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tion, the knowledge would have considerably diminished their enthusiasm. Had Hegel's famous axiom been understood by his followers to have been derived from Heraclitus and Empedocles, it is not probable that it would have sufficed to have given him celebrity beyond the boundaries of his native province. An acquaintance with the history of philosophy, has thus become a necessity in order that those who have acquired it, may not be possessed of a considerable and easily abused advantage. It has also become necessary in order that the unprofitable excitement with which novel theories are being elaborated, may receive some check from the proof which a history of philosophy affords, that every conceivable error and absurdity has been already propounded, and that no solution which may be devised for the problems of metaphysics can claim the merit of being now for the first time proposed.

None of the works which we have mentioned, indeed no work which has been yet written, fulfils the conditions of a history of the human mind. There is none of them which presents a complete analysis of the various causes which have brought about the fluctuations of opinion which the history of philosophy records, and assigns to each intellectual factor its proper amount of influence.

In our opinion, the attempt most free from contradictions which has been made in modern times to the evolution of a system, having for its basis the fundamental conditions and phases of thought, has been the system of Comte, if it be considered as limited to his exposition of the successive intellectual conditions.

In assigning the three transitionary states of the supernatural, the metaphysical and the positive, Comte stated a generalization which possesses so much apparent truth, and is sustained by so many seeming analogies, that it afforded prima facie proof that it had not erred far from the conclusion which might have legitimately been made. The generalization seemed to represent, with tolerable fidelity, the different forms under which the sciences of astronomy and chemistry had been cultivated, and it seemed to accord with the present condition, and the probably future one of the science of meteorology. Many of the social changes which history relates also appeared to add confirmation to the hypothesis. Yet, as is most frequently the case with false systems which bear the

closest resemblance to the truth, the doctrine of Comte has been found to be thoroughly and radically unsound. It described as the natural and healthy phases of intellectual growth, what on examination proved to be but the phases of intellectual disease. If a law is to be laid down describing the metamorphoses of an insect, it should embrace those which belong to its normal condition, and not those which possible malformation and irregular vital action might evolve. A law which represents the course which a mental disease is likely to take, does not represent that which the mind will be subjected to when maintained under salutary influences. Simple belief is no doubt characteristic of childhood, and the rashness and inconsiderateness of youth may sometimes conduct to scepticism; but there is nothing in the opening and strengthening state of the faculties that supersedes faith, and renders scepticism a more natural mental condition. As the faculties open, they rather become more fully aware of the importance of some sure principle of belief, and thus rather strengthen the previous influences. But when passion and thoughtlessness have corrupted the moral constitution, the disease readily infects the mental system, and so far supplies a delusive confirmation of the famous generalization of Comte.

There can be no doubt that the phases indicated by Comte, are often exhibited in the individual mind; and there can be no doubt that in the history of a national mind, a somewhat analogous series of changes is sometimes presented. In the history of the Grecian mind, first came the period of faith corresponding to its youth, then succeeded the scepticism of the time of the Sophists, and last followed the Socratic era, in which abstract speculation was comparatively neglected, and the practical and ethical tone characterised the philosophy. Yet a view of these modifications of the Grecian intellect, so far from being confirmatory of positivism, is utterly subversive of it. History shows that the reaction of the Sophists was against an unnatural and unhealthy effort to reimpose on the Greek mind a mysticism which it had discarded and almost forgotten. The changes it underwent were the changes of disease, and not such as a community, whose mental conditions have been evolved according to a calm and sensible system of theology, will be ever found to have exhibited.

