necessary' at all? That is: must they not, in this hypothesis, be regarded as intellectual forms intued by the mind in itself, the last reason of whose existence and evidence must be sought elsewhere?*

The Second Section treats of the "Essential Characteristics of Moral Truth." It begins by instancing a judgment, which contains the idea of moral obligation: "I ought to restore a jewel entrusted to my keeping by a friend, who has loaded me with benefits and is now in great distress." This means, that the not restoring the jewel would be an act morally evil. An examination of our consciousness attests, that moral obligation and moral evil are correlative terms. When I say that an act is of moral obligation,' I mean that to abstain from doing it

* Mr Ward, in a note, refers to an Article in the Dublin Review for July 1857, page 41, which has some remarks on this doctrine. "I do not understand the writer to question it, but to deprecate its adoption as the basis of Ethical Science. I the rather think this must be the writer's meaning, because only a few pages back he himself seems to have asserted the same doctrine."-page 47.

We have referred to the Article alluded to. We find, that it distinguished the general doctrine adopted above, which recognizes the identity of necessary truth with the Divine Essence, from the particular opinion of Malebranche, Fenelon, &c., that we see necessary truth in the Divine Essence. It is this latter opinion, which the Article considered "an unsuitable basis on which to build up Ethical science;" for the evident reason that science cannot be based on a mere opinion. But on the main question of the identity of necessary truth with the Divine Essence the Article makes no

comment.

With regard to the passage "a few pages back," where Mr. Ward thinks the writer of the Article 66 seems to have asserted the same doctrine;" quoting in support of this view the words "necessary and absolute ideas are the Divine Idea itself, presenting itself under different aspects:" we find that these words occur in a synopsis of M. Laforet's Moral Philosophy-are in fact Laforet's words-but by no means profess to convey the opinion of the writer of the Article in question. Indeed the writer seems to have studiously avoided expressing any opinion on the main question contained in the text. We may here add, that, while a large number of Catholic Philosophers hold the identity of "necessary" truth with the Divine Essence; comparatively few proceed further, and contend that we intue "necessary" truth in the Divine Essence. The two propositions are widely distinct.

VOL. XLVIII-No. XCVI.

8

66

would be morally evil; just as, the avoidance of an act is of moral obligation,' implies that the doing it would be morally evil. The term moral obligation does not, then, imply the existence of some one who imposed the obligation; it implies no more than the existence in certain acts of this quality moral evil."" (pp. 48-9.) In a note the author cites Cardinal Gerdil in support of the first part of this conclusion. And in another note he cites several scholastics in favour of the second part, viz., the existence in certain acts of the quality' moral evil." "

"We have then, however we came by it, an idea of certain qualities which we call 'moral goodness,' moral evil.' These qualities are of such fundamental importance, that no more momentous question can possibly engage our attention, than an examination into their real nature."

Entering on this examination the author states that moral good' is a simple idea.

"The idea expressed by the term 'sweet,'-when I judge e. g. that this lump of sugar is sweet,' is a simple idea. I may explain 'sweet' indeed by saying that it is the opposite to 'bitter;' just as I may explain bitter' by saying that it is the opposite to sweet.' But any further explanation than this is impossible; he who has never experienced the sensation in question, cannot possibly understand the term. So I may explain morally good,' by saying it is the opposite to morally evil;' or I may explain morally evil,' by saying it is the opposite to morally good." But I maintain that any further explanation of the term is impossible; that if a man had never experienced the exact thought in question, he would not by possibility, be made to understand the term."-p. 50.

He then gives some examples of complex ideas, which need no comment, and proceeds to explain the difference between analytical and synthetical judgments.

6

"Some judgments are analytical,' others synthetical.' And in like manner, since a 'proposition' is merely the verbal expression of a judgment,'-some propositions are analytical,' and others synthetical.'

"An analytical' judgment is one, in which it is judged that the idea of one term is contained in the very idea of the other. Thus if I say that he who possesses a poetical temperament, possesses in an intense degree the qualities B and E,' I shall be forming an analytical judgment; for I consider that the idea of possessing these qualities in an intense degree, is contained in the very idea a poetical temperament.'

"Those judgments which are not analytical,' are called 'syn

6

thetical' and we may give an illustration or two almost at random, for the purpose of making clearer the distinction between these two classes. Suppose I form this judgment; my parents were instru mental to my birth into the world: here is an analytical' judgment; this is part of what I mean, when I say my parents.' But suppose I form this judgment; my parents should be honoured and obeyed by me:' here is a synthetical judgment.' We may consider this latter judgment indeed to be intuitively evident but still the idea of claiming justly my honour and obedience,' is not part of the idea which I express, when I say my parents.' Another illustration may be taken from a thesis, which I argue in the fifth Section of the Second Chapter. To judge that happiness consists in a gratification of the propensions, is to elicit an analytical' judgment the judgment results at once, from considering what is meant by happiness,' 'propension,' 'gratification.' But to judge that earthly happiness' is most surely obtained by means of virtue,' -this, however true, is no 'analytical' judgment: its truth is made manifest, by examining, not the sense of words, but the properties of things.

