to the decision of a body in which England and France were supreme, and intimated that their consent to any such arrangement must be conditional on such an introduction of new elements into the Egyptian administration as would convert the Anglo-French Protectorate into an International one. Under these circumstances, the idea of any Commission of Liquidation had to be abandoned, at any rate for the time. It is worth adding that these negotiations, in which Egypt was the chief party interested, were conducted exclusively by the Anglo-French Controllers in Europe, acting under instructions from their own Governments, and almost without communication with the Government of Cairo. I do not dispute the expediency of the mode in which these negotiations were carried through, but if the exercise of such powers does not constitute a Protectorate, I fail to understand the meaning of words.

Simultaneously with the decree regulating the legal status of the Domain lands mortgaged to the Rothschild loan, the Egyptian Government issued a decree defining the position of the Controllers. If ever the correspondence which passed at this period between Cairo, Paris and London should be made public in its entirety, it will be found that the Khedive and his Ministers did their utmost to modify the stringency of the terms in which the authority accorded to the Controllers is defined, but were baffled by the steadfast resistance of the protecting Powers. The authority finally conceded resembles closely that exercised by the Resident in a protected Native State of British India. The controllers have a right to be present at the Councils of the Ministry, to demand information and offer advice on any matter affecting in any way the financial condition of the country; they are empowered to appoint resident inspectors, who are to report to them, not to the Ministers, and to hold office during their own pleasure; and they are authorised to refer any disregard of their advice to the diplomatic representatives of their two countries. The Controllers themselves are immovable, except with the consent of France and England; though Egypt has still been allowed the privilege of paying their salaries. I do not complain of these powers as excessive. I think the existence of some such European control as that exercised by M. de Blignières and Major Baring is essential to the welfare of Egypt, situated as she is. But, when I am told that the Court and the Pashas, who compose the national party, prefer the system of Anglo-French Controllers to that of Anglo-French Ministers, as constituting a smaller interference with their independence, I can only say that the Egyptians in this case are far less shrewd than my acquaintance with them has led me to believe. If it is so, Rehoboam was right after all in his theory of Oriental government.

The events which have occurred since the Controllers began to exercise their functions in earnest are of too recent a date, and of

too incomplete a character, to require recapitulation for my present purpose. The sudden access of prosperity in Egypt which has coincided with their advent to power is, I think, due to three causesthe unexampled richness of the crops; the extent to which, under the new Khedive, the country has been ruled with reasonable justice and humanity; and the fact that for the first time the authority of the European element has been distinctly and explicitly recognised as a principal factor in the administration of Egypt. So far, every single important act of the Government has been made with the advice and under the direct supervision of the Controllers; and as long as this remains the case, there is full security for the administration of the State being conducted with tolerable efficiency and honesty. The settlement by which the Controllers propose to liquidate the financial difficulties of Egypt is now before the world. It is a fair and reasonable scheme, and has been accepted as such by public opinion. How it is to be carried out in practice remains to be seen. The Powers represented on the International tribunals will shortly be called upon to approve a decree recognising the above scheme as binding on the courts; and this demand will be actively supported by England and France. If the Powers accept, well and good; but if they decline from the same causes as induced them to reject the Commission of Liquidation, there is only one way left of escaping from the deadlock to which the financial affairs of Egypt will have been brought. The International courts were only established for five years as an experiment, though it was understood that if they proved a success they would be made permanent. Now, if England and France were to withdraw from the tribunals, the result would be that the old consular courts. would resume their jurisdiction; and under this jurisdiction, oppressive as it was in many respects, no action could lie against the State, and no judgment enforced on State property. If, therefore, the International tribunals should be brought to an end, the creditors of Egypt would have no legal means of enforcing payment, and England and France have it in their power to bring these courts to an end in a year's time, at the very longest. The subject of the International courts is far too wide a one to be entered upon cursorily. It is enough to say that almost anything would be less disastrous for Egypt than the re-establishment of the old Capitulations; and if the financial difficulties bequeathed by the late Khedive to his country can only be settled on a satisfactory basis by allowing the consular courts of the minor Powers to resume their old jurisdiction, the remedy would be far worse than the evil it was intended to cure.

My object in this article has been to call attention to the direct and comprehensive character of the Protectorate we have assumed over Egypt in conjunction with France. In common with every one who has at heart the welfare of the Nile land, I am reluctant to

