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of soldiers, then in the very act of committing depredations. But, whatever opinions may be formed of characters like these, we cannot reasonably entertain a diversity of sentiment on the conduct of the German peasant. He appears to have been actuated by the genuine spirit of Christianity, which inculcates, among other virtues, benevolence, honesty, forbearance, and self-denial.

ANECDOTE OF HYDER ALY.

THE Christian system is not more replete with examples of virtue, in the characters of those who are actuated by its principles, of which the preceding article furnishes a striking proof, than Paganism is, with instances of barbarous ferocity, in those spirits where its dominion is unsubdued. This fact we shall illustrate by the following anecdote.

When Hyder Aly began his daring march to empire, he contrived to place one of his confidants, named Conderow, a man of an artful disposition, in the character of a spy, near the person of the monarch whom he was contriving to dethrone. The king, who was probably aware of his intentions, had the address to detach Conderow from the interest of Hyder; and, to secure his friendship, he was raised to the office of duan, or prime minister of state. This mark of confidence, bestowed upon the new favourite, was far from being pleasing to many of the king's old friends, among whom were some, who probably felt no small degree of disappointment, in finding themselves excluded from an office of such distinguished honour. It is well known to politicians, that between disappointment and revenge the distance is not great; and that, both in civilized and savage life, certain characters are always to be found, who, if they cannot reap the harvest, will endeavour to destroy the field.

preparations, he always professed the strongest attachment to the king, and avowedly aimed at nothing more than the removal of Conderow from that office, to which his treachery had exalted him.

Conderow, aware of his perilous situation, put himself at the head of the king's troops, and marched out to give Hyder battle. An engagement almost immediately ensued. Hyder was victorious. The army of Conderow was totally defeated; his camp plundered; and it was with difficulty that he made his escape to the city, to communicate the tidings of his disaster to the king.

As the pretences of Hyder were invariably confined to the removal of Conderow from his office, which were always accompanied with the strongest professions of attachment to the king, a considerable portion of the defeated army rallied round his standard, and soon enabled him to approach with his forces to the gates of the capital. The king, alarmed for his own safety, used every endeavour to penetrate the designs of his enemy; but so artfully had he concealed his intentions, under the plausible pretext which had been afforded him, that, giving to the king the fullest assurance of his perfect obedience, he prevailed on him to open the gates to receive him as duan, and to deliver up his former friend, but present enemy, Conderow, into his hands.

No sooner had Hyder entered the city, than he placed his own centinels on the magazines, and on the palace gates; and, making the king a prisoner, seized upon all his treasure, with which he paid his troops their full arrears; and, to secure their attachment, he made many valuable presents to his officers, who had distinguished themselves in his service.

His old friend Conderow, who now fell into his hands, he shut up in an iron cage, and for several days expos

him to public view. In this state of confinement, he was afterwards sent to Bangalore; where, after remaining upwards of a year in this miserable situation, he died. The cage containing his bones was afterwards preserved in Bangalore, as a trophy of this memorable exploit. Both the cage and his bones were to be seen in 1786, and it is highly probable, that some fragments remain even to the present day.

The disaffection which the conducted of the king, in creating the new duan, had occasioned, soon strengthened the hands of Hyder, so that he actually obtained an accession of power, by those means which had been adopted to arrest the progress of his ambition. The menacing attitude, which Hyder could not conceal, was also furnished with a plausible pretext; so that, while he carried on with vigour his warlike

INHUMANITY TO SLAVE, PUNIshed. AN inhabitant of Curaçoa was lately declared infamous, and banished the colony for life, for inhumanly treating a female slave, which occasioned her death. If such instances of justice, were to correspond in number with the barbarities which call for them, they might prove too common, we fear, to be recorded. They would, however, associate with interest, in protecting the unfortunate Africans.

REVIEW, &c.-ON THE PRESCIENCE
OF GOD.

[Continued from Col. 27.]

HAVING made these preliminary observations, let us now proceed to inquire more immediately respecting the nature of this sacred attribute, so far as its operations extend to human beings, to human actions, and to the final destinies of mankind.

evidence, that the supposed existence of such a being includes contradictory ideas. But can any man conceive for a moment, that infinite power can create a being, the result of whose actions, infinite knowledge cannot penetrate? The absurdity of such a supposition seems almost too gross to be refuted.