"Analytical judgments may be 'true' or 'false; for it is evident that I may be mistaken in my opinion, that this idea is contained in that. In regard to the more complicated phenomena even of my own mind, I may make very serious mistakes when I attempt their analysis.

"A second division of analytical' judgments may be into 'objective' and subjective.' For (1) I may judge, that one idea is contained in another, as I am at this moment conceiving the latter idea. Or (2), I may judge that those who conceive the complex idea most clearly and fully, those who use the word expressing it most intelligently, that those men tend more and more to include in it such and such simpler ideas. In the former case, I judge that the complex idea, as I now conceive it, contains these simple ideas in the latter case, I judge that the complex idea, in its full objective sense, contains them. The former class then may be called subjective,' the latter objective' analytical judgments; and great confusion of thought sometimes arises from the neglect of this distinction.

"Then again we may divide analytical judgments into exhaustive' and 'partial' accordingly as I judge that I am recounting the whole, or merely some part (greater or less), of those simple ideas, which together constitute the complex." "—pp. 52-54.

This leads to an examination of the idea morally good' in order to ascertain whether it is simple or complex. It is evident that it is a simple idea if it cannot be analyzed, if no component parts of it can be exhibited. The author contends that such is the case; establishing this view by a criticism of several "plausible" endeavours at analysis, all

of which break down when sifted. We are bound however to say that the examples selected for this purpose by Mr. Ward look very suspicious. For they are precisely such as could be upset with ease by any tyro. Reverting to the particular moral judgment, with which the section opened, our author lays down with regard to it three propositions:

"First, this moral judgment is intuitive and not inferential. Secondly, it is a legitimate intuition; that which is intued is a real intuem. Thirdly, that which is intued is a necessary intuem."p. 63.

The first point is proved by showing that it is not, and cannot be inferential: that is, there are no judgments which, whether taken separately or collectively, could possibly lead by way of logical inference to the moral judgment founded upon them.

"It is perfectly impossible to array these antecedent judgments in any logical shape, such that the moral judgment which we are considering can ever emerge as a conclusion. Various judgments no doubt are formed, antecedently to this moral judgment; but they are formed as the matter on which the moral judgment is exercised, not as premises whereof the moral judgment is a conclusion. That idea of moral good or evil which is the most characteristic element of this moral judgment, is not met with ever so distantly in any of those antecedent judgments to which we refer."-pp. 63, 64.

Next as to its being a legitimate, or true intuition. The author applies F. Buffier's criteria. (1) It is so clear, that its proof or attack can only be conducted through propositions, which are manifestly neither clearer nor more certain. (2) It has been so universally received among all classes of men, that none has ever thought of calling it into question. (3) Its truth is so strongly impressed on men's minds, that they always conform their conduct to it -even they who refine themselves into imagining a contrary opinion. Finally, that the "intuem," which is the object of this intuition, is a necessary truth, is established on the same principle as that on which we maintain the necessary truth of mathematical axioms.

The process which has been gone through with regard to the restitution of the jewel, might be repeated with reference to a number of similar cases. This body of necessary truths (be it greater or less) is called Moral Truth. Two things, then, are contained in this section: (1) 'moral

good,' and 'moral evil,' are simple and not complex ideas; (2) the application of these ideas to certains acts and circumstances is intrinsically necessary. All who hold the former position hold also the latter. But many philosophers who hold the latter, do not agree in admitting the former. Chief amongst this latter class are those, who consider these ideas capable of an analysis expressing some relation to God. This is a subject which must be treated at length, and accordingly occupies the next two sections. Before we pass to these sections we shall venture on two or three remarks on the present one.

The author cites Cardinal Gerdil in support of his theory, that moral obligation does not imply the existence of some one who imposes the obligation. It appears to us that Mr. Ward has outstripped his master. It is perfectly true, that Gerdil considers, that "la connaisance du juste et de l'injuste suffise pour imposer une obligation proprement dit:" and consequently, that such obligation exists quite independently of any one who imposes a command. But he never said that moral obligation would exist independently of any rule; or that the bare idea of le juste et l'injuste could exist independently of a reference to such rule. On the contrary, the very corner-stone of Gerdil's moral system is, that actions are morally good inasmuch as they are conformable to the necessary rapports des choses;" that they are morally evil inasmuch as they diverge from these necessary" rapports des choses." Our author, however, seems to insinuate, that the moral goodness or evil of actions is a quality, inherent in them, quite independently of any relation to any rule. We say insinuate," for he does not say so expressly; and we think we have a right to expect a more explicit statement on a point which is the very foundation of morality.

66

The second remark we shall make is on the erection of moral evil into a quality. He remarks that this is a question, which belongs properly to the treatise on "man's moral action." We shall therefore limit ourselves here to recalling the fact, that if there is one point, rather than another, on which there is an almost unanimous opinion of theologians and philosophers, it is this: that evil of any kind is the privation of corresponding good; that it cannot be conceived except with reference to the good which is excluded. From the time of St. Augustine downwards, this has been assumed as a sort of axiom, which needed only