the first of these sections, Mr. Taylor introduces the following remark:-" A celebrated author (referring to Godwin) has pronounced in a tone of great authority, that government is in all cases an evil. This is founded in the error of contemplating monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, as an analysis comprising every form of government. But had Godwin considered, that government could not be an evil, if it was founded in principles which would excite the good moral qualities of human nature, he would have searched for some such principle, capable of excluding monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy; all of which produce evil, because of their tendency to excite men's evil qualities.

Here we perceive a disagreement between these "political doctors, upon a speculative question of political inquiry; whether a government of any form can be instituted, capable of excluding monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy? Godwin maintains-as do, we believe, all other political writers-the negative side of this question; leaving the author of the Inquiry in the enjoyment of a solitary opinion, on the contrary.

To the following quotations from Mr. Taylor's book, we now beg leave to refer our readers, for proof, that he deems the constitutional powers of the president of the United States to be incompatible with the liberties of the people. And yet, in his introductory address to the public, he speaks of " the true value and real superiority of our policy," and "the beautiful entablature of its pillars." Let the reader reconcile these extracts with such commendations, if he can:

"An army and patronage enables a president to provide a faction. An army is the strongest of all factions, and completely the instrument of a leader skilful enough to enlist its sympathies."

"The army is the creature of law. So were the armies of Cæsar, Cromwell, and Bonaparte; and so, at this moment, are the armies of all existing governments, of which force is an element. The banner of usurpation and tyranny is usually hoisted by a legal army; a legal army is the instrument for giving permanency to the evil political principles, fraud, and force; and at no time, has a standing mercenary army been the steady auxiliary of national self-government, or obedient to election. It obeys its leader." p.

177.

"The president is a secret negociator with foreign nations; his monopoly of military patronage impels him to war, because war extends patronage, and patronage is power."- "By removing from the public negociator the excitement of military patronage towards war, integrity of negociation would be obtained, and fraudulent pretexts for war avoided." p. 179.

"Military power awakens and excites man's evil qualities, more than any other species of power, because it is less resistable; hence its malignity to good moral principles and the element of self-government." p. 179.

"A degree of military power is conferred upon a president, which, when augmented and ripened by pretext, conjuncture, or audacity, has sufficed, in every instance, to destroy national selfgovernment. To this instrument of destruction is subjoined a mass of civil power.""The executive power possesses the prerogative of conferring lucrative offices upon members of congress; the senators not excepted, though relied on as a check upon executive power. In England, this prerogative has utterly disqualified the house of commons, as the organ or guardian of the principle of self-government, for the democratical order. It will operate in America, as it has done in England. Is a legislature, courting the patronage of a man who commands an army, a pledge or residence for the principle of self government? Is this secured, by enabling a man who commands an army, to corrupt the legislature by perpetual and brilliant hopes?" p. 185.

"As civil and military patronage, the command of fleets and armies, the direction of a treasury, treaty making, and a negative upon laws, condensed in one man, constitute a power evidently monarchical, it is important betimes to consider, how the elective principle and the monarchical power are like to work upon the same person; the nature of one being to draw him within the pale of responsibility, and of the other, to excite him to overleap it." P. 186-7.

Our author contends, that "the elective quality of the presidency aggravates the error." p. 186. And "names," says he, "constitute nothing Monarchical powers constitute monarchy; and though monarchy is elective, it is still monarchy."

p. 187.

Referring to the formation of the executive department of the present federal government, our author makes also these bold remarks:

"A president of the United States was invested with far greater powers than sufficed to Cæsar for enslaving his country. Patronage, negociation, a negative upon laws, and a paper system, render some of those talents which Cæsar possessed, unnecessary to enable a president to perform what Cæsar effected.”— p. 175.

And, in another place, he asserts, that "the measures arising from the spirit early infused into executive power by its American form, were, armies, war, penal laws, and an increase of executive power by law, loans, banks, patronage, and profusion."p. 174.

