## GAME THEORYEminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson's introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the extraordinary advances made in the subject over the past fifteen years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models: games in extensive form and strategic form, and Bayesian games with incomplete information. |

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#### LibraryThing Review

Brugeranmeldelse - PaolaM - LibraryThingThis is a very good graduate level textbook in game theory. It is pretty hard going in terms of notation, so recommended for self study only to the most dedicated readers. However, if you do persevere ... Læs hele anmeldelsen

#### Review: Game Theory. Analysis of conflict

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### Indhold

1 DecisionTheoretic Foundations | 1 |

2 Basic Models | 37 |

3 Equilibria of StrategicForm Games | 88 |

4 Sequential Equilibria of ExtensiveForm Games | 154 |

5 Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form | 213 |

6 Games with Communication | 244 |

7 Repeated Games | 308 |

8 Bargaining and Cooperation in TwoPerson Games | 370 |

9 Coalitions in Cooperative Games | 417 |

10 Cooperation under Uncertainty | 483 |

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553 | |

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### Almindelige termer og sætninger

argmax assumption average payoff axioms Bayesian game behavioral strategy belief probabilities choose coalitional game condition consider cooperative correlated equilibrium decision-maker deﬁned deﬁnition denote the set efﬁcient example expected payoff expected utility extensive-form game feasible ﬁnd ﬁrst game F game in Figure game in strategic game theory given implement incentive constraints incentive-compatible individually rational inﬁnitely l’s type maximize mechanism mediation plan minimax move multiagent representation Myerson Nash bargaining solution Nash equilibrium negotiate node nonempty normal representation offer optimal option outcome payoff allocation payoff to player player l’s positive number positive probability possible probability distribution pure strategies randomized strategy randomized-strategy proﬁle repeated game revelation principle round satisﬁes Section selﬁsh seller sequential equilibrium sequentially rational set of players Shapley value solution concept speciﬁes strategic form strategic-form game strategy for player strategy proﬁle subgame subgame-perfect equilibrium subset suppose Table Theorem transferable utility unique utility functions utility payoff weakly dominated