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cannot look for the supply. May we not venture to urge the vast importance of this subject? Cannot something be done? Are we all doing our best? It is only by a combination of individual efforts that the work can be accomplished, and we plead not so much for the sake of our poor authors, though that would be a good plea, but we plead for the sake of God Himself, we ask that when so much is said for the devil, at least some voices may be enabled to make themselves heard on the side of God and truth. Could we not combine to render the publication of good books and of cheap but sound literature more easy? No doubt there are many difficulties, but God can enable us to surmount them all. Si Deus pro nobis, quis contra nos? We know that to human eyes the devil's work is easier far than ours, for he has corrupt human nature on his side; he has but to add his breath to that of the world and the flesh, and the poisoned sheets of print flow readily down the very stream whose current we have to stem. Still God is with us! Magna est veritas et prævalebit! We have a stirring war cry, and none who remain true to it can fail of victory :-Ad Majorem Dei Gloriam !

By

ART. VI.-An Introduction to the History of Jurisprudence.
Denis Caulfield Heron, L. L. D. London: John W. Parker and
Son, 1860.

EXT to that of Theology, the study of Jurisprudence

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a portion of the metaphysical and scientific nomenclature, with which most writers on the subject have surrounded it, it becomes also one of the most interesting. Obedience to authority is commendable, and indeed imperative, but no man is forbidden to examine the grounds upon which human authority is based, or to question the prudence or the justice of any human mandate or institution. The laws of God alone admit of neither hesitation nor inquiry, and the ultimate end of investigation of the laws of men is simply to satisfy the enquirer that those laws are framed

in accordance with the principles of Eternal Justice, and have their spring and source in the great fountain of everlasting wisdom.

The natural law, according to Paley, is that science which teaches men their duty and the reasons of it. It derives whatever force it possesses from its presumed concordance with the will of God, and its power is limited by its coincidence with that Will. Man's first duty, and t'he daily study of every man who desires to please his Creator, is to ascertain what is the will of God, and, having ascertained, to do it with all his might. By the proper application of the faculties, natural and supernatural, given him by God, man can always discern his duty; and the strength to perform that duty will never be wanting to him who asks it from Him who is the source of Power. Were it possible for man to live alone, the law of nature, aided by those of Revelation and the Church, would suffice for his guidance; but as he cannot do so, some system of laws to regulate the conduct of individuals in communities, and the conduct of those communities towards each other, becomes necessary; and the consideration of such laws, to which the name of Positive has been given, forms the proper object of the study of Jurisprudence.

The first principles of Jurisprudence resulted from common consent and Natural Law. Legislation simply confirmed, altered, or extended, but never abrogated the first principles. A system of positive laws never existed in a nation coevally with its origin; for nations, when first formed are usually barbarous, and do not possess the leisure or the knowledge to provide systems of laws suited to their growing wants. Systems of general law are the fruits of experience, and the results of the reasoning of the learned and the wise; and it may be safely assumed that every such system has had its origin as customary law, and has been formed into positive legislation to give it permanence and uniformity.

Laws may be thus divided-declaratory, directory, remedial, and prohibitory and penal laws. The first declare what the law shall be; the second lay down rules of couduct, or point out remedies; the third redress a private injury, or remedy a public inconvenience; and the fourth prohibit certain things to be done or omitted, under a penalty or vindicatory sanction.

The same rule of interpretation is not to be uniformly

applied to all these laws. The great maxim of the Common Law is, that in the interpretation of statutes, the intention of the legislature is to be followed. That intention is to be gathered from the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequences, and the spirit and object of the law,-these latter again are to be ascertained from the words of the law itself, and from the motives apparent therein. Words are to be understood in their ordinary sense, and in that meaning which is attached to them in popular use, save where such a meaning is inconsistent with the context or connection. The meaning of technical terms is to be ascertained by the sense which is attached to them in the art or science to which they belong. The context and the preamble of a statute are of great use in determining the sense in which particular words are used; and the subject matter of the law must also be considered, for it can never be presumed that words repugnant to the subject matter have been designedly used by the legislature. In like manner if the effect and consequences of a particular construction would lead to absurdity, or to a deduction apparently opposed to, or inconsistent with, the objects of the law, some construction which harmonizes with the general design, must be sought for and followed. Not that the effect and consequences, be they what they may, are ever to be permitted to destroy the enactment, they must simply aid in the exposition of the law, which, once clearly expressed, must be followed. The spirit of the law must also be regarded, but in subordination to the words, and so as not to control their natural and obvious meaning. It is a maxim of the Common Law that all statutes upon the same subject, or having the same object, are to be interpreted together, and as if they were in fact but one statute. The Common Law is to be regarded as it stood previously to the passing of the statute, not only for the exposition of terms, but to point out the nature of the mischief and of the remedy, and thus guide in the interpretation. In doubtful cases the power of the Common Law will prevail, and the statute not be construed to repeal it. It follows, hence, that where a remedy is given in a particular case, it is not to be held to extend so as to alter the law in other cases. Remedial statutes are those, the object of which is to redress grievances and injuries to person or personal rights and property in civil cases. These, as well as statutes,

