AT the close of the Congress of Laybach, on the 13th of May 1821, it had been agreed, that the Sovereigns should assemble, in the course of the following year, to take into consideration the term it would be expedient to fix for the cessation of the measures which had been deemed necessary to confirm the tranquillity of the Italian Peninsula. But events not less important than those which had led to the Congress of Laybach, and calculated to engage more powerfully the attention of the Sovereigns, had since occurred. The affairs of the East, the insurrection of the Greeks, the threatened rupture between Russia and the Porte, and, above all, the state of affairs in Spain, and the hostile and menacing position which France had already assumed in relation to that country, were subjects of far

greater importance and more immediate concernment than the interests of Italy, where the revolutionary snake had been scotched at least, if not killed, and where, by the military occupation of the provinces, which had been the scenes of popular movements, all idea of present danger was removed. That these events would principally, if not entirely, occupy the attention of the approaching Congress, every body foresaw; and as the result of the conferences might lead to a new war, or at least to some important alterations in the European system, people everywhere looked forward to the assembling of this august conclave with a corresponding degree of anxiety. The interest which the great powers themselves attached to this new Congress, was apparent even in the choice of their Mi

nisters Plenipotentiary*, for their principal legations were suspended, and the members, in conjunction with their respective Prime Ministers, ordered to Verona.

The meeting of Congress had been fixed for the commencement of September; but the sudden death of Lord Londonderry, after he had been appointed to represent Great Britain at Verona, and only a few days before he should have taken his departure, disconcerted the arrangements which had been previously formed, and was productive of considerable delay. There is also some reason to believe, that this melancholy event was considered by the other members of the alliance as a misfortune of no ordinary kind, and as likely to be followed by the most unto ward and provoking embarrassments. His Lordship was personally and intimately known to the Sovereigns and their Ministers; he had taken a prominent share in the negociations which had changed the face of Europe, and in the deliberations of the former Congresses, and he had approved of the intervention of Austria in the affairs of Italy; while the declaration of the 19th of January 1821, though it ostensibly recognised the principle of representative government, was so constructed as

to give no grounds for anticipating more serious opposition to the measures which were now to come under discussion. In short, although the name of the King of England was not attached to the treaty by which the Holy Alliance was instituted, the Cabinet of London, under the ascendancy of Lord Londonderry, appeared to have adopted its spirit; and the death of that Minister, at such a critical juncture, followed, as it would necessarily be, by a partial change in the British Ministry, might lead to some modifications of the system upon which he had acted, and so far derange the plans devised in the full anticipation of his concurrence. Such might have been, and such, we have reason to believe, actually were the reasonings of the members of the alliance, on the occasion of this unlooked-for and fatal event.

A number of circumstances pointed out the Duke of Wellington as the only proper person to succeed Lord Londonderry in this important mission ; but after his appointment took place, the departure of his Grace was delayed by ill health and other causes, so that he only landed at Boulogne, on his way to Vienna, on the 18th of September, although the Emperor Alexander, several of his Ministers, and the principal

VOL. XIV. PART I.

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Plenipotentiary of France, had reached the Austrian capital so early as the 7th of the month. On the 19th, the Duke reached Paris, and on the following day he had a long conference with the President of the Council (M. de Villèle,) on the existing relations of the French Government with Spain. But before proceeding to give the substance of what took place at this interview, it is necessary, first of all, to advert to an important document laid before Parliament, as exhibiting the views of the British Government, at an early period, in regard to the altered position of Spain, after the restoration of the constitution.

This was a confidential note by Lord Castlereagh, addressed, in May 1820, (that is, about two months after the movement in the Isla had been crowned with complete success,) to the courts of Austria, France, Prussia and Russia. It appears from this document, that, at the period in question, the British Cabinet were of opinion that every discussion which might tend to excite the attention, the blame, or the jealousy of the Spanish nation, or its Government, should be carefully avoided; and that no meeting of the Sovereigns should take place, or, at least, in the actual state of the question, none having for its ostensible object to deliberate on the affairs of Spain. The Duke of Wellington, who was better qualified than any other person to give a correct opinion, did not hesitate, when consulted on the subject, to declare, that, of all the nations of Europe, Spain was the least likely to brook foreign interference; that the slightest suspicion of such interference, particularly on the part of France, would expose the King to the most imminent danger; and that the difficulties which opposed every military operation in Spain, undertaken for the purpose of foreing the nation to submit to an order of things suggested or prescribed by foreign powers, were so

