1740.] EQUIPMENT OF THE SQUADRON. in this voyage, which he had reason 1 Ed. 1776: "His difficulties." 327 him he could spare him none, for he wanted men for his own fleet. This occasioned an inevitable and a very considerable delay; for it was the end of July before this deficiency was by any means supplied, and all that was then done was extremely short of his necessities and expectation. For Admiral Balchen, who succeeded to the command at Spithead after Sir John Norris had sailed to the westward, instead of 300 able sailors, which Mr Anson wanted of his complement, ordered on board the squadron 170 men only, of which thirtytwo were from the hospital and sick quarters, thirty-seven from the Salisbury, with three officers of Colonel Lowther's regiment, and ninety-eight marines; and these were all that were ever granted to make up the forementioned deficiency. But the Commodore's mortification did not end here. It has been already observed, that it was at first intended that Colonel Bland's regiment, and three independent companies of 100 men each, should embark as land forces on board the squadron. But this disposition was now changed, and all the land forces that were to be allowed were 500 invalids, to be collected from the out-pensioners of Chelsea College. As these out-pensioners consist of soldiers, who, from their age, wounds, or other infirmities, are incapable of service in marching regiments, Mr Anson was greatly chagrined at having such a decrepit detachment allotted to him; for he was fully persuaded that the greatest part of them would perish long before they arrived at the scene of action, since the delays he had already encountered necessarily confined his passage round Cape Horn to the most rigorous season of the year. Sir Charles Wager, too, joined in opinion with the Commodore that invalids were no ways proper for this service, and solicited strenuously to have them exchanged; but he was told, that persons who were supposed to be better judges of soldiers than he or Mr Anson thought them the properest men that could be employed on this occasion. And upon this determination they were ordered on board the squadron on the 5th of August; but instead of 500 there came on board no more than 259; for all those who had limbs and strength to walk out of Portsmouth deserted, leaving behind them only such as were literally invalids, most of them being sixty years of age, and some of them upwards of seventy. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive a more moving scene than the embarkation of these unhappy veterans; they were themselves extremely averse to the service they were engaged in, and fully apprised of all the disasters they were afterwards exposed to; the apprehensions of which were strongly marked by the concern that appeared in their countenances, which was mixed with no small degree of indignation to be thus hurried from their repose into a fatiguing employ to which neither the strength of their bodies, nor the vigour of their minds, were any ways proportioned, and where, without seeing the face of an enemy, or in the least promoting the success of the enterprise they were engaged in, they would in all probability uselessly perish by lingering and painful diseases; and this, too, after they had spent the activity and strength of their youth in their country's ser vice. And I cannot but observe, on this melancholy incident, how extremely unfortunate it was, both to this aged and diseased detachment, and to the expedition they were employed in, that amongst all the out-pensioners of Chelsea Hospital, which were supposed to amount to 2000 men, the most crazy and infirm only should be culled out for so fatiguing and peril 1 Sir John Barrow, in his Life of Anson, says "The feelings of these excellent judges are not to be envied, when they were afterwards made acquainted with the fact, that not one of these unfortunate individuals, who went on the voyage, survived to reach their native land-every man had perished." ous an undertaking. For it was well known that, however unfit invalids in general might be for this service, yet by a prudent choice there might have been found amongst them 500 men who had some remains of vigour left. And Mr Anson fully expected that the best of them would have been allotted him; whereas the whole detachment that was sent to him seemed to be made up of the most decrepit and miserable objects that could be collected out of the whole body; and by the desertion abovementioned, [even] these were a second time cleared of that little health and strength which were to be found amongst them, and he was to take up with such as were much fitter for an infirmary than for any military duty. And here it is necessary to mention another material particular in the equipment of this squadron. It was proposed to Mr Anson, after it was resolved that he should be sent to the South Seas, to take with him two persons under the denomination of agent-victuallers. Those who were mentioned for this employment had formerly been in the Spanish West Indies, in the South Sea Company's service; and it was supposed that by their knowledge and intelligence on that coast, they might often procure provision for him by compact with the inhabitants, when it was not to be got by force of arms. These agentvictuallers were, for this purpose, to be allowed to carry to the value of £15,000 in merchandise on board the squadron; for they had represented that it would be much easier for them to procure provisions with goods, than with the value of the same goods in money. Whatever colours were given to this scheme, it was difficult to persuade the generality of mankind that it was not principally intended for the enrichment of the agents, by the beneficial commeree they proposed to carry on upon that coast. Mr Anson, from the beginning, objected both to the appoint Ed. 1776: "In the Spanish American colonies." 