GAME THEORYHarvard University Press, 1. mar. 2013 - 585 sider Eminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson's introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the extraordinary advances made in the subject over the past fifteen years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models: games in extensive form and strategic form, and Bayesian games with incomplete information. |
Indhold
1 DecisionTheoretic Foundations | 1 |
2 Basic Models | 37 |
3 Equilibria of StrategicForm Games | 88 |
4 Sequential Equilibria of ExtensiveForm Games | 154 |
5 Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form | 213 |
6 Games with Communication | 244 |
7 Repeated Games | 308 |
8 Bargaining and Cooperation in TwoPerson Games | 370 |
9 Coalitions in Cooperative Games | 417 |
10 Cooperation under Uncertainty | 483 |
| 539 | |
| 553 | |
Andre udgaver - Se alle
Almindelige termer og sætninger
a₁ argmax assumption average payoff axioms b₁ Bayesian game behavioral strategy C₁ choose coalitional game consider cooperative correlated equilibrium decision-maker defined denote the set efficient example exists expected payoff expected utility extensive-form game feasible finite game in Figure game in strategic game theory games with incomplete given incentive constraints incentive-compatible incomplete information individually rational maximize mechanism move multiagent representation Myerson Nash bargaining solution Nash equilibrium node nonempty normal representation optimal option outcome Pareto efficient payoff allocation payoff to player player 2's positive number positive probability possible probability distribution pure strategies randomized strategy randomized-strategy profile repeated game round satisfy sequential equilibrium sequentially rational set of players Shapley value solution concept strategic form strategic-form game subgame subset suppose t₁ Table Theorem transferable utility unique utility function utility payoff vector weakly dominated x₁ Xien y₁ Σ Σ