breadth lie the power and charm of Yale life; strange seductive influences, which heedless of social affiliations, and forgetful of every barrier, bring men together and make them friends.

Such a legacy will not suddenly become extinct, for age invigorates, and tradition freshens it, while college custom gives it buoyancy. But a curious subtlety and sensitiveness forbid neglect, and undergraduate unconcern may threaten to dispel it from the University. Yet every favoring influence finds a quick response; for its welfare means the happiness of the great student body. And the secret of its growth is class intimacy. If classes know themselves, if each man knows every other man who entered college the same day with himself, the legacy will be permanent, and the dearest heritage of our Alma Mater-the Yale Spirit-will remain.

Charles Cheney Hyde.

THE WAITING YEAR.

Twice lingers on her way the fleeting Year

In April first-the darksome winter past-
She smiles through happy tears that follow fast,
And prescient of the Maytime loitering near,
She waits in listening mood, perchance to hear
Some faint heraldic note of wandering bird,
Some whispered hint, some confidential word,
Of pregnance in bare boughs and meadows seer.

Anon she lingers in the arms of Death,

Shorn of her glory, yet withal content

To feel upon her cheek his chilling breath.
Her birds and blossoms gone, she, too, must go.
'Neath gray November skies, with head low-bent,
She waits the benediction of the snow.

Arthur Ripley Thompson.

DeForest Prize Oration:

DANGERS TO GOVERNMENT FROM LEGISLA

THE

TIVE ASSEMBLIES.

JOHN LOOMER HALL, Willimantic, Connecticut.

HE science of government is broad and varied in its application. People of different circumstances and conditions, living in different climates and taught by different traditions will not seek the same means for their happiness and prosperity. Political Science is purely

local in its character. Yet there are certain tests to which all governments may be subjected. A government, be it a monarchy, aristocracy or democracy must preserve the life of the nation and maintain its dignity and grandeur. In foreign and domestic relations its policy should be liberal, and consistent. Its action must be prompt, vigorous and efficient.

Legislative assemblies have become important factors in modern politics and are largely responsible for the virtues and evils of governments. They are especially identified with democracies. Their existence as useful members of governmental machinery has been questioned. Plato and Comte insisted that the making and execution of laws could only be the right of the Few. Carlyle, in his protest against legislatures, declared that the salvation of England lay in the abolition of Parliament. On the other hand, Bacon and Burke maintained that government was "especially within the competence of the Many." The consequence is that the people of this age have rejected the theories of the divine right of kings and the infallibility of aristocracies and have a strong belief in the ultimate wisdom of the multitude.

The rise and fall of monarchies and aristocracies have been but events in the progress of nations. The crimes and blunders of kings in their despotic rule have brought ruin upon their nation, and their abuse of power has

caused revolution within. Yet history reveals failures of legislative assemblies equally serious and destructive. Since the adoption of popular sovereignty by France, the government has been unable to preserve its existence. either before the invasion of a foreign enemy or the uprising of a Parisian mob. Among all the causes of the French Revolution we are forced to remember that it was a legislative assembly that overthrew the established government. Although France was unprepared for selfgovernment, yet the results show how dangerous to the stability of a nation is a legislature swayed by passion and selfishness.

The foreign policy of England is conspicuous with legislative blunders. Parliament, against the protests of its wisest men, vainly sought to coerce her American Colonies, to overthrow the French Republic and to assert her power in the East by the Crimean War. It was not until Bismarck had triumphed over a blind and selfish legislature that Germany found her national unity. Even in America, where democracy is synonymous with liberty, the people are gradually relying upon the veto of the executive to bar the abuses of legislative power.

It is not intended to condemn legislatures or to disparage their existence. The progressive movement of the world demands their existence and continuance. Their evils arise when the supreme power is seized by men whose only title to authority is their power of intrigue, whose resolutions are but the momentary impulses of willfulness or timidity, whose actions are devoid of all "mastery, unity or continuity."

But it is too great a task to point out the good and evil for which legislative assemblies in various govern ments are responsible. Such a consideration is too broad, and the discussion will be confined to the dangers to government from legislatures of modern times and most especially in the United States. Montesquieu insisted upon the necessity of keeping separate the legislative, executive and judicial functions in a constitutional government. This distinction the Philadelphia Convention

sought to implant in our Constitution. But the power of the executive has declined in all its branches. In 1795 Washington refused to furnish Congress with the documents of the Jay treaty on the ground that the House of Representatives had no voice in the treaty-making power, and maintained "that the boundaries fixed by the Constitution between the different departments should forever be preserved." Now it is customary for the President to submit diplomatic papers to the House, often when negotiations with foreign powers are pending.

Purely executive functions have been frequently usurped. Mr. Johnson, as Commander-in-Chief of the army, was required to send his orders through a general who could only be removed by the Senate for disobedience. His cabinet was retained against his wishes and his entire administration illustrates the weakness of the President when opposed by Congress.

A practice has grown up within recent years of overcoming the presidential veto by compromise. The first instance of this was during Mr. Jackson's administration, when Congress attempted to attach to a revenue bill clauses establishing a National Bank. The attempt was rebuked by President Jackson as an infringement upon the rights of the executive. But fifty years later congress incorporated a reconstruction measure which President Hayes had vetoed with an appropriation bill and insisted that their passage should be simultaneous. Mr. Hayes was forced to recall his veto that the more important measure might pass. Nor has this spirit of encroachment halted at legislative enactments merely. The free action of the executive in regard to appointments to office, with which he is charged under the Constitution, and for which he is held responsible by the people is often defeated. The recent rejection by the Senate of two eminent citizens of pure character and acknowledged fitness, successively named by the President for Judges of the Supreme Court, and rejected solely from partisan reasons, affords a conspicuous example of this dangerous tendency.

The natural result of legislative encroachment will be the extinction or absorption of the executive. This result

is eagerly welcomed by a certain class of theorists who assert that by this absorption we should enjoy unity and harmony in legislation. Unity and harmony are desirable qualities, but never to be purchased at the price of safety. The independence of the executive and legislative branches is invaluable that there may be both division of labor and checks against the abuse of power. In support of this theory we have only to glance at the governments of Europe, where the legislature is sovereign and has no barriers to offset its action. In England, where the executive and legislative branches are practically united, there may be unity in legislation but there is not stability in the existing institutions. In Spain and Italy, Republicanism is using the legislature to overturn the present form of government. In France, where legislative sovereignty is most complete, the monarchial party in the legislature is a constant menace to the established government, and the existence of the government is dependent upon the existence of the legislature. Carlyle recognized this principle when he exclaimed, "A Parliament attempting the functions of governor can lead us only to anarchy."

Originally the powers of our Judiciary were sacred from all invasion. But in this branch also we see Congress extending its power. In 1857 the Dred Scott decision caused an outbreak of displeasure and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was questioned by members of Congress. The interposition of the court in the TildenHayes contest aroused great resentment in Congress, on the ground that it was an unwarranted assumption of power by the Judiciary. In 1866 Congress asserted its power by reducing the number of Judges in order that no appointment could be made by Mr. Johnson. Under President Grant's administration, when the decision of the court upon the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act was contrary to its views, Congress increased the number of judges and thus accomplished the result it desired.

This method is open to dangerous application. Like the Executive, the Judiciary must retain its independence and integrity. In our peculiar system of government