As power, which is omnipotent, can do every thing that does not involve a contradiction, so infinite knowledge must be able to discern whatsoever does not include contradictory ideas; and on this basis both of the

propositions must rest. This is a point which has been already argued ; and we have concluded, not only that contingent beings are possible, but that the actions and volitions of mankind, furnish all the evidences of contingency, which reason could ever direct us to expect. And, consequently, as no contradictory ideas are included in the supposition, we must conclude, on the same principle, that By the infinite knowledge of God, a being of infinite knowledge, must or, what in reference to us we deno-be able to discern these actions and minate his foreknowledge, we under- volitions, although they are continstand that branch of his infinite dis- gent. cernment, which enables him to perceive the various results of every volition that lies within the reach of possibility.

Whether this infinite discernment can penetrate contingencies, is a point which has been much disputed. By some, the possibility of the fact has been expressly denied; and the reason of this denial, is founded upon the impossibility that what is actually contingent, should ever become an object even of infinite discernment. That the power of man cannot discern the result of an action, which is equally poised between the possibility of being and not being, will be most readily admitted. But, if we attempt to carry the analogy from finite to infinite, and to infer the impossibility of the fact, with regard to God, merely from our inability to comprehend the manner, there are few, we may presume, with the exception of those who are interested in the issue, who would not conclude, that such a denial implied more indiscretion than wisdom.

That God, who possesses infinite power, is able to create a being whose actions may be contingent, is a fact which no one has a right to deny, unless it can be proved by the clearest

But, while it is asserted, that some actions and events are contingent, which are nevertheless plainly discerned by God, another question relative to the certainty of these, and of all actions and events, immediately presents itself to our view. This is urged with no common degree of eagerness, by those who are solicitous to render the prescience of God subservient to the interests of a particular system. In attempting to repel some of those consequences with which Dr. Clarke charged that system, upon the supposition that every future event and action were seen as absolutely certain, and rendered absolutely certain by God, the critic in the Magazine introduces this divine attribute to our view, decorated with a simplicity of attire, which he well knew how to change for robes of other colours. Of this fact, the following passages will furnish no inadequate specimen.

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Now, we have a right to presume, that this author knows that Calvinists deny that God's decree impels men to sin; for with regard to sin, the utmost they hold is, a decree to permit, and many of them contend that this is unnecessary; for it is, in fact, a decree to do nothing. But as to his fore

shall be."- Evangelical Mag. Feb. 1819, p. 49.

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knowledge, they contend, that it has no influence at all on men's future actions, no more than his afterknow- How this singular, but unequivocal ledge or remembrance can give being passage, is to be reconciled with the to what must have taken place before preceding, in which "foreknowledge is it could be remembered, or known to merely a spectator, that looks on and be past. But for a man who asserts sees things rise into being," we will that God views all things as now ex- not stay to inquire; neither are we isting, so that to his mind (and the disposed to unfold "all the consequences judgment of God is according to truth) of election which follow." These may there is no distinction between past, be fairly submitted, without any devepresent, and future, but all are ac- lopment to the reader's consideratually now in his presence; for such a tion. There is one point, however, writer to charge others with the blas- which seems to have been assumed phemous consequences of making God without any proof whatever, which, the author of sin, because they main- until some evidence shall be adduced, tain that God foreknows some things as we hesitate to concede, namely, that certainly future, is most marvellous ; if God foresees every thought, temand such an instance of injustice, ag- per, word, or action of men, from all gravated by effrontery, as is scarcely eternity, then all things are certain, to be matched even by the feats of and no decree can make them more Antinomianism, that brazen bull." In so." And, it seems to be a duty inthe following paragraph, these pas-cumbent on us, on the present occasages also almost immediately occur. sion, because all who oppose the con“We still, however, adhere to the old-sequences of the critic's system, are fashioned doctrine, that present know- challenged, "either to get rid of foreledge does not give present existence, knowledge, or to shew that it does not nor past knowledge or recollection of involve all the consequences of Calevents give them their past existence, vinistic decrees." nor foreknowledge give future existence. The futurition of an event is the ground of foreknowledge, which may be said to be a mere spectator, that looks on and sees things rise into being." p. 289.

