so far from being true, that, since God has no organ of sensation, nor such mean faculties as the best of ours are, and, consequently, cannot know things in the way in which we know them, if he does not know them by some other way, he cannot know them at all, even though they were present. There must, therefore, be other ways, or at least another way of knowing even There is, indeed, a common prejumatters of fact. And since the diffi- dice against the Prescience (as it is culty we find in determining whether usually called) of God; which sugfuture matters of fact may be known, gests, that, if God foreknows things, arises chiefly from this, that we in he foreknows them infallibly or cerreality consider, without minding it, tainly; and if so, then they are cerwhether they may be known in our tain; and if certain, then they are no way of knowing; it vanishes, when we | longer matters of freedom. And, thus, recollect, that they are and must be prescience and freedom are thought to known to God by some other way; and be inconsistent. But, surely, the nanot only so, but this must be some ture of a thing is not changed by its way that is perfect, and worthy of him. being known, or known before hand. Future, or what to us is future, may | For, if it is known truly, it is known be as truly the object of divine know- to be what it is, and therefore is not ledge, as present is of ours: nor.can altered by this. The truth is, God we tell, what respect past, present, and foresees, or rather sees, the actions of to come, have to the Divine mind, or free agents, because they will be; not wherein they differ. To deaf men, that they will be because he foresees there is no such thing as sound; to them. If I see an object in a certain blind men, no such thing as colour; place, the veracity of my faculties nor, when these are defined and ex- supposed, it is certain that object is plained to them in the best manner there; but yet it cannot be said, it is which their circumstances admit, are there because I see it there, or that my they capable of knowing how they seeing it there is the cause of its being are apprehended. So, here, we can- there; but because it is there, therenot tell how future things are known, fore I see it there. It is the object perhaps, any more than deaf or blind that determines my sensation: and so, people know what sounds and colours in the other case, it is the future choice are, and how they may be perceived: of free agents that determines the but yet there may be a way of know- prescience, which yet may be infalliing those, as well as there is of per- | bly true. No. 4.-VOL. I. | | | Let us put these two contradictory propositions: B, some particular man, will go to church next Sunday, and B will not go to church next Sunday; and let us suppose withal that B is free, and that his going or not going depends merely upon his own will. In this case, he may indeed do either, but yet he can do but one of these two things, either go, or not go; and one of these things he must do, or, in other words, he cannot avoid both. One of these two propositions, therefore, is now true; but yet it is not the truth of the proposition which forces him to do what is contained in it; on the contrary, the truth of the proposition arises from what he shall choose to do. And if that truth doth not now force him, the foreknowledge of that truth will not. We may, surely, suppose B himself to know certainly, beforehand, which of the two he will choose to do, whether to go to church or not (I mean so far as it depends upon his choice only); and if so, then here is B's own foreknowledge consistent with his freedom; and if we can but further suppose God to know as much in this respect as B does, there will be God's foreknowledge consistent with B's freedom. In a word, it involves no contradiction to assert, that God certainly knows what any man will choose; and, therefore, that he should do this, cannot be said to be impossible. But the prescience of God, when viewed in connection with the actions of moral agents, may be placed in another light, which the following observations will serve to render intelligible. that, never been left, had the petition never been preferred. The grant may be called the effect of a future act; and it depends as much upon it, as if it had been made after the act. In all this, there is nothing hard to be admitted, if M be allowed to foreknow the case. And thus the prayers which good men offer to the all-seeing God, and the neglects of others, may find fitting effects already forecasted in the course of nature. These possibilities may be extended to the labours of men, and to their behaviour in general. In all this, there is no implication of any contradiction or absurdity; and therefore it may fairly be supposed. And hence it will follow, that a particular providence, as well as that which is general, may be accounted for, and rendered compatible with the actions of men. Such a supposition is certainly not beyond the power of an almighty and all-perfect Being; neither does it appear to be inconsistent either with his wisdom or his goodness. -See Wollaston's Religion of Nature, &c. p. 99-103. Interesting Questions to Correspondents. TO THE EDITOR OF THE IMPERIAL 66 SIR, THE perusal of Number 1, of your Imperial Magazine afforded me considerable pleasure, and I sincerely wish it a circulation equal, in every respect, to its merit. My attention was particularly arrested by the last paragraph that appears in your review of Let us suppose M, some particular Verax, page 27. The observations on man, to foreknow, some way or other, the phrase, one eternal now," led that, when he shall come to be upon me to examine the precise import of his death-bed, L will petition for some human language, when applied to exparticular legacy, in a manner so ear-press divine things; and continuing to nest and humble, and with such a disposition, as will render it proper to grant his request: and upon this, M makes his last will, by which he devises to L that which was to be asked, and then locks up his will: and all this many years before the death of M, and whilst L has no expectation or thought of any such thing. When the time comes, the petition is made and granted; not by the making of any new will, but by the old one already made, and without any alteration: which legacy had, notwithstanding revolve this subject over in my mind, a number of important questions arose, to which I shall be greatly obliged, if you, or some of your learned Correspon dents, will furnish me with an answer, through the medium of your interesting compendium.