of the Exchequer, for changes generally cost money. Surely it must be for these reasons, and not because ideas are wanting, that in spite of the extraordinary progress in mechanical invention, in spite of the facilities afforded by numerous and excellent carriage roads, in spite, too, of vast improvements in the weapons themselves, the use of field artillery in battles has hardly progressed at all during this century, and the most distinguished English writer on the art of war-General Hamley, himself an artilleryman-asserts in the last edition of his book that, great as have been the advances in the actual power of field artillery, its relative power as compared with infantry has on the whole diminished. I should not hesitate to break a lance with him on this question, but that for present purposes it is more convenient to accept his decision, and to admit that weapons which have had their range, their mobility, their intelligence (if the expression may be allowed for the moment), and their destructive power enormously increased, still lack something to enable them to retain their old place in the hierarchy of arms, though the weapons which are supposed to have risen a step have only advanced in range and rapidity of firing. Range in both cases is supposed to include accuracy. It is the object of this article to discover the difficulties under which field artillery now labours, and to point out the remedies which seem to be urgently necessary. Let us see what are the chief characteristics of infantry and artillery, for it is between these two arms that the preponderance of shooting power must lie. Without question, infantry is the arm of most vital importance, and those rash advocates who endeavour to prove the contrary do but spoil their own cause. An army composed wholly of infantry would indeed succumb easily to one which had a proper proportion of the three arms; but it is possible to conceive of such an army marching through an enemy's country, occupying open towns, and even seizing such a capital as London. It is impossible to conceive of an army solely composed of artillery performing the like feat. Infantry alone can act both offensively and defensively whether in rest or in motion. It is comparatively cheap and quickly trained. Whatever effect may be produced by artillery, the final task of putting the enemy to flight and seizing his position must be performed by infantry; and the Turks have lately shown how stubborn a defence may be made and how terrible a fire maintained by infantry in a defensive position behind works, and supplied with an unlimited amount of ammunition. But the campaign in Bulgaria proved once more what, strangely enough, seems always to require new proofs-that defensive strategy only means delay. To win a campaign, armies must act vigorously on the offensive, and once out of his works in the open the infantry soldier is but a soft human being, through whose body bullets may pass and kill other men behind. He cannot possibly carry defensive armour in addition to his necessary arms and equipment. To save himself for the final rush, he is obliged to resort to creeping behind rocks and trees, taking advantage of every accident of the ground to conceal himself, and generally so moving that it is as difficult for him to fire at the enemy as for the enemy to fire at him. If the number of rounds fired by infantry advancing to attack were counted, their paucity would astonish those who have seen nothing of modern war. Each man has a nervous system, and his rifle is at the absolute bidding of his nerves. Every tremor influences his aim, and it is a remarkable fact that the shooting of troops at close quarters is often less deadly than that which takes place at longer ranges. On this point I can speak from experience, having accompanied skirmishers, supports, and reserves in actual combat. Moreover, every man who falls is so much shooting power lost, not temporarily, but permanently. For this reason all modern infantry tactics have to be based on a perpetual feeding of the advanced line from the rear. No nation has yet understood that the same principle can be and should be applied to artillery. The peculiar powers and weaknesses of field artillery are quite different from those of infantry. The first special power which will occur to everybody is its long range, which not only allows guns to strike an enemy far distant in their front, but gives the much greater advantage of enabling a long line of guns-say a hundred, which would occupy, roughly speaking, a mile of country-to act together on any point where the enemy may be advancing in force or defending himself with exceptional tenacity. This concentration of fire has never yet been fully carried out in the field. It is, however, a direct result of long range, and ought to be provided for by distinct regulations on the subject and the establishment of a few well-known signals. We have seen what can be done by one battery at a time during the experiments at Okehampton, but few English officers have any conception of the effect produced by the fire of a hundred guns. The next speciality of artillery is the steadiness of its fire. Leaving out of consideration the duel of guns with guns, in which the steadiness will be equal, we have the calm, cruel machine, without capacity for fatigue, for nervousness, for hopes and fears, placed at first outside the effective range of infantry, and needing only to be aimed by the best men in the battery, officers and non-commissioned officers. Once aimed, all the bullets in the world will make no impression on it. Its fire will be absolutely cool, true, and effective, even if there remain but one man of its gunners to discharge it. Nor need the aim be as true as that of the rifleman; for the field gun, in addition to the great range at which it can strike, acts as a fowling-piece at the end of it by the bursting of its shrapnel. The deadly effect of modern artillery fire has never been fully shown, for the only army which has used guns boldly-that of the Prussians in 1870-71-had no shrapnel, and the velocity of the projectiles was little more than half what Sir William Armstrong has lately taught us may be safely given to shells of all sorts. As for the Russians, their guns were hardly more than howitzers, yet there were occasions when great effects were produced by them. We need take little notice of the comical outcry against field artillery lately raised, because, forsooth, the Turks, buried in galleries under the parapets of Plevna, were not killed by shells which could not possibly reach them! As well condemn a fifty-guinea breechloader because it cannot shoot rabbits in their holes. If artillery fire failed to achieve impossibilities, surely no other fire could have done better. The lesson we have to draw from Plevna-and it is one of which I propose to make full use— e-is that troops of any kind under cover are practically invincible so long as their