Now, admitting the statement given in the last sentence to be correct, namely, that "the futurition of an event is the ground of foreknowledge, which may be said to be a mere spectator, that looks on and sees things rise into being," we are at a loss to conceive how this can imply certainty in the action or event, which rises into being; much less can we comprehend, how "the foreknowledge of God, can involve all the consequences of Calvinistic decrees." But whether we can comprehend this certainty, and these consequences, or not, we are assured by the same critic, that these must inevitably follow. Hence he observes, "If God foresees every thought, temper, word, or action of men, from all eternity, then all things are certain, and no decree can make them more so; then all the consequences of election follow, that God views every man as he comes into the world as an heir of life or death; and creating and supporting them with these views is equivalent to a decree that thus it

In proceeding to examine this important question, "whether on all occasions the Almighty beholds with absolute certainty, the event or action, which is the object of his discernment," it will be particularly necessary to understand, to what the term certainty is referred. If it refers to the divine knowledge, the fact will not be disputed; but, if it be referred to the action or event which is foreseen, several things must be ascertained, before the conclusion can be either adopted or rejected.

It is a most unquestionable fact, that the knowledge of the Almighty, in every form in which it can be viewed, includes certainty in its own nature, independently of all foreign causes, actions, or events, whatever. This certainty of the divine knowledge, arises from its inherent perfection; and the truth of the position will be equally immutable, whatever may be the object of the divine discernment. It follows, therefore, that the certainty of God's discernment, cannot, in itself, be affected by any action or event which is the object of it. For should we refuse to admit this conclusion, we shall be under the necessity of granting, that the certainty of / the divine knowledge does not arise

either from its own inherent perfection, or from the perfection of that Eternal Being, of whom it is an attribute; but from the nature of that object, action, or event, which, while lodged in futurity, cannot have any formal existence.

We have already proved, that the creation of beings whose actions may be contingent, as it involves no contradiction, is perfectly possible to infinite power. Contingent actions we have defined to be such as are poised upon the possibility of being or not being; and it has been argued, that many human actions furnish all the evidence of their being contingent, that might be expected from such as we may suppose should be expressly declared to be so. Now if any actions or events can be supposed to be uncertain in their natures, they must be those which are contingent. But, if the uncertainty of the action, will prevent the certainty of the divine knowledge, we must make the certainty of infinite discernment dependent upon the certainty of that action or event, which is the object of it. This is a conclusion which appears to be undeniable. For, if God can have no certainty of knowledge, unless the event or action which is its object be absolutely certain, the certainty of the event or action becomes necessary to the certainty of infinite knowledge; and, consequently, this knowledge, or discernment, is at once dependent for its certainty upon that action or event from which this certainty is derived. But to suppose an attribute of Jehovah to exist, without inherently including the utmost perfection of which its nature is susceptible, is an absurdity which can hardly be exceeded by any thing, but the monstrous idea, that its perfection is to be derived from an extrinsic cause, which can have no necessary exist

ence.

Nor are these the only absurdities which will follow from the supposition, that certainty in the divine knowledge necessarily implies certainty in the action or event which is its object. It is not in the nature of simple knowledge to give existence to an action, or an event, because simple knowledge can never become the efficient cause of action. And on exactly the same principle, it is not in the nature of certainty in knowledge, to give existence to certainty in an action or an event,

which may be the object of certain knowledge.

If it be true, that all knowledge must be finite, which is circumscribed by any thing that does not include an absolute impossibility, then it is true, that every species of knowledge which does not include certainty in its own nature, must necessarily fall short of infinite perfection; and in the same proportion that it is defective, it ceases to be an attribute of God. This is a conclusion, which can only be repelled by proving, that, for God to have a certainty of knowledge of an event or action, which is uncertain in its nature, involves a contradiction. But where shall we find those contradictory ideas which the proposition is supposed to include? If God has a certain knowledge of things as they actually are, and some things are uncertain in their own nature, it follows, that God must have a certain knowledge of uncertain actions and events; but this implies neither contradiction nor absurdity.

