STATE OF POLITICS.

A. D. 1701.

THE power of France having been predominant for more than half a century since the famous battle of Rocroy, the terror of Europe was excited in a very extraordinary degree by the accession of a prince of the house of Bourbon to the crown of Spain, and it was not sufficiently adverted to that the tics of kindred are a very feeble bond of connection when set in competition with the opposing views and interests of monarchs and kingdoms. England and Holland seemed to consider Louis XIV. as the sovereign of both countries, and the Dutch nation, conceiving Flanders and Brabant as already subjected, beheld in imagination the armies of France once more preparing to invade and overwhelm them. The French monarch, aware of the strength of these apprehensions on this head, discovered an extreme solicitude to dissipate their fears; and it is evident from the tenor of his dispatches at this period to M. Briord, his minister at the Hague, that he was far from entertaining any designs inimical to the liberties of Europe in general, or to those of Holland in particular. He appeared satiated with the glory he had acquired in the course of a long and triumphant reign, and desirous only to spend the remnant of his days in peace.

"The resident of Sweden," says this monarch in his letter to M. Briord of December 11th, 1700," has gi

* M. Palmquist, resident at Paris.

ven me to understand that M. Lillieroot* has signified to him that the States General are aware of all the mis chievous consequences to be apprehended from a new war-that they shall never think of rushing into one till they are convinced I shall take advantage of the new union between my crown and that of Spain to introduce my troops into the Flemish towns; and that their fear of such an event is in truth strong enough to prompt them to the most desperate measures, I have already observed to you. Hence I think it for the good of my ser vice to re-assure the Hollanders on that head; you are therefore on all occasions to enforce the sincerity of my intentions to preserve the peace; in order to convince them that having desired to preserve it with the late king of Spain, it was not to be supposed for the future I would break it for the sake of making conquests in the dominions of the king my grandson-that they may depend upon it my forces shall never enter into them, unless he should be obliged to demand my assistance to repel the enterprizes of his neighbours.'

And in a subsequent dispatch, dated Dec. 15, this monarch declares his firm persuasion that the States would not rush on a measure so contrary to their inte rests in case they were convinced he had no other intention than to maintain the peace: and that the orders he had given, and was then giving, would dissipate their fears. "I would have you then", continues he, "take every opportunity to re-assure them on this head; and in particular to let the pensionary know that I have not the least design on any of the places belonging to Spain,

* The Swedish minister at the Hague.

You may assure him I do not seek for any pretence to introduce my troops into those places. I will even enter into any reasonable engagements which the States General can demand on that head, provided they will at the same time withdraw their troops which at present are of no use there."

His most christian majesty then notices the orders issued by the emperor for the march of an army of 30,000 men into Italy, and he instructs M. Briord to inform himself with exactness of the designs and engagements of the Hollanders, of which he expresses a strong secret jealousy. "I observe," says he, "by the account you give me, that the alacrity which appears at present in the negotiations carrying on with the princes of the empire differs widely from the dilatoriness of the pensionary when negotiating with the same princes to bring them into the partition treaty."

In a third letter, Dec. 24, he observes," it is certain that as to England the greatest part of the nation dread a war. Hence they are led to prefer the measure of the will to that of the partition treaty; consequently the king of Great Britain will find great opposition in his parliament in case he is disposed to carry things to a rupture, as well because he can neither shew the necessity of it, nor answer for the event, unless furnished with a sufficient cause for undertaking it. But it would be giving him a pretext specious enough to inflame the spirits of the English, and smoothing the way to all his designs, if we should oblige the Hollanders by force to abandon the Spanish towns. I am therefore convinced that force must be deferred as long as possible, and that nevertheless all other means must be used to dislodge the

Hollanders, and to leave the Spaniards in the sole possession of their own towns. M. Lillieroot's proposal affords a natural opening for a proposition to the States to that effect. As I have no intention to revive the war, and as, on the contrary, I have no aversion to the alliance proposed by that minister for the maintenance of the peace, I have already caused M. Palmquist to be informed that if the king of England and the States Ge neral are in a disposition to open a treaty for that end against all such as would trouble it, I shall enter into it with pleasure."

The Swedish proposal here referred to was communicated by the earl of Manchester to Mr. secretary Vernon, Dec. 29th; but it was received at the court of London with great coldness, or rather contempt: and Mr. Vernon, in his answer, declares, that the king does not know upon what grounds this project is proposed by M. Lillieroot, but supposes it arises from him or M. Palmquist without any directions from the king of Sweden, and he approves of the intimation given by the ambassador to M. de Torcy, that the removal of the Dutch troops in garrison would not be assented to.

Jealousies thus running high on both sides, matters were soon brought to a crisis. For though both England and Holland came at length to the resolution of opening conferences with the most christian king, so little credit was given by that monarch to the sincerity of these late and reluctant advances, that on the very day that the earl of Manchester presented his memorial to the French court, the Dutch garrisons, by a previous order of the king of France, were superseded in the command of all the barrier towns from Luxemburg to

Ostend and Nieuport, by the unexpected introduction of French troops, February 6, 1701, (N. S.) And in vindication of this bold and decisive measure, the Spanish resident at the Hague, don Bernard de Quiros, delivered on the following day a memorial to the States, in which he enlarged upon the sincere and ardent desire manifested by his most christian majesty to maintain the union established by the last treaty of peace; that his majesty was even disposed to enter into new ties of friendship. "It was asked," says the memorialist, ❝ in his name, of your lordships, what assurances you desired for the future, promising to give them to you provided they were just and reasonable-that if your lordships feared that he would introduce his troops in the Spanish places, he engaged himself never to let them enter into them: and that he would be contented that the care of them should be entrusted with the Spanish troops, who alone have a right to keep them for the king my master, who at the same time gave notice toyour lordships of his accession to the crown, by a letter which I delivered myself to M. de Lier, then president of the week. Far from answering to the advances made by his most christian majesty, your lordships did not cease to negotiate with foreign courts. In Holland nothing is talked of but preparations for war, of arming ships, and raising money to augment the troops. The officers of those your lordships have in the catholic Low Countries raise actually their recruits, as well in the towns as in the countries belonging to the king my master. In short, all things here seem disposed for war, at the same time that the emperor causes his troops to march as well for Italy as for the Rhine; which he