to show in what manner the apparently militating truths, relative to this subject, ought to be received and held.

First then, we are to endeavour to ascertain and state distinctly, the doctrine contained in the answer before us.

The word decree, or decrees, in the sense in which it is used in this answer, is not found in the New Testament. In the Old Testament, the word occurs in several instances, and in a manner which might be supposed to be the same as that in which it is used in the Catechism. Yet in other instances, it will be found that the same original word is rendered statute. The word decree, or decrees, therefore, is altogether a technical term, adopted by theologians to convey a complex idea; that is, to convey a number of ideas by a single term. The framers of the Catechism seem to have been fully sensible of this, for the express design of the answer before us is to explain the import of this term, or rather of the phrase-the decrees of God; and they go on to do it in language which is taken from the Scriptures. They define the decrees to be "God's eternal purpose," formed "according to the counsel of his own will, whereby, for his own glory, he hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass." This language is all purely scriptural. Whoever will carefully read over the first chapter of the epistle to the Ephesians, will there find mentioned, the choice and purpose of God before the foundation of the world that is, from eternity; and that it is expressly declared that believers are predestinated to their inheritance, according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will. And the same apostle, in 1 Cor. ii. 7, says― "We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the hidden wisdom, which God ordained before the world, to our glory." In like manner, in the 11th chapter of the epistle to the Romans, after exclaiming "O the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!"-he con

cludes the whole with declaring-" For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things; to whom be glory for ever. Amen."

I have made these references to show you distinctly, that the explanation given in our Catechism of the decrees of God, is wholly scriptural, with scarcely a departure from the very words of inspiration. The phrase "according to the counsel of his own will," taken from Ephes. i. 11, has, I find, been thought by the systematic writers, to need explanation. Ridgely says "We are not hereby to understand that the decrees of God are the result of deliberation, or hist debating matters within himself, as reasoning in his own mind about the expediency or inexpediency of things, or calling in the advice of others, as creatures are said to do, when acting in council; for he must not be supposed to determine things in such a way, since that would argue an imperfection in the divine mind. It implies that his decrees are infinitely wise; as what is done with counsel, is said, according to human modes of speaking, to be done advisedly; in opposition to its being done rashly, or with precipitation." This is doubtless both just and pertinent.. But it seems to me, that the remarks are nearly as applicable to almost all the other terms and phrases which are used in this answer, and which are commonly used when speaking on this subject. The words decrees, providence, purpose, ordaining, predestinating, determining, appointing, and the like, are all descriptive of mental acts; which acts, when they relate to man, must not only be subsequent to his existence, but to many other mental acts from which they result. But the whole of this is utterly inapplicable to the Deity. His decrees, providence, purpose, ordination and predestination, are as much eternal as his existence.

Perhaps the whole difficulty and darkness in which this subject is involved, arises from our having neither. words nor ideas, which are more than very imperfectly applicable to it. We are obliged to use terms which are strictly applicable only to ourselves, and

far from being so with regard to our Maker. Succession, both as to time and thought, is inseparable from all that is done by a human individual. But succession of any kind, is not predicable of the Deity. When we speak of decrees, in the plural number, we do not mean that he decreed one thing at one time, and another after a considerable interval-or after

any interval whatever. We use the plural form in this expression, because the innumerable events that take place in time, are all ordered and fixed by the divine purpose and appointment, as much as if each one had been separately the subject of a decree. But the purpose, or decree of God, is really one, simple, undivided act of his will. In a word, the following lines of Dr. Watts, appear to me not only poetically beautiful, but logically correct

Having thus explained the terms that we use in regard to this subject, and seen that in their application to it, the use is not strict, but accommodated and analogical, I would state the doctrine before us thus-All events, of whatever kind, that take place in time, were determined, or fore ordained by God from all eternity, thus to take place; and all for the ultimate promotion of his own glory. It ought however to be carefully noted here, that all who soundly hold this doctrine, maintain that there is a difference, always to be kept up between what have been denominated the efficacious decrees, and the permissive de

crees of God. His efficacious decrees relate to whatever is morally good; his permissive decrees, to whatever is morally evil. In other words, his immediate agency, according to his decree, is concerned in whatever is morally good-his immediate agency is never concerned in what is morally evil. Evil he permits to take place, and efficaciously overrules it for good-for the promotion of his glory.

It must also be here distinctly noted, although it is clearly implied in the general statement, and will afterwards be more particularly considered, that the decrees of God relate as much to the means or secondary causes, by which events are brought about, as to the events themselves. Means and ends are equally, and undividedly, the subject of the decree. And the nature and character of the means, whether moral or natural, are not changed, but fixed and preserved by the divine purpose.

Thus have I endeavoured to ascertain and state distinctly, the doctrine contained in the answer of the Catechism before us. I am now to endeavour

II. To prove it, from reason and from Scripture. Here I shall not detain you long. For whatever difficulty some may find in receiving this doctrine, the process of reasoning by which it is established, is, as I apprehend, both short and conclusive; and the scriptural proof is extremely plain and direct. The reasoning process is this-We must believe that the Deity foreknew all things, or we cannot believe in the perfection of his nature. To say that he was, or could be, ignorant of a single future event, is to deny his omniscience-one of his essential perfections; and it is also directly to impeach his wisdom, by supposing that he acted without a perfect plan. But nothing can be foreknown while it remains uncertain. What is not certain, may be the subject of conjecture, but not of absolute knowledge. Future events, then, to be foreknown, must be perfectly certain. Now, before the events took place-innumerable ages before they took place-nothing could make their occurrence perfectly certain, but the determination

of God-of God unchangeably ordaining that a system should go into operation, which would infallibly produce these events at a certain time, and with all their attendant circumstances. Thus, we think, that the decree and the foreknowledge of God are inseparably connected together; and that, according to human conceptions, the decree, in point of order, must precede foreknowledge.

The reverse of all this, is the doctrine of the Arminians. They say that the foreknowledge of God is the ground of his decree: and some that he foreknew all things without properly decreeing any thing. But it seems to us that the whole of this sys-. tem exhibits nothing more than an abortive attempt to avoid a startling difficulty.' * We think so, because what its advocates say, appears to us, when fairly viewed, not to afford any relief whatever, in regard to the difficulty from which they seek to escape. We do by no means deny that the future and contingent actions of free moral agents, may be foreknown by the Deity. We think that Reid, in his essays on the intellectual powers of man-in the chapter on memory-has very satisfactorily illustrated this point. But it really affords no sort of solution of the difficulty in question. For it must still be admitted, that with a full and perfect view of what free moral agents would do and be, and all the consequences that would follow, the Deity gave being to those agents-he put into operation the system that was certainly to result in all their actions with all their consequences: and what is this, but virtually to admit, that he determined that these actions, and events, and consequences, should take place? For if he had not determined that they should take place,

*It is believed that the Socinians, on this subjeet, generally agree with the Arminians. There have been some Socinians, however, (and perhaps there may be some still,) who have even denied the omniscience and foreknowledge of God altogether. But of these it has been well observed by Dr. Witherspoon, that "they are so directly opposite to the letter of Scripture, that they deserve no regard."