of the moral consciousness, no question can be raised about the relation of its origin to the validity of its dictates or affirmations: since in fact there are no dictates or affirmations to discuss; validity and invalidity are not strictly attributes of mere likes and dislikes. It is, of course, important to ascertain how these tastes and distastes originated, in order that we may see how far they are likely to promote the good or well-being of the individual feeling them, or of society. But then, on this view, such sentiments are considered as possible means to this further end called welfare or well-being; and the ethical premiss, enunciation, or dictate, of which it becomes allimportant to determine the validity, is the implied proposition that a certain mode of being' in a man or a community is well-being,' good,' and therefore what we ought to promote. And no one, as far as I know, has maintained with regard to this premiss, this ultimate axiom as to what is 'well' or 'ill' in human existence, that our view of its correctness or incorrectness will be affected by any examination of its origin.

Others again find in the troubles and satisfactions of conscience nothing more than the forecast, more or less definite, of punishments and rewards that may be expected from other human beings in consequence of certain kinds of behaviour. On this view there are two quite distinct questions which may be raised as regards the authority of conscience: first, whether this forecast or anticipation of pain and pleasure truthfully represents the future reality; and secondly, whether the prospect of these particular pains and pleasures ought reasonably to determine our actions. But it does not appear that either of these points can be settled by investigating the history of conscience. In order to find out whether my community is likely to reward or punish me for such and such acts, my obvious course is to study the ways and habits of existing humanity: a knowledge of human tendencies in the past may no doubt help me somewhat to form my conclusion, but only in a secondary and subordinate way. If, however, I ask how these pains and pleasures are to be valued by a reasonable agent, on what principle they are to be preferred or postponed to other agreeable and disagreeable feelings, whether the standard of comparison is to be purely quantitative, or whether considerations of quality are to come in, &c. &c., I evidently raise questions which are altogether out of relation to theories of mental or social history. And this is still more clearly the case if the ethical debate takes a wider range, and it is asked whether pleasure and paiu are the sole objects at which it is reasonable to aim; and, if not, what other objects there are, and in what balance the real worth of these can be weighed against amounts of pleasure and pain. Where we are to find satisfactory answers to these questions I am not now considering; but it seems pretty certain that we shall not find them in the study of historical psychology.

HENRY SIDGWICK.

REASONS FOR DOUBT IN THE CHURCH OF ROME: A REPLY.

LORD REDESDALE's paper in the December number of this Review being a pendant to a previous article by another writer entitled 'Apology for Doubt in the Church of England,' is evidently intended for the use and benefit of Roman Catholics. It is clear to us who are of the Household of the Faith that the noble writer does not realise the basis on which the Catholic rests his belief. To doubt wilfully any one article of faith, or to enter on the examination of any dogma with the intention of suspending belief until the conclusion of such examination, would be for a Catholic a deadly sin.

This will be evident if it be borne in mind that the Catholic believes the whole deposit of revelation to have been committed to the care of an organised body possessed of a divine life. He believes this living body, the Church of Christ, to be the sole Guardian, the unerring Teacher, the indefectible Witness of the Faith, and the ultimate Judge in all controversies concerning it. The Catholic believes in revelation because God is very Truth, and cannot deceive nor be deceived; and he accepts this revelation on the authority and testimony of the divine, and therefore infallible, voice of the Church. Mysteries beyond the ken of human understanding, as well as facts and doctrines which might be known by the light of mere reason, thus rest on the same basis of certitude.

In order to be admitted into the Church, the adult has to make an act of faith in this fundamental truth of her existence and authority; and once in the Church, the mind, strengthened by Divine grace, forms the habit of believing in the truths of Christianity. Just as the logician examines the nature and value of the syllogism, and then without further proof uses this instrument, so the adult first examines the credentials and claims of the Church, and having admitted her divine life, her divine authority, and her divine testimony, afterwards accepts her word habitually and without questioning.

Lord Redesdale would have done much to further the cause of Christian unity if he had directed the attention of his readers to the great principle which we have laid down; for the real question underlying all differences between Catholics and Protestants is simply this :

Has God left on earth a visible and divine witness to the Christian revelation? It is clear that, if the Roman position be established, belief in all dogmas propounded by the Church follows as a necessary

consequence.

As, however, Lord Redesdale has chosen to urge certain statements as reasons for doubt in the Church of Rome, we will deal with these statements in the order in which they stand.

1. By giving Communion under one kind, the Roman Church, according to our author, 'sets up her own teaching in direct opposition to Christ's own words,' and deprives her children of receiving through the cup remission of sin through the blood of Christ. He adduces two passages of Scripture from St. Matthew xxvi. and St. John vi. 56. We Catholics reply that the words of the Gospel of St. John, Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you,' are taken by us in a literal sense, as signifying that we must eat the real flesh, and drink the real blood of the Saviour. With the crowd we may ask 'How can this man give us his flesh to eat?' but we do not, like many of the disciples, exclaim, "This is a hard saying, who can hear it?' nor do we go back and walk no more with him;' rather with St. Peter we say, 'Lord, to whom shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life. And we believe and are sure that thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God.'

