it, with a force which the enemy did not attempt to resist. They sought, however, to make a stand in the fortified convent of St Ramon, situated close to the city; but on seeing Mina preparing for the assault, they evacuated it in the night of the 13th. Mina then pushed on, and established his head quarters at Calaf, where he found himself in front of the main force of the enemy. But besides their strength in numbers and position, they had carefully fortified the steep cliff of Castelfollit; and while they held that post, Mina could not advance without losing his communications with Barcelona, and its fine maritime plain. He was obliged, therefore, to await, for about a month, the arrival of reinforcements and besieging materials. D'Eroles, meantime, manœuvred in Arragon, endeavouring to strike a blow against the detached corps under Zarco del Valle. At length, on the 16th of November, Mina laid siege to Castelfollit. The attack and defence were carried on for some days with the greatest vigour. At length, a breach being effected, the garrison, in the night of the 23d, evacuated the place, and, by aid of the darkness, succeeded in joining their comrades. The victors, next day, found only sixty remaining; and, we grieve to say, they stained their cause by putting them to the sword.

D'Eroles had now collected, in this vicinity, the flower of his disposable force. On the 25th, having observed that a detachment stationed at Tora, to cover Castelfollit, was considerably separated from the rest of the army, he suddenly bore down upon it, and attacked it with his whole force. The detachment had, for some time, a very hard conflict to maintain; but Mina, to whom the intelligence was instantly conveyed, hastened thither with the flower of

his troops, and renewed the battle, which now became most bloody and desperate; the enemy fought with the greatest fury; all Mina's staff were wounded. At length, however, the superior energy and discipline of the constitutional troops completely prevailed; the enemy fled on all sides, sustaining great loss, and were saved from total route only by the inaccessible nature of the ground into which they retreated.

This victory was followed by Mina with a step far too deeply tinctured with that factious rancour, by which Spain was so terribly agitated. He emitted a proclamation, denouncing the most deadly penalties against all who should, in any manner, favour the insurrection. Villages which assisted the rebels, or which even did not make all the resistance of which they were supposed capable, were to be sacked, demolished, or reduced to ashes. For smaller offences, large pecuniary fines were imposed. Such measures were violent, even against the broadest rebellion; but when directed against men who fought, on mistaken indeed, but honourable motives, for the old constitution of the monarchy, recently changed in a somewhat tumultuary manner, they cannot admit of the slightest justification. They were as opposite, we are convinced, to policy as to mercy. In civil contests, the first element is conciliation; and we have no doubt that the irritation excited by these proceedings was afterwards deeply visited, in its hour of distress, on the party by whom they were inflicted.

Segre, which led up to Urgel. The garrison made a shew of defending themselves; but as soon as the Spanish General had thrown a bridge over the Segre, and established a battery, they quitted the place, abandoning all their stores and ammunition. Mina's troops did not attempt to follow them into their mountain retreats.

Mina now spent a few days in collecting and concentrating his troops for the last grand operation. D'Eroles, on his side, mustered all his bands in front of Urgel, in the strong and intricate defiles which guarded the entrance into Cerdagne. The Conque del Trempe, the scene of the late destruction of Tabuenca's corps, afforded a position of great strength. The Regency, however, manifested their fears, by removing, on the 10th, from Urgel to Puycerda, vainly imputing this measure to the severity of the weather, and the infirm health of Mata Florida. On the 13th and 14th, Mina began to drive in the advanced posts; but it was on the two following days that the decisive struggle took place. It was long and obstinately contested, but finally issued in the total route and destruction of the Army of the Faith, whose scattered bands were seen crowding all the roads which led into France. Thither they carried tidings of the apparently total downfal of the cause; and the appearance was confirmed by the motley groupes of monks, peasants, and officers, which filled all the frontier towns, and were in a state of complete disarray and confusion. D'Eroles himself repaired to Toulouse.

Mina after his victory marched directly upon Urgel, and took possession of the town without resistance; but Romagosa, one of the most active of the Royalist chiefs, threw himself into the fort, which Mina

attempted without success to carry by a coup de main. As the situation rendered it nearly impossible to transport artillery thither, he was obliged to commit its reduction to the slow operation of blockade.

D'Eroles, mean time, was using every effort to put together again his shattered forces; and though they had been obliged, on entering France, to give up all their arms and military accoutrements, yet, by some magic, the nature of which might be easily guessed, they appeared in a few days better armed and equipped than before. D'Eroles was thus enabled to re-enter Spain; and by calling in bands scattered through different parts of Catalonia, he mustered a respectable force, with which he sought to cover Puycerda. Mina immediately marched to attack him; and, on the 28th, a general battle was fought, almost on the frontier of the two kingdoms. Like the rest, it was obstinately disputed; but in the end the Royalist army was totally routed, and saved itself only by flying within the French frontier. So near was the action, that balls went across the line, and, it is said, wounded several of the French troops, which were posted for the purpose of ob servation. On the following day, Mina entered Puycerda.

Such was the triumphant result of the campaign in Catalonia. In Navarre, also, it was successful. At Los Arcos, Quesada was so totally routed, that he escaped with only a very few followers to Bayonne. Here, however, there had been received a tender of the services of Don Carlos O'Donnell, whose brother, the Conde de Abisbal, was then making great displays of zeal for the patriotic cause; while another, Alexander, was employed in the army of Navarre. These particulars caused some hesitation in accepting his offer,

till the present exigency overcame all scruples, and he was placed at the head of the Western Army of the Faith. He proved, in fact, faithful to the cause; and having received supplies of money, he rallied the fugitives at Irati, collected some additional recruits, and began again, though in a less daring manner than had formerly been done, to scour the open country of Navarre.

