It has been said that Christina was exceedingly imaginative and fantastic, and this is so. The vastness of her culture, the brightness of her mind and the uninteresting surroundings in which she lived, all contributed to make her so. The great difference between her ideals and her real life would naturally carry her away and advance her further into the realm of dreams.

We shall not delay longer on the other psychological characteristics of Christina, as they represent the corollaries of those already mentioned. Hence, it is easily understood how an egotistic character--one with so weak a will could not do otherwise than reveal itself to society as immoral.

At this point one is met by the question: Is Christina's character, as it has just been delineated, to be placed among the normal or abnormal? It has always been said that she had an unbalanced, peculiar, eccentric, whimsical temperament, and Stearn, in the elaborate study before mentioned, places her in the intermediate zone between the sane and the insane. To us, however it seems as if such a definition were too vague and indeterminate and that it is merely the paraphrase of an old, common opinion. If pathological psychology is to give us a term by means of which we can throw light on a given historical figure, it is necessary for it to descend to limited and precise minutiæ, the more so as we can now lay aside that generality which passed current only in the days of which we are writing, which placed a figure among the number of the divine or of the human, of the celestial or of the terrestrial. At present we wish, first of all, to diagnose the disease, then with regard to historic individuality, to note what part that disease played in the production of the events which occurred in the life of the personage in question. Now, in the case of Christina, is a definition of her mental disease possible? Is it possible to make a diagnose of her affection? We believe and frankly say that the psychological characteristics met with in her, authorize us to state that Christina in our judgment was the victim of hysteria. Nervous

pathology, indeed, admits a peculiar disease, characterized by a complexity of the most varied phenomena, of which there are a few which are capable of leading us to a safe diagnosis. These are: egoism, vanity, contradictoriness, moral insensibility, a tendency to be fantastic and to wander, frivolity and a lively intelligence, all of which may for the most part be regarded as consequences of a weak will.

And with this the psychopathology of to-day would have made answer. Now it seems to us that there is room here for investigation, as to how far modern science can be benefited by such an answer. In the past it appeared quite an advancement to be able to judge by means of a formula or to incorporate in a scheme a given historical figure, which till then had been regarded as extraordinary; and it cannot be denied that thus on being successful in classifying among diseases of the human brain some of those which had been reputed "divine actions," we have shown a progress in knowledge. But now a new exigency presents itself; we may content ourselves with a simple definition of the mental state of a historical personage, but we wish to know in what relation the development of a given form of mental disease stands to the surroundings in which the person lived, as, on the other hand, it is necessary to know the part played by the disease in the accomplishment of the person's acts. It is only after having answered such questions that we can be said to have interpreted a historical individual by the light of psychopathology. If we had stopped at the simple definition of Christina's mental state, characterizing her as hysterical, what would we have done? We would have expressed comprehensively, in a single word, the whole of her psychological character, but science and history would have gained nothing. Hysteria, in fact, expresses a group of the most diverse phenomena, which may be determined by numerous causes, and until we have succeeded in ascertaining these we signify by the word hysteria only a number of symp

toms deprived of any real value. In the case of Christina, for example, that assemblage of symptoms (egoism, vanity, frivolity, weakness of will), which we have called hysteria, may well have been due to other causes, and also have been produced very differently from those of any other form of hysteria; and the task of historical psychopathology is to exactly place en evidence the cause and evolution of a given pathological form in relation to historic surroundings. It must be borne in mind that morbid conditions of the mind are not like common diseases, each of which has a cause, progress, anatomical basis, course and fixed termination. In every case, on the other hand, it may be said that there is something peculiar and special, for each person has a different mental constitution and lives in different historic and social conditions. And if we consider the events of Christina's life we are at once convinced that, had she been educated differently, and had she been able to apply her genius and excess of mental energy to great and glorious enterprises she would not have appeared to us as hysterical. Hysteria, indeed, in her was not something decreed by fate which she had inherited from her ancestors, nor had it followed one or more definite causes, but it represented the epilogue of a great battle of elements and the final result of the great opposition which her intellect encountered in the surroundings in which she lived.

Hysteria, therefore, represents the termination, the consequence, the causes of which may be most diverse, and until we have determined these we cannot be said to have interpreted psychologically a certain historical period, but only to have expressed in a word, what was formerly done in more than one. What fundamental difference exists between saying Christina was hysterical and affirming that she was of a giddy, egotistical, capricious, fickle, weak character? None it seems to us; but if, on the contrary we can show in what way her mind, in given conditions, developed gradually; if we try to show clearly how her mind, partly by hereditary influence

had been constrained to model itself into a certain shape, and if finally, we follow the action which the spirit of her century exercised over her will, then shall we have reconstructed, scientifically, a historical figure. In such a case the diagnosis of hysteria becomes an accessory fact to a long series of matters which are very important and worthy of recognition. Hysteria is not, therefore, the fundamental cause which determined the course of events of Christina's life, and gave to it its peculiar psychological physiognomy, but is only the external expression or the effect of profound internal factors. It is clear, however, that we cannot deny that many of Christina's acts must be attributed to the hysterical turn of temperament which developed in her; but these are only secondary, accessory or subsequent.

We have already observed that one of the tasks of psychological history is to inquire up to what point the disease had taken part in the production of acts, famous or otherwise, which had been done by the person under examination; and now we must insist, because it seems to us a real danger, that of desiring to make a collection of the varied activities of the mind, and calling them morbid because there is one abnormal one met with.

We conclude that morbid mental conditions must be considered as complicated phenomena which presuppose variable genetic factors and by determining these in each case the importance of psychiatry in history is much diminished. Indeed it appears to us a delusion to believe that one of the foundations of history may be the pathology of mind. We do not deny that in some rare instances it may be an important aid, but for the most part it only substitutes one word for others, enclosing itself in a faulty circle of its own. The positive method ought not to stop at calling by a name stolen from pathology (often considered only as simple analogy), a collection of historic phenomena, but must proceed to trace the genesis and mode of development of these phenomena, which morbid or not, must have their causes and nature investigated

Medico-Legal and Psychological Aspect of the Trial of Josephine Mallison Smith.

held for MURDER, IN PHILADELPHIA, PENN., NOVEMBER 29th, 30th, 31st and DECEMBER 1st, 1892.

By EDWARD C. MANN, M. D., New York,

Med. Supt., Sunnyside Sanitarium for Diseases of the Nervous System.

ΟΝ

N Dec. 19th, 1891, Josephine Mallison Smith shot and killed John Hobbs, at Powelton Ave. Station in Philadelphia. Her trial came on Nov. 29th, 1892, before Judge Biddle, in Court of Quarter Sessions in the City of Philadelphia. The defense The defense was insanity, the writer having been engaged for many months previous to the trial in eliciting the whole life history of the prisoner, in order to arrive at an opinion respecting the true psychological aspect of the case. The ground taken by the Commonwealth was that the prisoner was a depraved girl, who had threatened to kill the deceased, and who out of jealousy and revenge did kill him, and that it was simply a case of murder in the first degree. That the case was one of wickedness. The ground taken by the defense was that since the age of fourteen the prisoner had been a sick girl; that she had been suffering from disease of the mind and that an examination into the whole life history of the prisoner showed very conclusively that there had been since the age of fourteen, a subjective morbid condition of the nervous system, which had constantly and continuously misled her mind and conduct, and that the act was the product and outcome of disease. That the morbid sexual perversions were related to her mental disease instead of being acts of wickedness or immorality as alleged by the learned