Now we confess that in the Blessed Sacrament under the species of bread, and equally under the species of wine, is the living Christ in the fulness of His two natures and His Divine personality. The risen Flesh, the risen Blood, the Soul, and the Godhead, in all their completeness are there, under the accidents or properties of bread, and also under the accidents or properties of wine. Whether then the Communicn be given by the consecrated bread or by the consecrated cup, or by both, we equally receive the one living Christ, and therefore eat His Flesh and drink His Blood. Whoever believes in the real presence of our Lord in the Blessed Sacrament must admit this. Greeks and Armenians are in this belief one with Rome. Had Communion been given while Christ was dead, under the form of bread there would have been the Flesh of Christ united to the Divine Nature, but not the precious Blood; and under the form of wine there would have been the Blood of Christ united to the Divine Nature, but not His Sacred Flesh, and consequently the communicant, in order to fulfil our Lord's command, would have been obliged to receive under both kinds.

Dr. Döllinger, a witness whose testimony Lord Redesdale may be disposed to admit, in his History of the Church asserts that 'there never was a doubt that the substance of the sacrament was contained under either form, or that he who received under either form, received a perfect sacrament, and all the graces that were connected with it: that he was incorporated with Christ, and was nourished with His

body.'. 'Communion under one form,' he goes on to say, 'was, therefore, frequent in the ancient Church, perhaps more frequent than Communion under both forms.' Instances of this are given in the case of infants who received only the species of wine, of anchorets in the wilderness who bore with them the consecrated bread, of the sick who also received the bread, of the faithful who took it with them to their own houses, especially in the times of persecution; and of bishops who sent it one to another. It may, therefore, fairly be said that the Christians who lived soon after the days of the Apostles did not understand the words of our Lord in the sense which Lord Redesdale now attaches to them.

They did not believe the words, Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you' to imply the necessity of receiving Communion under the form of wine as well as under that of bread.

Catholics hold the words of the Evangelists which describe the Last Supper to mean-(1) That Christ on that occasion exercised His priesthood according to the order of Melchisedec. He took, He blessed, He brake the bread, He gave thanks, and He gave it to His Apostles, saying, 'This is my body;' and in like manner He took and blessed the cup and gave it, saying, 'This is my blood.' (2) That by the words 'Do this in commemoration of me,' He perpetuated this priesthood in the persons of His Apostles and of their successors.

The sacrificial power so conferred was to be exercised in the same manner in which it had been exercised by our Lord. Hence the integrity of the sacrifice requires the consecration of both bread and wine, and the receiving of both by the sacrificer. And let it here be remarked that a priest or bishop, or even the Pope himself, when not offering the sacrifice, receives Communion merely under the form of bread. As to the necessity of the consecration of both species for the integrity of the sacrifice, Greeks of all sects, Nestorians, and Armenians are one with Rome. The command of our Lord was clear and absolute, and no power on earth can change it. By a strange contradiction, the Communion service in use among Anglicans, who are so loud in their accusations of a mutilated sacrament, orders, in direct opposition to Christ's command, a new consecration under one kind only, in case either element should come short.

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The second point put forward by the noble Lord is that the Church of Rome continues to invent new articles of faith,' and he illustrates this statement by a reference to the dogma of the Immaculate Conception and that of Papal Infallibility.

Catholics hold that the Church has no power to invent articles of faith, or to proclaim a new revelation. Her office is to guard the deposit of Faith in its integrity, to teach it in its completeness to the nations, to expound its meaning, and to apply it for the promotion of the spiritual welfare of her children,

Catholics know that Councils have decided controversies and made declarations concerning the Faith. But such decisions and declarations are not inventions. The very wording of their decrees shows that they are derived from the faith once delivered to the saints. Nice did not invent the Godhead of Jesus Christ, Constantinople did not invent the divinity of the Holy Ghost, Ephesus did not invent the two natures in Jesus Christ, nor did the Vatican invent the personality of God; although these doctrines were declared by these several Councils. The varied circumstances of the Church, the very proneness of mankind to err, the wants of the supernatural life of men, the direction of intellectual activity to religion, necessitate on the part of the Church explicit declarations of the body of faith which she has always held.

It is true, indeed, that the words, immaculate conception' and 'Papal infallibility' are not to be found in Holy Scripture, yet the Catholic cannot fail to see in the sacred pages the doctrines of which they are the expression or legitimate development. On the immaculate conception of her who, in the words of the Scripture, is full of grace, whom all nations shall call blessed, Cardinal Newman, in his Second Eve, has collected a mass of testimony which proves that the doctrine is no new thing in God's Church. And as to the infallibility of the Pope, the successors of St. Peter did not wait for the Vatican Council to proclaim them infallible, but from the earliest times they have acted as men who believed themselves to be possessed of this great gift. They have condemned error, they have proclaimed anew truths that seemed in danger of being obscured or perverted. The obstinate refusal of submission to their dogmatic decrees was ever held to involve grave sin.

No one can read the Regula Fidei of Pope Hormisdas, or Pope Gelasius' letter to the Emperor Anastasius, or the opening words of the Code of Justinian, or the profession of the Greeks at the Second Council of Lyons, or the bull Unam Sanctam, without seeing how thoroughly the supremacy of the Holy See both in government and in teaching was embedded in the mind of the Church.

Catholics find in the doctrine of the Infallibility as defined by the Vatican Council the full meaning of our Lord's words, 'Thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it,' 'I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not, and when thou art converted strengthen thy brethren,' and of His charge to St. Peter, Feed my lambs, feed my sheep.'

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In the last place Lord Redesdale urges that the Church of Rome refuses to accept what the Church has decided, and so long as she continues to do so renders Christian unity impossible.' In support of this proposition he adduces the 28th canon of the Council of Chalcedon, and concludes that the Church in the fifth century knew