In the district round Mequinenza, the insurrection during this time remained unbroken, and collected even additional strength, though without materially extending its range. Bessieres, a Frenchman, who had made himself conspicuous at Barcelona for the violence of his patriotism, was now its chief, and supported the cause with zeal and ability. He was seconded by Ulman, a Swede by birth. Towards the close of the year, however, Velasco, from Saragossa, made preparations for laying siege to Mequinenza.

During all this period, France carried on, without intermission, movements indicative of hostile purposes. Not only was she unquestionably the secret source whence money and arms were so copiously supplied to the insurgents, and their losses so quickly repaired; her own movements also became every day more open and decided. The terni of Sanatary Cordon, which had so long served as a cloak to her designs, was changed by a royal ordinance into that of " Army of Observation." Its numbers, daily augmenting, swelled to a much greater amount than this term could justify; while stores, artillery, and magazines, were accumulated, much more than in proportion to these numbers. Although the Spanish authorities and commanders strictly prohibited and avoided all breach of neutrality, yet in three instances small detached parties, pur

suing their adversaries, who sought refuge there, crossed the limit; occasions which the French authorities eagerly marked and magnified into grounds of complaint.

At Madrid, in the meanwhile, the public mind was variously agitated by exultation at the triumph of the constitutional cause, and by jealous apprehension of the views of France and the other powers assembled at Verona. The most zealous of the popular deputies called upon Ministers to demand positive explanations upon these subjects; but this motion was not seconded; and nothing, in fact, occurred in the Cortes, to afford even an ostensible ground of dissatisfaction to foreign states. It was otherwise in the clubs, particularly that called the Landaburian, which formed the rendezvous of the orators most devoted to the popular interest. Language was there occasionally held, too much akin to that which produced such terrible results at the era of the French Revolution. Loud reproaches, accompanied even with menaces of immediate invasion, were held out against France, and in some degree against the other powers, who were considered as confederated with her against the liberties of Spain. These proceedings were carefully noted down by French emissaries, and transmitted to Paris, where an inventory was kept of every thing which could afford ground of national hostility.

This year had not quite closed, when the rising of the Congress of Verona was accompanied with the bursting of the storm upon Spain. As, however, that crisis lifted the curtain upon a new act of this fatal drama, we shall find it more conve nient to pause here, and not to break in upon a train of connected events, which belong most properly to the succeeding year.

ed; the useful arts had begun to be more extensively cultivated; the state of society had been ameliorated: in a word, the condition of the Brazilians was, in every respect, preferable to that of the Portuguese, deprived of their King, and for a time exposed to all the miseries of foreign domination. Proud of the presence of their Sovereign, they thus lost the habits of colonial submission; while the revolutions which were taking place around them must have engendered an utter repugnance to return to their ancient state of vassalage and dependence.

Matters being in this state, the news of the revolution in Portugal was at first received by the more active part of the population with a degree of enthusiasm, which retarded for a little the King's departure for Lisbon; and although the consequences of these two events were by no means foreseen, the Brazilians flattered themselves, that the new constitution would guarantee to both parts of the monarchy a perfect equality of rights and privileges. Hence several of the provinces sent deputies to the Extraordinary Cortes; but the problem with which they were to be occupied was one of difficult solution; and even those who had at first most loudly applauded the revolution, soon saw cause to be alarmed for its consequences.

On his departure from Rio Janeiro for Lisbon, the King had recommended to the Prince Royal, whom he left to govern in his absence, to preserve, at whatever cost, that rich possession of the House of Braganza, should he even be obliged, in conformity with the ideas of independence so widely diffused over the American continent, to accept the Crown. But after the institution of provincial juntas, (a consequence of the revolution,) the Prince saw himself insensibly deprived of the greater part of his authority; since the provinces, who had any representations

to make, sent them, not to Rio Janeiro, but to Lisbon, where their deputies were instructed to forward their object, and support their claims. This naturally led to the greatest disorder and confusion. The provinces became detached and isolated; and Rio Janeiro was no longer the capital. The Prince lost no time in making the King and the Cortes acquainted with his situation. He stated that the provinces had refused to obey him; that they no longer paid their contributions, or that they applied them to local purposes without the intervention or consent of the Government; that the treasury was exhausted; and that all these evils required a prompt and powerful remedy. The Cortes, however, could think of no better expedient than to recall the Prince, and to divide the administration of Brazil into provincial governments, in order, by depriving it of a common central authority, the better to insure its submission to the mother country. This was the object of the decrees of the 29th of September 1821, which gave rise to the first serious difference between the two parts of the Lusitano-Brazilian kingdom.

On the receipt of these two decrees, the Junta, or Provisional Government of Santo Paulo, (a country long distinguished for the independent spirit of its inhabitants,) presented an address to the Prince Royal, on the 24th December of the same year, in which they expressed, in strong language, their indignation at these decrees: that for the establishment of provincial governments, they described as having been conceived under a system of anarchy and slavery; and that, for the recall of the Prince, they reprobated as an attempt to weaken and disunite the country, by depriving it of a Prince regarded by the great Brazilian family as their common father. They then proceeded to unfold their views as to the mea