1740.] MANNING AND VICTUALLING OF THE SQUADRON. 329 ment of agent-victuallers, and the allowing them to carry a cargo on board the squadron. For he conceived that in those few amicable ports where the squadron might touch he needed not their assistance to contract for any provisions the place afforded; and on the enemy's coast he did not imagine that they could ever procure him the necessaries he should want, unless (which he was resolved not to comply with) the military operations of his squadron were to be regulated by the ridiculous views of their trading projects. All that he thought the Government ought to have done on this occasion was to put on board to the value of £2000 or £3000 only of such goods as the Indians, or the Spanish planters in the less cultivated part of the coast, might be tempted with; since it was in such places only that he imagined it would be worth while to truck with the enemy for provisions. And in these places, it was sufficiently evident, a very small cargo would suffice. But though the Commodore objected both to the appointment of these officers, and to their project; yet, as they had insinuated that their scheme, besides victualling the squadron might contribute to settling a trade upon that coast, which might be afterwards carried on without difficulty, and might thereby prove a very considerable national advantage, they were much listened to by some considerable persons. And of the £15,000, which was to be the amount of their cargo, the Government agreed to advance them £10,000 upon imprest, and the remaining £5000 they raised on bottomry bonds; and the goods purchased with this [latter] sum were all that were taken to sea by the squadron, how much soever 1 Ed. 1776 adds: "Of the ill-success of which he had no question." "Prest money is money advanced on condition that it shall be "ready" when the lender demands it back. French, "prêt ;" that is, it is lent "on call." the amount of them might be afterwards magnified by common report. This cargo was at first shipped on board the Wager store-ship, and one of the victuallers; no part of it being admitted on board the men-of-war. But when the Commodore was at St Catherine's, he considered, that in case the squadron should be separated, it might be pretended that some of the ships were disappointed of provisions for want of a cargo to truck with; and therefore he distributed some of the least bulky commodities on board the men-of-war, leaving the remainder principally on board the Wager, where it was lost. And more of the goods perishing, by various accidents to be recited hereafter, and no part of them being disposed of upon the coast, the few that came home to England did not produce, when sold, above a fourth part of the original price. So true was the Commodore's prediction about the event of this project, which had been by many considered as infallibly productive of immense gains. But to return to the transactions at Portsmouth. To supply the place of the 240 invalids which had deserted, as is mentioned above, there were ordered on board 210 marines detached from different regiments. These were raw and undisciplined men, for they were just raised, and had scarcely anything more of the soldier than their regimentals, none of them having been so far trained as to be permitted to fire. The last detachment of these marines came on board the 8th of August, and on the 10th the squadron sailed from Spithead to St Helens, there to wait for a wind to proceed on the expedition. But the delays we had already suffered had not yet spent all their influence, for we were now advanced into a season of the year when the westerly winds are usually very constant and very violent; and it was thought proper that we should put to sea in company with the fleet commanded by Admiral Balchen, and the expedition under Lord Cathcart. This expedition was designed to And as we made up in all twenty-one | wind blew so fresh that the whole men-of-war, and a 124 sail of mer- fleet struck their yards and topmasts chantmen and transports, we had no to prevent their driving. And, nothopes of getting out of the Channel withstanding this precaution, the with so large a number of ships, with- Centurion drove the next evening, out the continuance of a fair wind for and brought both cables ahead, and some considerable time. This was we were in no small danger of driving what we had every day less and less foul of the Prince Frederick, a seventyreason to expect, as the time of the gun ship, moored at a small distance equinox drew near; so that our under our stern, which we happily golden dreams, and our ideal posses- escaped, by her driving at the same sion of the Peruvian treasures, grew time, and so preserving our distance; each day more faint, and the diffi- nor did we think ourselves secure till culties and dangers of the passage we at last let go the sheet anchor, round Cape Horn in the winter season which fortunately brought us up. filled our imaginations in their room. For it was forty days from our arrival at St Helens to our final departure from thence. And even then (having orders to proceed without Lord Cathcart) we tided it down the Channel with a contrary wind. But this interval of forty days was not free from the displeasing fatigue of often setting sail, and being as often obliged to return; nor exempt from dangers greater than have been sometimes experienced in surrounding the globe. For the wind coming fair for the first time on the 23d of August, we got under sail, and [Admiral] Balchen showed himself truly solicitous to have proceeded to sea; but the wind, soon returning to its old quarter, obliged us to put back to St Helens, not without considerable hazard, and some damage received by two of the transports, which, in tacking, ran foul of each other. Besides