Mr. Taylor seems to place scarcely any confidence in either moral or political integrity; so very little, indeed, that although he treats of both the good and evil moral principles of the United States, he believes men are so necessarily corrupted, by the possession of power, that we cannot conceive how he could ever imagine it to be possible to institute any description of government whatever, which would not make the rulers despots, and the people slaves. "Power," says he, "changes moral character; private life regenerates it:"-and again; " great power, or a long possession of power, changes a man's moral character, whether it is derived from inheritance or election." A division of power, and a rotation in office, are two of the devices to which men of Mr. Taylor's political tenets have generally resorted, for preventing an abuse of power. Yet, says this gentleman-who appears to derive great pleasure from dealing in paradoxes and inconsistencies"all despots, monarchical and aristocratical, uniformly and strictly practise the principles of division and rotation, as the best means to defend their monarchy and aristocracy." He elsewhere speaks of the "inefficacy of election to prevent the abuse of executive power." Here, then, (if we may ever speak positively of what Mr. Taylor says) are three of the fundamental principles relied on by writers in favour of republican government, for defending the people against an abuse of power by their rulers, which are declared

to be ineffectual for that purpose, by this zealous advocate for republics.

We now submit to the judgement of our readers two extracts from the book before us, in order that he may compare them with other passages from the same work:

"The insufficiency of election to prevent great power from awakening evil qualities, has induced the people in their state governments to superadd many auxiliaries, drawn from the principle of division. Rotation, plural executives, frequency of election, and a limited patronage, are among them."- "Before an experience of twelve years had passed over, in the case of the executive power of the union, under a relaxation of our principle of division, a majority of the United States have agreed in perceiving in it an inclination towards principles inimical to our policy." p. 172.

Decidedly opposed as our author is, to every thing like aristocracy, he denies the existence of any aristocracy produced by natural causes: hence, in various places throughout his book, he employs much of his ingenuity in combating the opinions of Mr. Adams, on the same subject. It is not incumbent on us to decide between them; nor is it by any means necessary to engage in such an undertaking. But we believe it will be deemed an extraordinary stretch of incredulity in Mr. Taylor, with respect to the existence of an aristocracy founded in nature, that he should consider as an error, what the experience of all ages and nations demonstrates to be true-that some men are endowed with faculties far exceeding the general standard." Armies, taxes, patronage, and paper," are placed by our author among the artificial aristocracies; and these "modern devices of tyranny," as he is pleased to denominate them, are objects of his highest terror and abhor

rence.

"War," according to this writer, "is the keenest carving knife for cutting up nations into delicious morsels for parties and their leaders. It swells a few people to a monstrous moral size, and shrivels a multitude to an equally unnatural diminutiveness. It puts arms into the hands of ambition, avarice, pride, and selflove; and aggravates these passions, by erecting the holders into a separate interest, which has in no shape been made just or honest

by the restraints of moral principles or didactic prohibitions. It breeds a race of men nominally heroes, mistaken for patriots, and really tyrants. It enables knaves and traitors to delude the multitude into a belief, that real patriots are knaves and traitors; and thus force good men to become the instruments of bad, to avoid the persecutions of this delusion." p. 589.

"Heavy taxes in peace," says the same writer, "are unexceptionably political slavery. Liberty and slavery are contrary principles; and, therefore, liberty does not produce heavy taxes." p. 285. He makes every species of war dangerous to libertyand one fed by paper systems, fatal to it.

"Patronage," which Mr. Taylor next names, in his list of the "modern devices of tyranny," has been sufficiently anathematized by him, in the extracts already given from his " Inquiry," to preclude the necessity of noticing it further in this place.

We have now arrived at the last named of our author's "devices" above mentioned, contrived and employed, as he seems to suppose, for the destruction of public liberty. This formidable engine of tyrannical power, which he comprehends under the denomination of "paper," is meant to denote what is well understood by the terms "funding" and " banking" systems.

As the deleterious effects upon the freedom of a people, attributed by Mr. Taylor to these systems, constitute almost the alpha and omega of his "Inquiry" into the principles of our governmental policy, we shall, in this place, offer to the consideration of our readers, such cursory observations on the subject, as have presented themselves to our view.

It has already been said of this work, that its author in most of his animadversions on the funding and banking systems, has mingled and confounded institutions which, however allied, have no necessary connexion with each other, and which should be investigated separately, in order to ascertain the nature and properties of each. This remark the reader will find to be just, notwithstanding Mr. Taylor has affected to devote two separate chapters to "funding" and "banking," respectively.

Without distinguishing between the various kinds of banks which answer the purposes of maintaining national and commercial credit, in different countries, this writer attempts to attach to