great as to render the success of such a project extremely problematical. Moreover, considering that there was no part of Europe of equal extent where such a revolution could have taken place with so little direct or imminent hazard to other states, the Cabinet of St James's stated, that the Allied Powers might, through the medium of their respective legations at Madrid, represent, in strong terms, the consequences which would result from any violence offered, either to the person or family of the King, or from any hostile measure directed against the Portuguese states in Europe, which Great Britain was bound by treaty to protect; that it would nevertheless be highly dangerous to extend the powers of the alliance formed between the Sovereigns beyond the sphere prescribed by the recognised principles upon which it was founded; that this alliance had been organized for the conquest and deliverance of a great part of the Continent of Europe from the military power of France; that after the defeat of the conqueror, the alliance had taken under its protection the state of things such as it had been established by the peace; but that it had never been intended to become a confederacy for the government of the world, or the superintendance of the internal concerns of other states; in which case, it never could have received the sanction of his Britannic Majesty's Government.

In consequence of the principles laid down in this circular, the affairs of Spain were not made the subject of ostensible and public discussion; and even at the Congress of Laybach, the Allied Powers, while concerting measures for subverting the revolution and the constitution of the Cortes in Italy, had avoided coming to any conclusion, in their collective capacity, with regard to the Spanish revolution, notwithstanding their individual sentiments on that subject were matter of notoriety, as they had been expressed without

reserve or qualification. But the affairs of Spain having assumed a different aspect, and the relations of that country with France having become such as to indicate the speedy approach of hostilities, the question naturally arises, Would the Cabinet of London have adhered to the principles laid down in the circular of 1820, or would it have yielded to the instances of the Holy Alliance? The impression produced upon the different members of the confederacy by the death of Lord Londonderry would almost incline us to believe that some pledge had been given, or some understanding existed, that England would so far depart from those principles, as to oppose no obstacle of any kind to the ulterior views of the Alliance with regard to Spain; but the contrary has been constantly and strenuously affirmed by his colleagues. It appears from a document drawn up by his Lordship, and transmitted by Mr Canning to the Duke of Wellington on the 14th of September, that, in regard to Spain, his Lordship thought there was nothing to be added or changed in the political system hitherto pursued by this country; and that solicitude for the safety of the Royal Family, a faithful observance of our engagements with Portugal, and abstaining from all interference in the internal affairs of that country, ought to form the basis of British policy at the ensuing Congress.

Having premised thus much, in order to put our readers in possession of the case as it concerns Britain, we now return to the conference between the Duke of Wellington and M. de Villèle. The latter signified to his Grace, that the meeting of a Congress could not be a matter of indifference with regard to the state of affairs in Spain; that should it separate without coming to a decision, the existing evil would only increase; and that, in the event of such procrastination, it was by no means improbable that war might break out be

tween France and Spain, before the Alliance could have it in their power to pronounce any collective decision on the disputes presently pending between the two countries. M. de Villèle then expressed a wish that the Congress would take into consideration the actual position of the French Government with regard to Spain, and that the four Allied Powers should declare what line of conduct each would pursue, in the event of a war being rendered necessary. In reply to these propositions, the Duke of Wellington stated, that it was impossible for him to say what would be the determination of the British Government with regard to a hypothetical case; and he applied for further instructions. These Mr Canning lost no time in forwarding. By his dispatch of the 27th of September, he informed his Grace, that if there was any intention of interfering, by force or by menace, in the internal affairs of Spain, his Britannic Majesty's Government was so convinced of the inutility and danger of such a proceeding, which appeared as reprehensible in principle as it was impracticable in execution; that when the necessity or the occasion should arrive, he would be authorised to declare frankly and peremptorily that, in the event of such interference, this country could in no degree become a party to a measure which it so highly disapproved. It remains to be seen what effect this declaration produced upon the deliberations of the Congress.

The Emperor Alexander was still at Vienna; and with the exception of some military reviews at which he was present, he only appeared as a private individual, even at Court. The marked attention shown by him, from the moment of his arrival, to the French Plenipotentiary, Viscount Mathieu de Montmorency, was very generally noticed; and it is to be presumed that, in the conferences then held between