which concern the public good, are to be construed liberally, the words being taken in their largest sense, so far as the context permits, and the mischief to be provided against justifies. Penal statutes and those enacted for the punishment of crime, are invariably construed strictly; and where the words are doubtful the person accused is entitled to the narrowest exposition. There are numerous other rules for the construction of statutes which have acquired the force and authority of maxims, and the great object and scope of these is certainty in interpretation. This hasty consideration of the rules for the construction of statutes leads us to the enquiry how far a system of codification, reducing all law to positive and direct enactments, is practicable and politic. In the early stages of society there were but few positive laws. The Justinian Code was not a system promulgated and adopted in the infancy of the nation, but on the contrary was formed when the Roman grandeur was declining, and was an embodiment of the rules and principles derived from the decisions of judges, and from the general experience. The nation had progressed as far as it was ever destined to do, and the codification of its laws was unquestionably an indication of its maturity. This appears equally true of France as regards the Code Napoleon.

In the work before us this portion of the science of Jurisprudence is discussed in the fourth chapter with ability and discernment. In the first, an introductory chapter, the connection and mutual dependence of the social sciences, Ethics, Political Economy, and Jurisprudence are discussed; in the second the science of Ethics. is considered in its relation to Jurisprudence, and the third is devoted to Political Economy. The fourth chapter enters upon the science of Jurisprudence, and after pointing out the distinction between Ethics and Jurisprudence, glancing at the theory of the development of sympathy, and lucidly and fully defining the terms of the science, proceeds to treat of Political Jurisprudence, Taxation, the duties of Government, the Divisions of Jurisprudence, Codification, and the Study of Jurisprudence.

Codification is at the present day one of the most vexed questions in Jurisprudence, and Mr. Heron thus writes:

"Codification is attended with many dangers. There is the risk of error in definitions. There is the risk of perpetuity being given

to those errors by the legislative enactment, so as to preclude their correction upon discovery, as under the present mode of administering the Common Law in England. Definitions in a statute may be useful when they contain a command, or a prohibition, when their object is to determine acts, which individuals are bound to perform, or to abstain from; but when they have no other object than to make known the nature of things, they are useless and dangerous, and should be left to science. In Codification there is also the danger of cramping the development of the scientific principles of the Common Law, and of retarding the adoption of advanced rules of justice more consistent with the public welfare and the progress of Society. It is impossible to codify the laws of a nation in such a manner, as that no change will be necessary. The rights of the different classes of Society are continually changing, and the narrowness of human wisdom cannot foresee the cases which time discloses. Nor does the conversion of Common Law into Statute Law render it absolutely certain. It is still exposed to the risk of ambiguous construction, arising from the natural imperfection of language as the representative of thought and from the imperfect use of language. But by arrangement and classification the disadvantages of the accumulations of books, and of the judgments of the courts may be diminished. The Statute Law may be improved by a more scientific method of enactment, and the skilful use of appropriate language. The carelessness of former legisltion may be remedied by a strict definition of terms, and by a strict adherence to the judicial phraseology as having a fixed and generally recognized, if not technical meaning. The wants of society are so varied, the communication of men so active, their interests so multiplied, and their relations so extended, that it is impossible for the legislator to foresee all. In the materials which particularly fix his attention there is a crowd of details which escape him, or which are too contradictory or fleeting to become the object of a legal test. It is impossible to chain the action of time, to oppose the course of events, or to prevent the insensible change of manners. It is impossible to calculate in advance what experience alone can reveal. A code, however complete it may appear, is no sooner finished than a thousand unexpected questions present themselves to the magistrate. Laws once digested remain as they have been written. Men, on the contrary, never repose, they always act; and this movement, which never stops, and the effects of which are differently modified by different circumstances, produce at each instant some new combination, some new fact, some new result. Many things are then necessarily abandoned to the empire of custom, to the discussion of learned men, and to the arbitrament of the judges. The duty of the law is to fix, with enlarged views, the general maxims of Right, to establish principles fertile in their consequences, and not to descend into the detail of the questions which may arise from each matter. It is for the magistrate and the

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