SHOWING THAT THE PROOFS OF

BODY, LIFE, AND MIND,

CONSIDERED AS

DISTINCT ESSENCES,

CANNOT BE DEDUCED FROM PHYSIOLOGY,

BUT DEPEND ON A

DISTINCT SORT OF EVIDENCE;

BEING

AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

CONTROVERSY CONCERNING LIFE

CARRIED ON BY

LAURENCE, ABERNETHY, RENNELL, AND OTHERS.

BY PHILOSTRATUS.

Ipse et Persona.

SECOND EDITION.

LONDON:-1824.

PREFACE.

WHAT is comprised in the following sheets being only the amusement of a few leisure intervals of professional occupations, which the author employed in examining the controversy respecting Life which arose out of the Hunterian Orations, would never have been laid before the public, but for the following reasons.

A sort of indirect aspersion seemed to be thrown out by the advocate. of the Hunterian Doctrine of Life, against a scientific adversary, implying motives on the part of the latter by which it is hardly possible to suppose he can have been impelled, and involving, by an obscure use of the words The Party, a number of other persons of similar opinions. The author considering himself as included in the sweeping but ambiguous charge, by having emerged originally from the same school of anatomy, and having pursued physiology to similar conclusions, and being at the same time conscious of no other motive than the advancement of science, feels disposed to lay before his medical and literary friends his view of the subject, well assured that the Party, as it is called, never had any intention of invalidating the public religion of any nation, nor any power of doing it, if they had possessed the wish. In considering the wholly distinct nature of the evidences on which religious dogmas are founded, the author has taken an example for illustration from the Catholic religion, for this reason, that it is the original and general faith of Europe; while the different little Protestant heresies of a local and fugitive nature are merely branches of the great vine, however altered in their complexion and fruits by the soil on which they have struck root. Whatever argument, therefore, applies to the support or destruction of any of the offspring in particular, must apply with a more consistent and universal force to the great mother church in general. Moreover, the author has ventured to introduce the adverse party to notice as Protestant writers, not only because they belong to that profession, in common with most of their countrymen, but because, from an impartial survey of history, he is induced to

conclude that the method adopted by certain Protestant Christians of mixing their own peculiar modes of profane reasoning with religious mysteries is one of the means of ultimately destroying the holy doctrine; and that this method, combined with the mutual contradictions of disunited schismatics, has been slowly sapping the foundation of religious faith ever since the Reformation. He by no means intends hereby to commit himself to any particular belief; but the above remark has resulted from the history of Christianity studied as a matter of general information, previous to the adoption of more contracted professional pursuits.

The author is desirous of showing the completely distinct nature of physiology, and its harmlessness as far as respects any religious dogmas, and at the same time of exposing the total inefficacy of the hypothesis of the Hunterian party to uphold the latter in case of an emergency.

Added to these considerations, there is an apparent spirit of persecution in the mode of attack and conduct adopted by other persons who have joined in the cry against the supporters of materialism, which every lover of science must hold in abhorrence, convinced that truth is never brought to light by any safer means than a free and unrestrained examination of its evidences. To disarm, therefore, certain non-professional antagonists of spurious weapons, is another duty imposed on the defenders of the freedom of discussion.

Finally the author conceals his name, because he wishes the argument of the Essay to stand on its own merits or demerits unprejudiced, and because, not being personally named in the attack, he is unwilling to enter the list of combatants on a subject which admits of so little positive proof.

INTRODUCTION.

As I think, in common with the illustrious leader of the other party, that it is desirable to place the object aimed at in any treatise in such a distinct point of view in the beginning of it, that the reader may be at once apprised to what end the subsequent arguments are directed, so have I thought it fit to state briefly, in my Preface, what I consider to be the main drift of the various VOL. XXIV. NO. XLVIII.

Pam.