this, we made two or three more attempts to sail, but without any better success; and on the 6th of September, being returned to an anchor at St Helens, after one of these fruitless efforts, the reinforce Admiral Vernon, who had captured Porto Bello in the preceding November; but through various delays it did not sail till the end of October, and after joining Vernon, the united force attacked Carthagena, only to be repulsed. Lord Cathcart, before that miscarriage, had died from the effects of the climate, General Wentworth succeeding him in command of the troops. However, on the 9th of September we were in some degree relieved from this lingering vexatious situation by an order which Mr Anson received from the Lords Justices, to put to sea the first opportunity with his own squadron only if Lord Cathcart should not be ready. Being thus freed from the troublesome company of so large a fleet, our Commodore resolved to weigh and tide it down Channel as soon as the weather should become sufficiently moderate; and this might easily have been done with our own squadron alone full two months sooner had the orders of the Admiralty for supplying us with seamen been punctually complied with, and had we met with none of those other delays mentioned in this narration. It is true, our hopes of a speedy departure were even now somewhat damped by a subsequent order which Mr Anson received on the 12th of September, for by that he was required to take under his convoy the St Albans, with the Turkey fleet, and to join the Dragon and the Winchester, with the Straits and the American trade,1 at Torbay or Plymouth, and to proceed with them to sea as far as their 1 That is, the merchant vessels proceeding to the Mediterranean through the Straits of Gibraltar and to the American colonies; the collective word "trade" being aptly enough used to denote the gathering of all the ships bound for the one or the other destination, under the care of their armed convoys. 1740.] DEPARTURE FROM ST HELENS. way and ours lay together. This encumbrance of a convoy gave us some uneasiness, as we feared it might prove the means of lengthening our passage to Madeira. However, Mr Anson, now having the command himself, resolved to adhere to his former determination, and to tide it down the Channel with the first moderate weather; and that the junction of his convoy might occasion as little loss of time as possible, he immediately sent directions to Torbay that the fleets he was there to take under his care might be in readiness to join him instantly on his approach. And at last, on the 18th of September, he weighed from St Helens; and though the wind was at first contrary, had the good fortune to get clear of the Channel in four days, as will be more particularly related in the ensuing Chapter. Having thus gone through the respective steps taken in the equipment of this squadron, it is sufficiently obvious how different an aspect this expedition bore at its first appointment in the beginning of January from what it had in the latter end of September when it left the Channel; and how much its numbers, its strength, and the probability of its success, were diminished by the various incidents which took place in that interval. For instead of having all our old and ordinary seamen exchanged for such as were young and able (which the Commodore was at first promised), and having our numbers completed to their full complement, we were obliged to retain our first crews, which were very indifferent; and a deficiency of 300 men in our numbers was no otherwise made up to us than by sending us on board 170 men, the greatest part composed of such as were discharged from hospitals, or new-raised marines who had never been at sea before. And in the land forces allotted us the change was still more disadvantageous, for there, instead of three independent companies of 100 men each, and Bland's regiment of foot, which was an old one, we had only 470 invalids and marines-one 331 part of them incapable for action by age and infirmities, and the other part useless by their ignorance of their duty. But the diminishing the strength of the squadron was not the greatest inconvenience which attended these alterations, for the contests, representations, and difficulties which they continually produced (as we have above seen, that in these cases the authority of the Admiralty was not always submitted to), occasioned a delay and waste of time which in its consequences was the source of all the disasters to which this enterprise was afterwards exposed. For by this means we were obliged to make our passage round Cape Horn in the most tempestuous season of the year, whence proceeded the separation of our squadron, the loss of numbers of our men, and the imminent hazard of our total destruction. And by this delay, too, the enemy had been so well informed of our designs that a person who had been employed in the South Sea Company's service, and arrived from Panama three or four days before we left Portsmouth, was able to relate to Mr Anson most of the particulars of the destination and strength of our squadron from what he had learned amongst the Spaniards before he left them. And this was afterwards confirmed by a more extraordinary circumstance; for we shall find that when the Spaniards (fully satisfied that our expedition was intended for the South Seas) had fitted out a squadron to oppose us, which had so far got the start of us as to arrive before us off the Island of Madeira, the commander of this squadron was so well instructed in the form and make of Mr Anson's broad pennant, and had imitated it so exactly that he thereby decoyed the Pearl, one of our squadron, within gun-shot of him before the captain of the Pearl was able to discover his mistake. CHAPTER II. ON the 18th of September 1740, the squadron, as we have observed in the |