enemy is in front of them. Further advantages of artillery are that the gunners come to their work cool and fresh, and the horses which convey them have time to rest while the guns are in action; that the men are not tempted to retire without orders, because in so doing they would disarm themselves; and that the nature of field artillery enables it to carry all it requires, whether ammunition or other valuable aids to its action. The Russians have proved that there is hardly any ground over which guns cannot be carried. After the double passage of the Balkans, by a mere sheep-track in summer and through the deep snow in winter, the fictitious notion that artillery hampers an army may be considered as exploded. There is, however, one great disadvantage under which artillery labours. A very scattered line of picked shots may lie in holes, in folds of the ground, or behind lumps of earth or rocks, and quietly shoot down the gunners one by one as they stand exposed working their pieces. The same effect may be produced by a line of infantry behind shelter trenches at long range, provided the supply of ammunition be almost unlimited. Against such fire little can be done by artillery as at present constituted. Gun-pits may be constructed if there is time enough; but artillery ought not to be confined to one spot, nor can the men build gun pits at every new position. Moreover, the protection of gun-pits is only relative. The long-range dropping fire of infantry will search them out. This is the one fatal weakness of field artillery as now organised, but it is capable of absolute extinction, as will presently be shown. To clear all the ground before us, it is necessary to get rid of one curious error which clings to many men in spite of frequent disproof. Because the relative superiority of artillery fire over that of infantry is greatest outside the effective range of infantry, and decreases as the range diminishes, the notion exists that the absolute effect of artillery fire is greater at moderately long than at short ranges. The truth is that the effect steadily increases as the range diminishes. To prove this, it is only necessary to quote one experiment made at Okehampton. Two rows of figures were placed at 1,000 yards from a battery of sixteen-pounders (six guns). The figures-' dummies' as they were called-represented a first or firing line of infantry 100 strong with its supports, about as numerous. The battery fired for four minutes and placed hors de combat 71 men in the first line, 24 in the second. Then the dummies were placed at 600 yards from the battery, their number being increased to about 150 in each line. Three men were taken away from each gun to represent losses; only two minutes were allowed to the battery, and in that time it placed hors de combat 98 men in the front line, 36 in the second. Again the range was shortened to 400 yards, and two more gunners taken from the crew of each gun. In two minutes 117 men of the first line would have been down, and 39 of the second line. Once more was the range shortened to 200 yards; another gunner was taken from each gun, and one minute allowed. Only one line of 156 infantry was given the battery to fire at. In their one minute 81 dummies were disabled, or more than half. Lastly the same line of 156 infantry faced the battery at 100 yards range, and in one minute lost 113 of its number. Thus the number of men killed increased rapidly as the distance diminished, and, taking the average percentage of first-line men disabled in one minute, we find that the proportion was 18 per cent. at 1,000 yards, about 33 per cent. at 600 yards, 40 per cent. at 400 yards, more than 50 per cent. at 200 yards, and about 75 per cent. at 100 yards. We are not concerned here with the question of what infantry would have done in the same time against the artillery, but merely with the fact that the actual destructive effect of artillery fire increased steadily from 18 per cent. per minute killed at 1,000 yards, to 75 per cent. at 100 yards, and this though the number of gunners was diminished to represent losses from the fire of the infantry. Out of this interesting experiment we get two facts worth remembering. First, that the destructive power of artillery at close quarters is practically annihilating; and secondly, that guns can be worked with rapidity and excellent effect even though six men be removed from each gun. The next point to which attention must be directed is the immunity of the guns themselves from destruction in modern battles. If we take as examples the battles round Metz which resulted in the investment of the maiden fortress, and compare the loss of men and horses with that of material, we have the following very curious results : BORNY. Officers and men 138 158 1 gun-carriage, 1 limber, 3 wheels Horses 988 1,563 2 gun-carriages, 5 limbers, 2 limber-boxes, The losses at Mars la Tour were, on an average, one fourth of the men who go to the front with the guns, and three-fourths of the horses. In each battle there is the clearest possible proof that the chief loss of field artillery is in horses, for the number of horses which go into action is 18 less per battery than that of officers and men, while the loss in horses was invariably greater. The next loss is in officers and men, while the damage to material is so small as to be hardly worth reckoning. Now, let us assemble our facts in order. First, the fire of field artillery is almost annihilating to infantry at close quarters if even a small number of men remain to work the guns; and this power is intensified at any point in proportion to the number of guns acting together. Secondly, under present arrangements artillery suffers much by the fire of infantry so distributed as hardly to attract the notice of the guns, which cannot waste ammunition on individual sharpshooters. Thirdly, the losses sustained by artillery in well-fought battles are chiefly in horses, next in officers and men, hardly at all in material. Fourthly, by its nature artillery can carry with it into action all the heavy stores it needs both for offence and defence. Fifthly, the only method of protecting field artillery against losses, yet devised, is the digging of gun-pits, which needs much time, fatigues the men, and tends to limit the free movements of the batteries. In rocky ground, gun-pits could not be made at all with the means at disposal of artillery. Sixthly, if the gunners are fairly protected from infantry fire, there is no reason why the practice of the guns should not be perfectly steady, and their effect nearly as good as that obtained on the practice ground during peace. Lastly, while the offensive power of infantry has immensely increased since the introduction of breechloading arms of precision, their defensive power has not increased at all. To protect themselves from the fire of artillery, they must still cover themselves with works, and so lose all power of movement. |