-Is language of human or of divine origin? Have words naturally any signification; or is their meaning purely arbitrary? Was language regularly formed, before a written Revelation was given to man? Were the words employed in the volume of Revelation, to express invisi ble, spiritual, and eternal things, originally invented and appropriated to express visible, natural, and temporal things? If the same words be ̄ employed to express the things of earth and the things of heaven, does it not follow, that some of the ideas and notions usually associated with words, when employed as the signs of some earthly phenomena, should be dropped, when they are substituted to express the glorious objects of the eternal world! Does not this hold universally of every word that language can supply; the things of earth, and the things of heaven, being so diverse in their natures, is it possible that the same word can be used uniVocally of both? When words are taken from their primary use, and adopted as the signs of things imperceptible to sense, should not the meaning of the word be governed by the nature of the object for which it stands, and not the nature of the object determined by the primary import of the term? If the origin, nature, and use of language, were generally understood, would it not prevent many of those mistakes which are made in the religious and in the philosophical world? I am, Sir, yours respectfully, S. Equity. Equity in law, is the same that the spirit is in religion, what every one pleases to make it: sometimes they go according to conscience, sometimes according to law, sometimes according to the rule of Court. Equity is a roguish thing: for law we have a measure, and know what to trust to; equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. It is all one as if they should make the standard for the measure we call a foot, a Chancellor's foot: what an uncertain measure would this be! One Chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot: it is the same thing in the Chancellor's conscience. That saying, "Do as you would be done to," is often misunderstood; for it is not thus meant, that I, a private man, should do to you, a private man, as I would have you to do to me; but do as we have agreed to do one to another by public agreement. If the prisoner should ask the judge, whether he would be content to be hanged, were he in his case? he would answer, No. Then, says the prisoner, do as you would be done to. Neither of them must do as private men, but the judge must do by him as they have publicly agreed; that is, both judge and prisoner have consented to a law, that if either of them steal, he shall be hanged. Friends. Old friends are best: King James used to call for his old shoes; they were easiest for his feet. Conscience. If we once come to leave that so loose, as to pretend conscience against law, who knows what inconvenience may follow? For, thus, suppose an Anabaptist comes and takes my horse. I sue him. He tells me he did according to his conscience. His conscience tells him all things are common among the saints; what is mine is his : therefore you do ill to make such a law. If any man takes another's horse, he shall be hanged. What can I say to this man? He does according to his conscience. Why is not he as honest a man, as he that pretends a ceremony established by law is against his conscience? Generally to pretend conscience against law is dangerous: in some cases haply we may. nitude; that is, they do not extend through equal portions of the ecliptic; but, taken altogether, they make up a complete revolution through it. See Magalhaen's Hist. of China, p. 335; Du Halde, vol. 2. p. 30. prior to that event. It seems to be | farther informed, are not of equal maggenerally allowed, that their first Emperor, Foli, was nearly contemporary with Noah, and that he computed astronomical tables; he is also said to have given figures to the heavenly bodies, and to have instituted sacrifices at the time of the solstices. In the reign of Hoangti, A. C. 2697, the Pole Star was observed by Yuchi, who invented also a kind of armillary sphere; and the cycle of sixty years was then established. The Emperor himself is said to have invented several instruments for observing the stars, and fixing the cardinal points; and posterity have ascribed to him the merit of founding a tribunal of mathematics, for the advancement of his favourite science. Yao began his reign, as the annals of the Chinese inform us, about the year before Christ 2317. He is said to have been the inventor of the civil year; which is luni-solar, and begins from the instant of the new moon, which happens nearest to the time when the Sun enters the 15th degree of Aquarius, (Du Halde, p. 90,) at which time a festival of tillage is solemnized; and they call that day the beginning of Spring. The Chinese divide the heavens into twenty-eight constellations. They assign four of these constellations to each of the seven Planets; so that the year always begins with the same planet. They also include in them all the stars which are in the heavens, as well those which are in the zodiac, as those which lie out of it. The names of these Constellations, according to Du Halde, vol. 3d, p. 96, are, 15. Juey. 16. Leou. 17. Guey. 18. Mao. 1. Kao. 2. Kang. 3. Ti. 4. Fang. 5. Sin. 19. Pie. The Chinese do not give to their constellations a form corresponding to the name, as the Greeks did. This indeed, in many instances, is not possible; as the greater part of the above names express, in the Chinese language, the dignities or employments of magistrates; though some are the names of rivers, mountains, provinces, or towns of China; and a few are the names of domestic furniture, or instruments of husbandry. On the northern part of the sphere, they place the king, the queen, the heir apparent, the guards, and courtiers; but these are represented by single stars, and not by collections of them: and their constellations are formed by connecting the stars with straight lines. In this manner the Great Bear would be thus represented * * Much has been said by historians, concerning the skill of the Chinese in predicting eclipses, and of their early attention to the observation of these phenomena. Du Halde, vol. 3, p. 80, assures us, that the circumstances of no less than 36 eclipses of the Sun are recorded by Confucius himself; out of which there are but two that are false and doubtful; he probably means, which do not agree with modern tables. Confucius lived about 551 years before Christ; Magalhaen's Hist. p. 65. A remarkable eclipse happened, according to their accounts, in the first year of the Emperor Tehong-Kang: and we are informed, that the two Imperial astronomers, Hi and Ho, were put to death, because they had neglected to foretell it, which it was their duty to have done. It is said that the Chinese knew the true length of the solar year, to be 365, and a little less than six hours, at least 2000 years before the birth of Christ. And P. Trigault, who went |