Should it be asserted, that infinite knowledge can discern no action or event, unless that action or event be certain, we must then identify the certainty of the event with the certainty of knowledge; and this will lead us to inquire from what primary cause the certainty of this action or event is derived. This inquiry will necessarily carry us up to God; since no one, it is presumed, will pretend to assert, that the absolute certainty of actions or events can be derived from any other primary source. We may, indeed, amuse ourselves in our retrospective ascent, with volition, disposition, and motive; or we may perplex our inquiries with the mysterious influence of passive power, or negative energy; and endeavour to infer a positive effect from causes which have only a negative existence; but, if an action or an event be rendered absolutely certain, no power could have primarily rendered it so, except that of God. But to suppose, that the Eternal God has so constituted actions and events, as to render them certain, in order that he might know them, is to conclude that he would have been ignorant of their possible and actual issues, if he had not established a chain of subordinate causes, which should finally terminate in the certainty that was required. If the certainty of an action or event, be necessary to the cer

knowledge, they contend, that it has no influence at all on men's future actions, no more than his afterknowledge or remembrance can give being to what must have taken place before it could be remembered, or known to be past. But for a man who asserts that God views all things as now existing, so that to his mind (and the judgment of God is according to truth) there is no distinction between past, present, and future, but all are actually now in his presence; for such a writer to charge others with the blasphemous consequences of making God the author of sin, because they maintain that God foreknows some things as certainly future, is most marvellous ; and such an instance of injustice, aggravated by effrontery, as is scarcely to be matched even by the feats of Antinomianism, that brazen bull." In the following paragraph, these passages also almost immediately occur. "We still, however, adhere to the oldfashioned doctrine, that present knowledge does not give present existence, nor past knowledge or recollection of events give them their past existence, nor foreknowledge give future existence. The futurition of an event is the ground of foreknowledge, which may be said to be a mere spectator, that looks on and sees things rise into being." p. 289.

Now, admitting the statement given in the last sentence to be correct, namely, that " Ithe futurition of an event is the ground of foreknowledge, which may be said to be a mere spectator, that looks on and sees things rise into being," we are at a loss to conceive how this can imply certainty in the action or event, which rises into being; much less can we comprehend, how "the foreknowledge of God, can involve all the consequences of Calvinistic decrees." But whether we can comprehend this certainty, and these consequences, or not, we are assured by the same critic, that these must inevitably follow. Hence he observes, "If God foresees every thought, temper, word, or action of men, from all eternity, then all things are certain, and no decree can make them more so; then all the consequences of election follow, that God views every man as he comes into the world as an heir of life or death; and creating and supporting them with these views is equivalent to a decree that thus it

shall be."-Evangelical Mag. Feb. 1819, p. 49.

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How this singular, but unequivocal passage, is to be reconciled with the preceding, in which "foreknowledge is merely a spectator, that looks on and sees things rise into being,' we will not stay to inquire; neither are we disposed to unfold "all the consequences of election which follow." These may be fairly submitted, without any development to the reader's consideration. There is one point, however, which seems to have been assumed without any proof whatever, which, until some evidence shall be adduced, we hesitate to concede, namely, that "if God foresees every thought, temper, word, or action of men, from all eternity, then all things are certain, and no decree can make them more so." And, it seems to be a duty incumbent on us, on the present occasion, because all who oppose the consequences of the critic's system, are challenged, "either to get rid of foreknowledge, or to shew that it does not involve all the consequences of Calvinistic decrees."

In proceeding to examine this important question, "whether on all occasions the Almighty beholds with absolute certainty, the event or action, which is the object of his discernment," it will be particularly necessary to understand, to what the term certainty is referred. If it refers to the divine knowledge, the fact will not be disputed; but, if it be referred to the action or event which is foreseen, several things must be ascertained, before the conclusion can be either adopted or rejected.

It is a most unquestionable fact, that the knowledge of the Almighty, in every form in which it can be viewed, includes certainty in its own nature, independently of all foreign causes, actions, or events, whatever. This certainty of the divine knowledge, arises from its inherent perfection; and the truth of the position will be equally immutable, whatever may be the object of the divine discernment. It follows, therefore, that the certainty of God's discernment, cannot, in itself, be affected by any action or event which is the object of it. For should we refuse to admit this conclusion, we shall be under the necessity of granting, that the certainty of / the divine knowledge does not arise

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