say anything which may increase the difficulties inseparable from the task the two Governments have undertaken. But it is obvious that the efficiency of the Protectorate depends absolutely upon the two protecting Powers working cordially together. The result of this dual arrangement has been undoubtedly to give a great increase to French authority and influence in Egypt. From the purchase of the Suez Canal shares up to the date when Ismail Pasha was allowed to dismiss the Anglo-French Ministry with impunity, English influence was paramount in Egypt. Since that period France has got precedence over us in every respect. I regret this result, not so much as an Englishman, as because, from causes into which I need not enter, English influence is on the whole more beneficial than French to the development of Egypt. But I have little fear as to the ultimate result. The interests of England in Egypt, both political and commercial, are so immeasurably superior to those of France that in the long run England and not France must always claim the supremacy. The reason why I allude to this struggle for influence, in which France for the time has obtained the upper hand, is to show one of the permanent difficulties inseparable from any joint Protectorate. Major Baring and M. de Blignières have hitherto worked together with a harmony that does every credit to their good sense and honesty of purpose. The entente cordiale between the two Governments of London and Paris has been successfully maintained in Egypt, partly because our interests in other parts of the world have led us to act together, partly because England has in the end always given way to France whenever there was any difference of opinion with respect to Egyptian affairs. But this Anglo-French understanding cannot be expected to last for ever, and whenever it ceases to exist the authority of the joint control falls to the ground. Italy, Austria, Greece, Russia, and all the Powers who view with ill-will the supremacy we have established over Egypt, are on the look-out for any dissension between England and France which may enable them to overthrow this supremacy; and no native prince, whoever he may be, will be able to resist the temptation of seizing any opportunity to emancipate himself from the unwelcome control of the protecting Powers. Thus. though the experiment of an allied Protectorate has worked well so far, and is perhaps the best that could have been adopted under the circumstances, it is fraught with complications in the future, both in Egypt and elsewhere, which England might have avoided by a bolder and, as I deem, a wiser policy. As it is, we have assumed all the responsibilities of a Protectorate without the power which its direct assumption would have bestowed upon us.

EDWARD DICEY,

ON HISTORICAL PSYCHOLOGY.

THE investigation of the origin and primitive condition of the Mind, the innateness' or derivedness of its ideas or faculties, has occupied a considerable space in modern European philosophy from the publication of Locke's famous treatise to the present time. In England especially, during the last thirty years, under the influence of the Mills, Bain, Spencer, Lewes, and other writers of the dominant school, it has been thought that the study of the conditions, physical and psychical, under which different species of mental phenomena are empirically found to manifest themselves, must necessarily lead to conclusions of fundamental importance in metaphysics and ethics: indeed it is often taken for granted in current controversy that the view which any one takes of the association of ideas' or the 'evolution of faculties' will determine the answer which he gives to the deepest questions as to Being, Knowledge, and Duty. The aim of the present paper is to show that this common presumption is really unfounded. The inquiry into the conditions under which any class of mental phenomena are produced has doubtless very considerable interest, both speculative and practical: the history of minds should be studied as much as, or more than, any other history, and the art of education and the important branch of Ethics which relates to self-culture must be to a great extent based upon it; but it belongs rather to Psychology regarded as a special department of empirical science, than to the supreme, architectonic study which we call Philosophy. In saying this I do not mean to assert that there is no conceivable knowledge as to the origin of minds which would have profound philosophical importance. For instance, it must be admitted that if we could prove that minds were directly created at or before birth, or had existed during eternity a parte ante, and if we could ascertain what it was that had had this eternal existence or transcendental origin, our metaphysical and ethical inquiries would obtain an entirely new starting point. My contention is that no such result is likely to be produced by any conclusions that we can reasonably suppose to be scientifically attainable, as to the origin either of mind generally, or of any particular mental elements or attributes.

We may perhaps distinguish three philosophical questions, on the discussion of which theories of the origin of mental facts have been supposed to exercise a preponderant influence. There is, first, the fundamental question as to the nature and mutual relations of Mind and Matter, the two kinds of being which, in the view of common sense, together make up the whole universe of reality. Secondly, there is the logical or 'metalogical' question as to the validity of axioms, or universal propositions taken as ultimate premises in Mathematics and Rational Physics; and to some extent, at least, in any science that has reached the deductive stage. And thirdly, there is the similar question as to the validity of the universal rules or principles of duty, which are in the same way taken as premises in all ordinary moral reasoning. All three questions have been very closely connected in philosophical exposition and controversy. It is obvious that the second and third will naturally be examined and answered by the same method: and the different ways in which they have been answered have commonly had a close connection with the views, ' materialistic' or 'idealistic,' which different philosophers have taken of the ontological problem first mentioned. Indeed we may almost say that the second question, at the present time, is most generally interesting, on account of this connection. In an earlier stage of physical science, indeed, the issue between the à priori and 'empirical' views of the evidence of axioms was, or seemed to be, practically important for the determination of scientific method. Men were really not agreed as to how they should go about to acquire knowledge of physical laws. But this importance is now evanescent, at least as regards the established and dignified sciences that have professors and manuals. For example, the interest taken in discussing the grounds of our belief in the laws of motion, depends on the light which the discussion is expected to throw on the constitution of the mind that somehow has come to know these general facts of the material world: we all know that physicists will continue their researches and reasonings in precisely the same way, whether the Conservation of Energy be established on an à priori basis, or treated as merely a generalisation from experience. Indeed, whatever may be the special arena selected for single combat between Idealism and Sensationalism or Empiricism, the important issue at stake is commonly thought to be the degree of dependence of mind on matter whatever a philosopher may mean by Idealism, commonsense means by it the systematic establishment of the popular conviction that a man is something more than his body.

Let us ask, then-What is the bearing of the inquiry into the origin of mind (as a whole or in part) on the question of the connection between Mind and Matter?

We must first observe that this connection is primâ facie of two quite distinct kinds: (1) Physiology leads us to conclude that