2 H

arguments contained in the ensuing pages; and this mode of proceeding has been deemed particularly necessary in the present instance, because I have all along neglected the trouble of submitting to a second perusal, before going to press, a manuscript which was not originally intended for publication. It is not, therefore, in order to solicit the reader to anticipate the result, and wave the discussion, but to assist him throughout in forming an estimate of the real force and bearing of each argument employed, that I am induced to forewarn him of the conclusion at which I have arrived, and to state distinctly my own opinion, and my reasons for entertaining it.

After an almost unremitted attention to the anatomy and functions of the animal machine, for many years, it seems to me, that physiology can be correctly employed only to represent our perception of the various phenomena of living bodies, considered in their mutual relations to each other: that this perception of phenomena leads to the inevitable conclusion, that every vital action, as well as every propensity, every intellectual and reflective faculty, and every sentiment of the mind, is the necessary consequence of the active state of an appropriate material organ. This opinion is the result of such a uniform and consistent experience of the relation between each organic part and its proper faculties, that I have long regarded it as an incontrovertible maxim of physiology. At the same time, our single consciousness with a duplicity of organs, as well as the individualisation of objects whose various qualities having no apparent affinity are perceived by different organs of sense and intellect, together with the power we are conscious of possessing to direct our attention to various sensations and to exert our will accordingly, naturally force on our minds the belief in some common centre of sensation. Correct analogy obliges me to regard such a centre as existing in the brain, and being, like the other organs, a modification of

matter.

But though physiology leads me no farther for a cause of vital intellectual phenoinena than to appropriate organs, I am nevertheless conscious of a personal identity, which no argument can annul. I have always believed, and do still believe, that I am something distinct from the circumexistent matter of the universe, of which my body forms a part, and that I am likewise distinct from the moving principle of the surrounding universe, of which my vitality may be a modification. This consciousness of being is, however, no deduction from physiology; it is an intuitive feeling, and resolves itself, after all the vain attempts of philosophers to explain it, into a conditional principle of existence. I believe that this very consciousness of a distinct being is itself dependent on the

activity of some material and cerebral instrument; perhaps it is connected with the common centre of sensation. For, strange as it may appear to those who are unacquainted with forms of insanity, this belief of our individual existence, this very power of discriminating between ourselves and the surrounding world, is weakened and nearly destroyed in particular cases of hepatic irritation and cerebral disorder, just as other powers of the Mind are, of which I have given examples in the course of the following inquiry.

The consciousness of identity of self relates only to past and present perceptions, and does not involve the belief of the future existence of the identical percipient, after the dissolution of the Body. Almost all nations, and all religions, however, entertain this hope of futurity, and have professedly referred it to Inspiration and we may observe, that the reanimation of the material Body is the doctrine of Scripture, founded on the miracle of the Resurrection.

The most definite notions on the subject above alluded to, may be found in the volumes of the Bible. The Jewish historian, at an early period, distinguished the Life from the Body of animals; and the Christians repeatedly recognise the distinct nature of perishable Body, from the eternal Soul of man. As neither physiology, which relates to organism, nor natural conscience, which persuades us of mental identity, have any thing to do with these doctrines of religion, they ought to be regarded as distinct objects of research. The dogmas of religion should be established on the fulfilment of prophecies, the performance of miracles, and on other historical and mystical evidences on which their professors have always founded them; while philosophy should be left free to speculate on the infinitely varied phenomena every where displayed by the surrounding world, and to draw her own conclusions as to their origin and nature.

Those who desire to enter minutely into the detail of these evidences, may consult an extraordinary, but prodigiously able work, entitled, The End of Religious Controversy, &c. by J. M. Keating and Brown, London, 1818. The intelligent author of this work, said to be an eminent bishop, has, however, oinitted one strong argument in favor of some of the austere religious institutions of celibacy connected with Catholic faith, I mean that afforded by M. Malthus, in his unanswerable Treatise on Population. The arguments of J. M. also respecting purgatory, and the invocation of saints, admit of some further philosophical illustrations and defences.