Neither Professor Butler's work nor that of Mr. Lewes, is at all designed to develop the variations of philosophy, in connection with the light they throw upon the constitution of the human mind, unless indeed the object which the latter proposes to himself of enforcing the negative part of Comte's system, can be considered as some feeble expression of such an intention. Each system of philosophy which he reviews, he invariably dismisses with the criticism that metaphysical knowledge is impossible. Not caring to illustrate the more positive tenets of the master towards whom he entertains a most extravagant veneration, he has entirely devoted himself to the establishment of the conclusion that the supernatural and metaphysical states are equally delusive, and that man is endowed with no faculty which can enable him to solve the enigmas of existence. With the view of demonstrating this singularly irrational deduction, Mr. Lewes most laboriously notes all the fantastic errors into which philosophers of equally unbalanced faculties as his own, have so frequently fallen. Because some forty or fifty men of most singular mental constitutions, have given expression to some very fanciful opinions respecting the truths of natural theology, Mr. Lewes infers that natural theology is impossible. It might quite as reasonably be argued, that because some forty or fifty such men as the first James or the second Joseph might be enumerated who have failed to understand the true principles of government, therefore a correct theory of government is impossible. When Cicero said that there is nothing so absurd as that it has not been taught by some philosopher, he intended the reproach not for philosophy, but for its expounders. The merits of such distinguished students of speculative science as Latham or Donaldson, are not impaired by the failure which has attended the efforts of so many others; nor does the failure of the latter impeach the practicability of the science of philology which has been (though no other proof existed), so satisfactorily demonstrated by the success of the former. The real test, as to whether metaphysics is impossible, is not whether several have been found thoroughly incompetent to frame a proper metaphysical system, but whether the truths it proposes have been in general accepted by mankind. The absence of success, which has attended the speculative efforts of many of the ancient and modern philosophers has proceeded from their neglect of the proper

criterions of truth, and from their having attended more to the views suggested by their imagination than to the deliberate conclusions of their intellect. Mr. Lewes' volumes display most forcibly the truth that the human intellect, though it possesses in the world by which it is surrounded, ample proof of the fundamental dogmas of natural religion, yet when it discards authority and traditions, and yields itself to its own crude imaginations, is quite unequal to the formation of a correct system of theology.

The tone of Professor Butler's work contrasts favourably with that which prevails in Mr. Lewes'. His aim was to develop the narrative of Greek Philosophy, in such a way as at the same time to communicate a solution of its many anomalies, and to explain what he conceived to be the principles that reconcile the seeming discrepancies and contradictions of many of the systems. The present work is a reprint of Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, which he delivered to the students of Trinity College, Dublin, from the Chair of Moral Philosophy, established in 1837. After a considerable delay since the lamented death of the author, they were published in 1856 by Professor Thompson, of Cambridge, who, though he had not been personally acquainted with Mr. Butler, is disposed, from the high estimate which he has formed of his writings, to rank him "among the most gifted spirits of his generation.'

Although the Lectures reflect very high credit upon Professor Butler, we do not believe that his fame is best consulted. by an exaggerated eulogy. The lofty style which is well sustained throughout, and which occasionally rises to eloquence, is sufficiently expressive of Professor Butler's peculiar powers, which were rather suited to the office of bringing out in an imposing and attractive form the latent beauties of philosophical speculation, and of dwelling upon the poetical aspects of metaphysics, than to the more difficult one of subjecting philosophy to a rigid and scientific analysis. Hence his work is characterised by a warm enthusiasm for the most imaginative and rhetorical of the philosophers, but does not evince much critical acumen, or a capability of always distinguishing between what belongs to the imagination and what to the intellect. Though not, therefore, destined to take a foremost rank as a metaphysician, Professor Butler has yet accom

plished quite enough to justify feelings of deep regret for his premature demise, and to authorize us in entertaining the conviction that had he been longer spared, he might have produced some work retaining the merit of the present one, and in great measure if not entirely free from its defects.

Having so far indicated the general characteristics of the works which we have placed at the head of this Article, it is not our intention to enter into more detailed criticism of them, except in so far as more special attention to the opinions of either writer may be involved in the rapid and necessarily compendious survey we propose to take of the more prominent outlines of Greek Philosophy.

The division of our subject most convenient for adoption, seems to be that which resolves it into three distinct inquiries concerning, 1st, the sources from which Greek Philosophy was derived; 2nd, the most remarkable phases it underweut; and 3rd, its analogies with Modern Philosophy.

The learned are divided between two widely different opinions as to the origin of the philosophy of Greece. The opinion that it was a spontaneous product of the native intellect yielding to its own speculative impulses, and fashioning its conceptions in obedience to the influences by which it was surrounded, is one which, with an important class of writers, has attained considerable currency.

Ritter assigns the period of the decline of the Socratic Schools as that of the introduction of the Oriental element into Greek Philosophy; whatever had been earlier accomplished he conceives to have been the original growth of the Grecian mind. Browne, in his history of "Greek Classical Literature," entirely adopts the same opinion. Those writers who have preferred to consider the Grecian systems as offshoots from those widely diffused creeds, which the earlier profane records exhibit as already established in South-western Asia, have not been quite accordant respecting the form under which they accept the hypothesis. The more general opinion with this class connects the Greek philosophy with the philosophical tenets of the Egyptians, the Hindoos,

* p. 160.

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